




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## FOREWORD

This volume makes available to the public the addresses and discussions of the third conference of the Chicago Association for Child Study and Parent Education. This organization promotes group discussions in small meetings throughout the year, but in addition has chosen this most effective way of arousing interest in the training of parents for the better guidance of their children. The actual material presented is of high order, but equal in value to the material is the extraordinary amount of interest that the conference developed in Chicago and the Middle West. The metropolitan press regarded the conference as news, and many thousands who could not attend had their attention called in an effective way to the importance of the enterprise.

The topic chosen for the conference was planned to emphasize the important truth that other factors than the physical and intellectual ones determine the development of children. It was impossible within the limits imposed to include all sides of the emotional life of children, but some of the more important researches were reported during the meetings, and intelligent parents will be continually stimulated to consider these important factors in the development of their children.

It would be trite to enlarge upon the importance of emotions in the life of children, or to insist on the necessity for clear and distinct ideas on this subject in the minds of those who deal with our young. The discussions in this book present a valuable symposium of the opinions of spe-

cialists concerning the basic emotions, including, among others, fear, anxiety, religious feeling, and the sexual emotions. The reader who looks here for a solution to all his problems will be disappointed, since the scholars who took part in the program, being competent scientists, have stressed the importance of research with the implied insistence that much of what we desire to know is still undiscovered. And yet there is presented here a body of authoritative statements which will be a distinct contribution to the knowledge of every layman and ought to result in an attitude of scientific humility. If we can use what we know about emotions and be alert to the new knowledge that is continually being acquired, we shall deserve the well-earned praise of our successors.

But important as emotion is, it cannot be too often insisted upon that emotion is neither a thing nor a force. Emotion never did anything nor caused any disturbance. Our idiom may allow us to say that fear, for example, produced a certain disorganization, but this is only a manner of speaking and is essentially inaccurate. Emotion is a manner of behaving, but it is more than a manner of behaving, it is also a manner of experiencing. Emotional states and emotional seizures result from complex antecedents which when fully known may be adequately controlled.

On the practical side what we need to know is how to control conditions so that children may act with confidence and assurance, avoid a feeling of inadequacy and failure, and understand the disturbances that are produced by the unwholesome repression of their sex impulses and other fundamental urges. These things are being studied in hundreds of centers throughout the civilized world, and when

their conditions are fully known we shall have the knowledge which will permit intelligent direction.

It has long been recognized that emotional conditions of adults are highly important for the life of the children. Repeatedly in this volume has this point been emphasized, and renewed insistence is given to the dictum that the training of children is to a large extent dependent upon the education of parents. Perhaps one ought always to add upon the education of teachers also.

An emotion, then, is not a separate force or set of forces, but rather one aspect of life which can be abstracted for purposes of study but which is integral in the behavior and experience of adult and child alike. As intangible as the emotional factor may seem, it is after all not difficult to deal with it intelligently, and this volume of papers is a contribution of real value on a subject of vital moment.

ELLSWORTH FARIS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

May 15, 1930







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# THE CHILD'S EMOTIONS

*Proceedings of the Mid-West Conference  
on Character Development,  
February, 1930*

72388



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CHICAGO · ILLINOIS

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COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

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## ADDRESS OF WELCOME

*Mrs. Eva L. Lawton, Chairman, Chicago Association for  
Child Study and Parent Education*

The Chicago Association for Child Study and Parent Education is as always happy to greet its members and friends. To those who have been loyal comrades during the five years of our existence, we especially extend our cordial greetings. To those who have become adherents of our organization more recently, we extend the hope that they will enjoy what we have to offer. To both groups, we express our sincere thanks for their co-operation with us and for their sympathy with our efforts.

This is the fifth year of our existence as an organization in Chicago. We will not take the time of more important speakers to rehearse for you what we have accomplished in these last five years of effort to put across an idea, namely, that parents can profit themselves and their children by education in matters bearing directly on their functions, their duties, and their responsibilities as parents. Moreover, I believe we have proved by the general success of our meetings and conferences that parents are more than eager to avail themselves of the opportunity of acquiring this education. In mentioning the success of the past years, we are not trying either to praise or to glorify ourselves, but simply to use ourselves as an index to the whole child study and parent education movement. We realize fully that we are but one factor—and a small one—in the whole picture of what is taking place in countless cities, in countless schools, countless churches, homes, clubs, and organizations

of whatever nature in which parents assemble, more or less definitely as parents.

Here, in our city, I might cite the Infant Welfare Society, the Illinois Society for Mental Hygiene, the Elizabeth McCormick Memorial Fund, the Institute for Juvenile Research, the Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, the United Charities, the Young Women's Christian Association and the Jewish Home Finding Society, the Community Center and adult education departments of the public school system, as well as the domestic science classes of the Lewis Institute and the Lucy Flower Technical High School, as examples of the organizations that have made parent education an integral part of their programs. Diverse as are the functions and methods of these groups, they all deal with children, either directly or indirectly, and for that reason realize that without educating the parents their work with the children is only half done. One of these groups is engaging in the education of foster-parents; another is dealing with the prospective mothers of families in pre-parental education. When all is said and done, the home is still the paramount influence in the life of the child and probably outweighs the sum-total of all other influences.

The work that is being done in our city in parent-education has many virtues and some more or less grievous faults. One of these is the lack of co-ordination among the various agencies engaged in it. Recently there has come on the part of the federal government a definite recognition of the possibilities of parent-education. In many communities, there has been a pooling of effort; in some states there is a state-wide program. In Illinois and unfortunately even in our own community, there is a lamentable disunity of

effort, of personnel, of plan and method. Co-ordination would undoubtedly make for much more effective work and better results.

For our own organization, I can freely state that we are both willing and anxious to submerge our own identity in the interests of any more comprehensive program for the education of parents that may be undertaken by any other organization or institution, if it carries with it the same ideals for which we have striven. We realize all too keenly our own limitations, which have been conditioned both by lack of funds and lack of scientifically trained leadership. I am quite willing to admit that aside from our own great desire to learn something ourselves and the ardent conviction that other parents are as eager as we for the same goal, we are wanting in much that leadership in this great movement should connote. We say this, not from any false sense of modesty, but from a sense of the responsibility we feel when we consider the large field that might be covered, the great good that might be accomplished, and our own inadequacy to cope with the problem from its many and diverse angles.

It is rather with a view to stimulating interest in the whole matter of parent-education than with any hope of dealing adequately with any one phase of child life that we have held these annual conferences of either one or three days' duration. It is this point that we have tried to stress repeatedly, if nothing else, that the parents are the responsible agents in connection with the child's best development. We cannot say it too often. Our conferences are not valuable so much for the actual factual material which they bring us as for their thought-provoking and stimulating effect. We have always tried to bring to this

platform only those authorities who have made a definitely recognized contribution to the field of child psychology or education. Many of the speakers you have heard here in the past have made statements quite in contradiction to those of other speakers. We repeat—we maintain an open forum and we leave to your judgment the evaluation and application of what you hear. We hold no brief for any school of psychology; we have no preconceived theories as to the relative values of any methods of training or techniques. We are not adherents of any one system of education. We are not trying to imbue you with any doctrine along any line whatsoever. What we are striving and hoping for is to cultivate in you as parents an attitude of open-mindedness, an attitude of alertness to your great possibilities and privileges as parents in developing a finer type of parent-child relationship. To cultivate this flower of finer attitude involves more than can be planted in the span of a few days' time. It involves a weeding out, with much thought and patience, of much that lies close within ourselves, a transplanting of many thoughts and ideas.

In the few days now before us, we present for your consideration a few of the experiments, a few of the theories, and a few of the problems that research is trying to solve in connection with the emotional life of the child. We feel that the modern parent has a desire and a right to be cognizant of them. We hope you will draw your own conclusions and make your own applications. We hope you will not be confused by divergent viewpoints. Above all, we urge you not to be led by overenthusiasm into foolish extremes but to keep your sense of balance and, I might add, your sense of humor. If you find in these lectures those things that have a bearing upon your own particular



problem and situation, we hope you will have the courage to make use of what you have acquired.

Our conference of this year has been the most difficult we have yet undertaken both from the point of view of material and of the manner in which it should be presented. We have dared to be more scientific and less general than ever before. First, because the matter of emotions is one in which there is still so much that is problematic, we have not been able to present the subject in a form that is conclusive. We have, therefore, deemed it advisable to present a few of the many research projects that are being undertaken and from which some basic theories may be evolved. In this way, we have tried to put before you both the theories of psychologists and the experiences of those engaged in actual research work with children. Second, because many of our members have profited by a considerable amount of study in the past years, we have felt that they prefer to be given the opportunity to acquaint themselves with specific facts rather than with generalities. In this we have received the helpful interest and co-operation of both our great local universities, of schools, both public and private, and of the Institute for Juvenile Research. To all of them we are truly grateful.

It is no easy task to plan a program for an audience whose qualifications for understanding and assimilating it are so diverse, and who have in common but one thing, namely, their interest in making themselves better guides to those in their care. However, if this common interest is sincere, we believe we have something to offer to each and every one.

We do not feel that our program is by any means a finished piece of work, perhaps not even a particularly well-

rounded one. Emotions are difficult of analysis, yet they must have causes and an environment in which they either flourish or die. It is naturally our ambition and our responsibility to cultivate those that are worthy and beautiful and to weed out those that are obnoxious. How to do this is the problem. Physical and mental factors are perhaps less difficult to analyze and work upon. Emotions are subtle, intangible, and immensely important. What parental attitudes, what attitudes on the part of teachers, companions, and social groups are responsible or contributory to both the desirable and the undesirable elements in the child's emotional make-up? What can we do to bring about a more stable emotional set-up, how can we help the child to be free to develop his own personal emotional life, while at the same time we teach him to have respect for the personality of others? How can we give the child a knowledge of, and sympathy for, past institutions, the capacity to evaluate them critically, and a passionate desire to improve upon them? These questions you will hear discussed either from the general platform or at the more informal round-table meetings.

Finally, let me again repeat that there will be nothing conclusive about what you may hear. We have tried to bring to you the best thought of today. At the same time we fully realize that what is the best thought of today is not the best thought of a slightly distant tomorrow. However, we do contend that as parents we have a right and duty to keep abreast of the best thought, to grow with our children, to be keenly alive to all matters that point in the direction of better concepts of child guidance, be they in the realm of theory or practice.

**BASES OF EMOTIONS**





## HEREDITARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF THE CHILD

*Abraham Myerson, Professor of Neurology, Tufts College  
Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts*

I hope that you will follow the advice of the chairman, whose remarks essentially were to the effect that you must receive what the speakers of the convention have to say with caution and with discrimination. She was on the verge of saying that you ought not to believe us. I hope, however, that you will extend to us the courtesy and consideration extended in the barrooms of the great West, when they said of the pianist, "Don't shoot him; he is doing his best."

Anybody who talks about children should state his qualifications. My qualifications are of two kinds: first, clinical, as director of medical departments which deal with abnormal minds and with abnormal children; second—perhaps the most important qualification—I am the father of three children, who have taught me more about the mind of the young human being than all the clinics I have ever attended. I have a little motto which I have urged upon my medical colleagues to accept, to wit: that nobody shall practice pediatrics until he is the father of two or three children at least.

If I were to cover the field which was assigned to me, "The Hereditary and Environmental Factors in the Emotional Life of the Child," there would be nothing left for the rest of the speakers to discuss, because everything is covered under that heading. Heredity and environment

leave nothing else to be talked about. I am going to confine myself to some general statements of importance, which will orient you, I hope, toward understanding what the other speakers will say.

In the first place, you must disabuse yourself of the notion that heredity and environment are two great cosmic and opposing forces, sparring for the mastery of the universe. The usual conception of the situation is heredity versus environment, as if some great ring-master were introducing to the public Kid Heredity and Battling Environment. As a matter of fact, these forces are in collaboration, and there is no real separation between the two. The only definition of heredity which holds is that it is the sum-total of the powers of two living organisms, the seed of the male and the egg of the female. Environment is everything else under the sun; yes, including the sun and the rest of the universe. It is a bit inconceivable that the little tiny sperm and the diminutive egg are somehow or other operating without being influenced by the rest of the universe.

At some point in the scheme of things, whatever we call Nature (and I call Nature "she," because fundamentally it is kinder to the male than to the female) became weary of the reproduction plan which had been followed before. In the earliest and simplest forms of life when reproduction is to take place, the creature which is to increase divides into two in a very direct way. As a subvariant the organism sends out a bud, and the bud grows until finally a new individual is made. These new individuals carry the characters of the race. There is, as you see, no sex, no thrill, no complications.

Then Nature decided to put thrill into the situation,

and she made sex. Sex, at least, has this importance: it adds personal satisfaction to the scheme of reproduction of the race, and it also contributes practically all the trouble in the universe.

She divided each race into two specialists: a specialist for the production of the seed, whom we call the male, and one for the production of eggs, the female. The fundamental characteristic of the male, no matter how wonderful he is in any other direction, is that he can produce seed, which when it reaches the egg fertilizes it. The fundamental thing about the female, no matter how beautiful, cultured, etc., she may be, is that she produces eggs which when fertilized start growing to produce a new individual. All the romance, all the love stories, all the divorce-court proceedings, and all the satisfactory and unsatisfactory complications of sex have only one real fundamental thing behind them—the necessity for the seed to reach and fertilize the egg. The rest, however important it may seem to the individual, is mere trimmings.

When the seed does reach the egg, a most marvelous process takes place. I shall not go into the details of this process. About one-half the hereditary characters, which the new individual is to have, come some way or other under laws not clearly understood from the male, and one-half come from the female. Then a little shuffling of characters takes place, which brings about unpredictable results, and you have a new individual which starts evolving within the first great environment—the womb of the mother. The womb of the mother thus represents environment in its beginnings. Heredity, as a definite force which we can really alter, ends.

We may summarize the relationship between heredi-

tary forces and the environmental forces in this brief manner.

Environmental forces may completely *destroy* the potentiality of the hereditary forces, as, for example, when an infectious disease destroys the fertilized egg while the child is *in utero*, or when something or other happens to the mother and there is a miscarriage. The environment may *foster* the full development of the child, as when the mother lives under good circumstances, is well cared for, has the proper kind of food, and when the child is born in an environment which is favorable to it. Thus, environment may be compared to a gardener, and the seed of the plant may be called heredity. The gardener may destroy the plant he takes care of; a mediocre gardener may allow it to reach a fair level; an excellent gardener, having due knowledge of the plant and seed, will give it such a situation as to permit its potentialities to develop fully. Environment does not create the potentialities of the fertilized egg, but it may injure those potentialities; it may interfere with them; or it may foster them.

Thus, the life-conditions of the mother, what happens to the child when it is born into a home, and the situation of things generally in the universe in which it lives, make or mar its hereditary qualities. You thus start with the conception that heredity and environment may co-operate, or environment may operate against the evolution of hereditary potentialities.

Is there a heredity of emotion? Is there a hereditary transmission of emotional states? As such, there is none. Of course, you do not transmit anger, fear, disgust, or any of the basic emotions from the parent to the child as such. There must be, however, a transmission of emotional po-

tentialities, of the possibility of development in certain directions. We have some proof of this, although no proof that is conclusive, because nobody can take apart heredity and environment and permit a child, so to speak, to grow up in a neutral environment under experimental conditions.

One of the mental diseases tends at least to prove that there are inborn hereditary potentialities in the direction of emotion. One of the great diseases of the mind is called manic-depressive psychosis. In this state there is an alternation of what may be called the depressive emotion, an emotional state in which there is a lower evaluation of the ego, a lowered zest for life, and which has sorrow and sadness as its main subjective state. This depressive emotion alternates with the opposite emotion, in which exhilaration and joy are expressed in pathological measure, and the whole individual takes a strenuous attitude toward life, desiring much, having a higher evaluation of the ego, and, in general, quite the opposite emotionally from the previous condition. It happens that this particular disease is the most hereditary of the mental diseases and, in my opinion, is almost the only one frequently transmitted from generation to generation and transmitted independently of the experiences of the individual. So far as this particular disease goes, it indicates that the potentiality for emotional states is hereditary. However hereditary emotion is, it is only so in the sense that each person has a prevailing emotional trend in his life, which may be disciplined, altered, or changed by the environmental forces.

What are the environmental forces which bear upon the emotional states? We might ask first, "What is emotion?" That would open to you a controversy which rages in the present-day psychological literature. One author will give



you a list of from forty to fifty emotions; another cuts them down to one-half dozen basic states; one man will say of another's classification, "He's talking about sentiment." The other will retort, "He's mixing emotion with instinct."

I am going to give you a general idea of what an emotion is, and you may, if you care to, make your own definition. Let us assume that instead of facing a very attractive audience, I am at the present time facing a lion or, better still, a tiger. I read a book recently which rather "debunks" the lion as a source of fear. Let us say that the tiger is in a jungle and that I am not within shelter and that the tiger sees me at about the same time that I see him. There results a play of emotion between us, though he would not feel what I do. [What I feel is, first, a change in the tension of my muscles, and if somebody could look at me, he would see that my pupils were dilated. If I attempt to talk, it will probably be very difficult to understand what I have to say, because my mouth is dried up, and there is a curious sensation up and down my body, which has been described as "goose-flesh." Probably my face is very pale. If I could estimate what took place in my organism, I would find that I am experiencing a huge physiological event, an event involving the entire chemistry of my organism; that I am afraid to my toe nails and the inmost recesses of my body. [In other words, there is a terrific bodily reaction with some central brain structure involved in the emotion which I am now experiencing.] We, who deal with neurological problems, have established that a part of the brain called the optic thalamus is very intimately related to emotion. This optic thalamus is a very fine structure that will some day be set up as a cen-

tral factor in human life, since it is here that emotional states are co-ordinated.

At the same time, two other sets of events are taking place within me: first is an impulse to run away if there is a shelter handy. In other words, the instinctive conduct, which we call flight, is being set in motion. At the same time, there is an upward reverberation of the situation in that which we call my intelligence. Memories of tigers I have heard about, if I have never seen one before, or, if I am a hunter, memories of past experiences with tigers come to my mind. The instinctive reaction of flight then becomes modified by something which we call an intelligent reaction. In other words, if I have a gun, I get ready to shoot the tiger.

So at least three types of reactions take place in me, which blend into one another and are only artificially separated. First, a great wave of feeling which we call fear emotion; second, a tremendous outpouring of energy, which we will call the motor response, whether it's instinctive or intelligent; third, a reverberation in my higher centers which control emotion, which control instinctive responses, since the higher centers have for their function the control of feeling and conduct. |

What the tiger feels, I cannot tell you, but there is one thing he would do; he would put on a horrid face; he would snarl, roar, and show his teeth; and he would come bounding at me. The tiger is not without guile, when he does all these things. He is dramatizing himself into the situation. He is trying to produce in me an emotional state which will paralyze my motor responses, so that I will not be able to run, or so that I will not be able to use my gun. I do not say that he figures all this out, that he ration-

alizes, "Mr. Hunter, I am going to scare you so stiff that you will do nothing." He does it by some instinctive guide, which fundamentally makes emotion a sort of interplay between living objects.

[ In life, however, our most potent emotional reactions come through our fellow-men. I may look out of a car window and get a feeling of awe, as it is called, as I gaze upon the beautiful mountains and lovely streams and things of that kind; but I get tired of them quickly. The emotion of awe soon disappears. But let me see some human being walk across a meadow and there comes at once a sharpening of attention and a sense of something in common, which makes that human being more interesting and more emotion-laden than anything else in the environment. In other words, there is a constant interplay of emotion between human beings. There is a contagiousness to emotional states which is the most important social event in the universe. The interplay of intelligence is really not so important as the interplay of emotion.]

( To come back to our child, just born into a world, born into a family, born to a particular pair of people, Mr. and Mrs. Jones. He is not born to just man and woman. He is born to two peculiar persons, who have throughout their life collected a peculiar group of emotions, which they are fiercely determined to thrust upon the new individual. They want him to feel as they do about the things of life. They are bound that he shall fall into the same emotional mold as they. Their background and tradition, the pressure of the dead, who have influenced them, the books they have read, the lectures they have listened to, the whole of their life-experiences comes to that child as a force which bears upon him to compress him into their emotional form. )

On his part, the child starts out with a few rather undifferentiated emotions. I believe he easily feels fear. I am sure he has something akin to surprise. Early he expresses what we call joy. I am not certain he has sorrow, but he shows anger when deprived of what he wants. Take a little two-day-old baby away from the breast and see what he expresses before he gets that breast again. His whole facial expression and the manner in which his little limbs stiffen indicate that frustration of purpose which expresses itself in anger.

You cannot separate emotion from the rest of the mental life of a man. Nobody gets fear or anger in a vacuum. We feel fear and anger in some setting or situation which frustrates or threatens our purposes, which does violence to our ego feeling, to our sense of justice, and of right and wrong, to our desires, and to a dozen and one things which I shall not elaborate. There is a constant swing between what we call feeling, what we call volition, and what we call intelligence. Some mental events are more purely emotion, some more purely thought, some more purely will, and so on.

But feeling or emotion is the great value in existence. We value a situation which has taken place in our lives by what it has made us feel. The *affect* is the standard of values. Whatever we achieve, whatever we get, how we rise or fall in the social scale, all mean nothing except in terms of the emotional response. Thus, a most important phase of teaching is to bring about those emotions which will on the whole give the greatest value in producing the greatest satisfaction to the individual, and which will keep him in harmony with his environment.

To come back to our hypothetical child, born into a

hypothetical family. He is born to a times as well as to a family, because a child is more the child of his era than he is the child of his parents. I differ from our chairman, when she says that the parent is the most important figure in the emotional life of the child. What we call the times, to wit, the whole conglomeration of attitudes, which are expressed in any one era, the new conventions, the new contrivances, the thousand and one currents of thought, the something which we may call the emotion of the times is on the whole more important because, sooner or later, the child goes from the home and becomes bathed in his times, immersed—so to speak—in the emotions, ideas, and volitional setting of his period.

How does the environment in the shape of the father and mother and society go about attempting to mold a child to the emotional image desired? There are several techniques it utilizes. In the first place, there is example. The child is imitative, so we say. What we really mean by imitation is a desire to be in harmony, to have the same experiences and to feel the same things that the parent does.

I stand up against the wall with my legs crossed, reading a paper. All of a sudden I look down and see my four-year-old daughter holding a book in her hand with her legs crossed, and looking at me now and then to see if she is going through the same performance that I am. What is she trying to do? She is putting herself in the same position that I am in order that she may get the same thrill that she, not consciously of course, assumes that I am getting. Hers is an effort at fellowship. Imitation in a large measure is a gesture of fellowship.

It is all very well to preach to a child, "Don't show



fear; don't show anger; control your emotions." But if you go around the house tearing your hair with each headache, upset into a fuss because of a speck of dust which the maid has inadvertently forgotten to take up, or if you fly into a fury of rage because the world shows a tendency to ignore your desires and plans, you must not expect your child to show endurance, to be patient, and to be calm and equable. If you express disgust and dissatisfaction because the minutiae of life have gone wrong, certainly it will not be on your account that the child will grow up hardy and strong, with good solid satisfaction, and with a well-balanced emotional life. He may—but not because of you; despite you. Thus, the nature of the household—whether or not anger or fear are inordinately expressed, whether there is a solid emotional tone or an unstable emotional life—plays an important part in the growth of the child's emotions.

The next technique is the time-old and time-tried technique of reward and punishment, praise and blame. The human being is so made, and other animals are made in the same way, that he reacts to the attitude of those around him by emotion. If I show to someone with whom I am in intimate contact that I do not like him, if he sees anger or contempt in my attitude, he reacts with an appropriate emotion. He may react with anger, "You hate me, and I hate you." He may add interest to the emotional give and take, or he may fall into a state of self-depreciation expressed in the formula, "He whom I love and think so much of does not like me; I must be bad," and then he turns the whip of his emotions upon himself; or he may react with indifference, which he reaches as a final response. He may say, "This person has said this and that

about me so many times; what he says does not mean anything." That is a very common reaction of the child to the praise and the blame of his parents, especially if he regards them as unreasonable. He reaches a stage of equilibrium in that what they say and what they do—to their surprise—passes, so to speak, into one ear and out of the other. This is what should happen if praise and blame, reward and punishment are foolishly administered.

Thus we respond to praise, blame, reward, and punishment. A great philosopher once said that the most important task of mankind is the proper distribution of praise, blame, reward, and punishment. How you praise your child, how you blame him, how you punish and reward him are very important in determining responses, in conditioning them. You create in some measure what the physiologists call conditioned reflexes. These weapons of the environment are not to be used indiscriminately, but all of them have a legitimate place, including punishment. Here I know that I am out of harmony with most of the succeeding speakers. I repeat, however, that punishment has its place in the cosmos of the child as it has its place in the cosmos of all of us.

You can tell a very young child all day not to pull a cat's tail. When the wavy tail passes his way, challenging him to pull it and setting up an instinctive response, he forgets the injunction and falls to the temptation. When the cat claws him, punishment has taught him more than admonition.

You can say to a child, "Don't eat green apples," but green apples smell and look good; they also taste good. Here are three avenues by which we judge life's pleasures. The child takes the apples and by way of punishment

gets colic. From that time he does not eat green apples, which bring up an experience in memory which inhibits conduct.

There is no harm in the administration of pain if it is judiciously used, if it is inflicted in relationship to the situation, and if it does not too profoundly humiliate the ego of the child. The body is covered with pain receptors so that we shall experience some pain in order to avoid more disastrous evils.

In one of the great nervous diseases the sense of pain disappears, and the affected one may put his hand on the hot stove, burn himself to the point where his hand becomes charred, and yet does not know what has happened until he smells burning flesh. If he experienced a pain sense, even for a minute, it would save him.

If pain is administered at home, it must be done with discretion and kindness in order to save the child from the more severe pains in a rough and cruel world, for reward, praise, blame, and punishment are the directors of the child's activities at a time when he cannot choose by an inward mentor, when experiences have not piled up to the point of wisdom so that they govern his emotions and responses.

Thus in a very young child a spanking at times may purge him of unpleasant emotions, may bring his ego into line with what is reasonable. The flow of sweet reason may fail where the hand administered vigorously to the proper place may succeed. Often a child who is spanked comes out all smiles after the preliminary crying.

Of course, praise and reward have to be used adequately. Punishment only works for a short period or is too expensive for its results.

There comes a time, of course, when experience teaches what emotions are proper and what emotions are not proper. Each racial group, every social group differs widely in this respect. Your traditional Englishman believes in bringing up his children so that, when the house is burning down, the child will take a cigarette, be nonchalant, and view the situation through his monocle. A Latin, bringing up his child to meet the same situation, leads him to shout, gesticulate, and to express the fear and excitement vehemently. Both the Latin and the Englishman, however, get out of the burning house, which is the important matter, after all. A Jewish home is quite different in what it expects in emotional response from the child from the Gentile home. Your New England Yankee, parsimonious in most matters, is also parsimonious in the expression of emotions. Such a parent will bring up his little boy so that he will drawl his deepest feelings. He is trained, in a word, toward a repression of his emotions. His emotions, as the result of such education, are painfully expressed. It becomes easier to hide them than to give them their normal outlet. Perhaps a braver attitude toward life is thus brought about. But life loses much of its color and vividness as a result.

Let me take up at this point what might be called the social value of the emotional response. The child soon learns that emotions can become dramatized, that they may essentially become works of art, and that they have a definite social value. In the growth of culture, it comes about that a lady or a gentleman in a most deep sorrow keeps a handkerchief ready so that the tears shall not be too unseemly. And the child learns that what he feels and expresses brings a reaction of feeling to his parents, and

then he starts to use his emotional manifestations as a weapon in the battle to get what he wants. He learns that his tears and cries are of tremendous importance to his parents, and then he starts using these tears and cries for the accomplishment of his own childish wants.

When he is frustrated, he manifests anger. He may learn that anger on his part breeds anger on the part of his parents, and then he switches from anger to tears, because tears are more productive in the weakening of the parents' resistance. It is stated on good authority that the female sex of the race never forgets this lesson. It thus comes about that the expression of emotions becomes one of the great weapons of life. We express anger, not only because we feel anger, but to inspire fear in others. That is what our hypothetical tiger was doing when he came rushing at me. We use our sorrow, not only because we are very sad, but to get pity from other people. We use our joy to communicate a like state in our friends and an unhappy state in our enemies. We use our disgust to produce a community of feeling with those whom we want to share our emotion and to arouse another emotion in those whom we do not like. So we divide up people into two groups: those whom we want to share our good emotions and those whom we want to have the reverse emotions.

It becomes one of the most important and difficult parts of child-training how to organize the expression of the child's emotions—and emotions demand expression. You know that if somebody slaps your face or says an insulting word, if you are in a position to knock him down, the anger emotion disappears. You may even feel like helping him to his feet afterward. If you have to stifle your emotion, you go around for days and days in an unhappy



state of mind, mentally disorganized. You are not fit, because there is in you an unexpressed emotion.

Yet emotions must be stifled, and one of the great problems of life is how to bring up a child to express emotion and yet stay civilized. It is not wise to expect a child to become civilized too soon. A very young child should yell when he is mad, should weep with all his being when he is sad, should caper with all his might when he is glad, and should express his curiosity by adequate inquisitiveness. As time goes on, he should be taught to tone down the expression of his emotions in response to the exigencies of civilization. Alas, that this should be so, but it is necessary.

I am one of those who believe that a family or a group is on the down-grade when emotional responses disturb them too greatly, when they are disorganized by the expression of emotion in others, when they dread the noises and excitement of the red-blooded life.

Next of importance in the handling of the child is to know how much of his emotional response is dramatized for the purpose of getting what he wants from you. I came up on the train with a man who had a very sick child. During the time of his illness, this child was indulged in everything. Here you have a commonplace situation. Bacteriae come along that have no business in a child, create a disturbance in him; he becomes sick. Then the child evokes the pity and the tender feeling of those around him; he becomes indulged. After a while, he pretends to be sick whenever he does not get what he wants, and the alarm of the parents prevents them from taking stern measures. It really is a major problem in discrimina-

tion to know when the sickness actually stops and how much of it is faked.

I must pass along rather hurriedly to another phase of my subject. In any emotional state, there are two factors: first, the situation which evokes it, and, second, the organism which is to react. Your fatigued child is going to react differently to a situation from your fresh, vigorous child. In fact, it helps one to determine whether or not a child is well by taking into account his emotional responses. The little one, who has, in one way or another, become exhausted of energy output and energy reserve, tends to the emotional response of fear, futile anger, and disgust. The strong, sturdy child tends to express, not futile anger, but the anger that succeeds, he easily feels joy and expresses his health in vigorous emotions of the energetic type. So the physical health of the child becomes a factor in the emotional development of the child. Thus, diet, sleep, exercise, the pressure of studies, and a thousand and one physical conditions become factors in mental hygiene.

I discuss in some detail the fear emotion. I believe that fear is one of the great constructive emotions in life. One, I believe, must experience fear in order to adjust properly to life. Fear has been a sharpener of the intelligence of man. Agriculture, medicine, and morals (to speak only of three important matters) have one of their basic roots in fear. You, who are here today, are actuated by the fear that your children will not develop well, so that you are seeking knowledge to counteract the feeling. But fear, like every other emotion, may become a poison in excess. Chronic fear destroys appetite, impairs sleep, and thus interferes with nutrition and recuperation. There are households in which a child is immersed in fear. One of the

most important fears with which he becomes inoculated is the fear of sickness. There are households in which the mother is plunged into a frenzy of fear whenever her child has a running nose, when he sneezes, or when his appetite temporarily falls off. She breeds hypochondriasis in him. She fears that if he goes out without his rubbers, he will die; and that if he does not eat spinach, his bones will not develop right. I firmly believe that one of the great quarrels of the new and old generation is being fought over the question of spinach or no spinach. Do not take the theories of pediatricians, dietitians, mental hygienists, including myself, too seriously.

*parents* Then there is the fear of not doing the right thing and the fear of making a mistake. There are households in which such a standard of perfection is set up, so severe an attitude is taken toward a mistake, so censorious an eye is watching the child that he finally is thrown into an obsession of doubt as to what to do. When a child is constantly viewed as a problem, when he is given no leeway for the trial-and-error method of learning, he is being brought up in the worst possible way. He would be better off with a parent who slaps him when she is mad and praises him when she is glad; at least, he would know what to expect.

✓ The inferiority complex, so-called, has its origin in the home where too much is expected, and where the child finally loses confidence in himself.

My final discussion will be of the emotion called disgust. I do not know whether my colleagues in this series of lectures are going to classify this feeling as a primary emotion. Whether or not they do, it is one of the most important emotional responses to life. Disgust means lit-

erally bad taste. When you wish to express the emotion of disgust, you either pretend to spit or to vomit, no matter how delicately you tone down these gestures. Disgust is the emotional state behind the building up of taste. Uncleanliness is disgusting; therefore, cleanliness. Poor art is disgusting; therefore, Renoir and Van Gogh. Disgust, therefore, is a constructive emotion, and yet it may become a disorganizing state of mind when experienced too readily and too frequently. There are people who go through life disgusted, because they build their standards of taste so high that they can experience no wholesome satisfaction. They have pitched the pinnacle of their desires on so narrow an edge that it topples over at the slightest urge. This is truer of women than men. Men are more robust in desire and satisfaction than women are, although there are hyperaesthetes among men.

Overfinickiness is the road to neurasthenia, since one of the most important symptoms in this neurosis is the disappearance of desire and satisfaction and the appearance of chronic disgust. When you breed your child so carefully and so elaborately that his values become too delicately poised, you are breeding him to chronic disgust. This is a crude world. Eating, sleeping, reproduction, being born, and dying are crude. If you strip the clothes off life, it is not so nice to look at. You must be bred into a robustness of taste to endure it well.

At any rate, there is a type of home, which I am sure is the home of a great many people in this audience, in which, in the effort to refine the child, he is brought to the pitch of overrefinement, so that he feels disgust too keenly, too quickly, with a resultant loss of desire and satisfaction. Such a child does not have the robust, abound-

ing joy in life that a child should have. When you have accomplished this as a result of your training, you have harmed your child more than if you had allowed him to swear, be dirty, have an occasional running nose, allowed him to get fatigued and even sick.

All training should be to breed hardy emotional desires and satisfaction. Sophisticated, overrefined emotional responses should only come in adult life. They are not part of the normal development of the child.

I have endeavored to develop for you a few of the basic considerations of the hereditary and environmental factors in the emotional life of the child. The hereditary factors are out of the way by the time you get thinking about them. It is difficult for you to choose your child's grandfather or grandmother, or to annihilate yourself from his ancestry. Furthermore, it is a far cry to the day in which we will be able to predict the characters and potentialities of a child by the qualities of his parents. Some day we may be able to say, "Mate Mary and John, but not Mary and Tom, because Mary and John will give the correct emotional balance to posterity." At the present time, nothing of the kind is possible. Perhaps one ought to beware of marrying the overemotional, overfinicky, apprehensive person and the one too easily given to excesses of joy and sorrow.

But the environment can be altered. The environment can be manipulated. You can select the right kind of books, the right food, and the right companions. Emotions can be controlled by teaching and by example. You can bring into the child's life the wisdom and experience of your own emotional responses. You can keep in mind that there is



a constant interplay between your emotional state and that of your children.

But, after all, no matter what you teach or how wisely you act, depend on it that in the long run the child must learn the value and meaning of his own emotions and those of others, must learn in the school of life what he may express and what he had better conceal.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC EMOTIONS

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During the last ten years the science of child development has come to occupy a fairly distinct area of research. Although it borrows its methods in part from other sciences (such as psychology, anthropology, and nutrition) which are concerned with specialized phases of growth, it uses these methods in tracing the growth process as a whole and in studying the relationships of the various aspects of growth to each other and to the developing personality.

From this point of view, our interest in emotional behavior arises from a recognition of its importance as a dynamic factor in the development of the whole organism. The methods employed in studying emotion have been contributed from psychology and physiology, chiefly, but increasingly also from biochemistry and other sciences.

A historical summary of the methods and results of genetic studies of the emotions indicates a tendency toward more objective and integrated research—an attempt to supplement the earlier natural science methods with the more detailed and quantitative methods of the laboratory sciences.

### THE JOURNAL METHOD

The first systematic ventures into the realm of child study were made by means of the diary record. Among the earliest biographers we are not surprised to find the prolific and versatile figure of Charles Darwin, who made a study of his son, paying particular attention to emotional responses and to the facial expressions accompanying them.

Since Darwin's time there have been many diaries and personality studies. Some of these, such as Shinn's and Fenton's, give a vivid and faithful picture of the child, delightfully presented. A recent, more extensive use of diary records has been reported by Professor Blatz of the University of Toronto. A group of young mothers with an adequate background in psychology were given training in recording child activities in a nursery school. They were thus prepared to take records on the emotional episodes of their own children at home. The first observations recorded only the amount and intensity of crying, with the contributing circumstances. With experience the parents were able to recount more complex emotional episodes in detail. A number of infants have now been observed from birth by both their fathers and mothers, under the direction of a trained staff. The method is invaluable in helping us to understand the behavior of an individual child and, in the case of parents especially, in helping us to obtain an objective point of view in regard to our own children. However, because the diaries are usually kept by parents whose ability to take such records is an indication of a superiority which is shared by the child, we cannot draw conclusions from such cases that will apply, in general, to all children. Nor can we hope to achieve detailed, daily records on more than a very limited number of children. For research purposes, diaries are now being relied upon chiefly to supplement more objective records and to indicate problems which may be seen to require a more intensive study. In mapping out any research program on young children, we need to know how children behave in a free environment before transferring them to an environment which has been prepared for a specific

purpose. Such a preliminary investigation can well make use of the diary record.

#### THE "ASK ME ANOTHER" METHOD

In contrast to the technique of the diary record, dealing exclusively but intensively with one individual, we have the questionnaire method, which is chiefly useful because it enables the collection of a larger volume of records with a minimum expenditure of time and money. G. Stanley Hall, a pioneer in this field of child study, was assiduous in collecting reports from a large number of persons concerning their own emotional experiences or the observed emotional behavior of others. Thousands of persons answered such questions as the following:

"Recall a few cases of great laughter in children, and describe its causes." "Describe overt acts (involving anger); describe every vasomotor symptom, all changes in muscular tension. In description be photographically objective, exact, minute as to details." It is unnecessary to comment on the difficulties in being "photographically objective," particularly when the reported episodes belong to earlier experience.

Hall's enormous two-volume work on adolescence, including information gleaned in this manner, was regarded as indispensable in the classrooms of his era. It has been succeeded by works based upon data from more directly investigated sources, as in the case of Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa*, which combines psychological and anthropological techniques in a scientific description of adolescents in a primitive civilization.

During the last thirty years questionnaires have changed somewhat in form, becoming more specific and detailed,

and more scientifically administered as to sampling and procedure. Woodworth's "Personal Data" sheet, which has been adapted for use with children, is an example of this kind. In the Mathews revision for children, seventy questions were included, dealing with fears, worries, unsocial, moods, and the like. Here are a few of the questions which children are asked: "Are you bothered much by blushing?" "Do you like to play alone rather than with other children?" "Is it easy to make you laugh?"

Because of the errors to which questionnaires are subject, they have been alluded to as belonging to the "underworld of science." Their reliability is relative to the specificity and objectivity of the questions, the number and kinds of persons who answer them, the recency or remoteness of the experiences related, and the purposes to which they are put. Like the diary records, they are more useful as a preparatory measure pending further research than as valid bases for conclusions. This is particularly true in dealing with the un verbalized elements of our emotional life.

#### RATING SCALES

At the University of California Institute of Child Welfare we are obtaining records of emotional behavior and of related types of reaction by means of a variety of rating scales. For the most part, these attempts to deal with specific responses, rather than with general traits, such as "jealousy" or "assertiveness." One convenient form of rating involves a time scale, as in the following example: "Talks in a shrill tone of voice—Never . . . rarely . . . sometimes . . . usually . . . often. . . ."

Another form for which we have listed an inventory of



more than two hundred items provides a seven-point scale, with a description of the behavior characteristics of certain points on the scale. Thus, for the trait "inhibition of crying" a rating of 1 or 2 applies when "child does not use crying as a means of expressing emotion. Crying in emotional situations is typically absent or brief. Child does not cry unless exceptionally hurt or exceptionally disappointed." A rating of 4 applies when "child's crying varies in normal fashion with the nature and intensity of his emotion. For his age he shows an average overt expression of the emotions through crying." A rating of 6 or 7 applies when "child is exceptionally prone to cry in emotional situations. Is a 'cry baby,' cries readily on slight provocation." The value of this technique is perhaps limited to studies on single groups of children (as in a nursery school) in which the significance of the terms and the standard meaning of each rating can be agreed upon by a committee of raters.

In the study of intellectual traits recent findings at the Institute indicate that, with suitable procedures, ratings may yield measures which agree with I.Q.'s as well as I.Q.'s on different tests agree with each other. In the measurement of emotional characteristics, ratings must provide the criterion against which other methods are to be checked, and while it would be unfortunate for us to limit our developmental studies solely to ratings, we must acknowledge their importance in providing a background for other work.

A study by Goodenough and Leahy may be cited as an illustration of the use of ratings in the study of personality differences in children in relation to their order of birth. The children were rated by nursery school and

kindergarten teachers who had had an opportunity to observe in a relatively controlled environment over a period of months. On the basis of over three hundred cases, they found that the oldest children in the family showed tendencies toward lack of aggressiveness and self-confidence, lack of leadership qualities, much suggestibility, and some seclusiveness and introversion. The middle children showed these traits in less degree. The youngest children showed no outstanding characteristics but were variable. The only children showed higher ratings for aggressiveness and self-confidence, for gregarious interests, and for instability of mood and flightiness of attention.

#### THE "BEHAVIOR SAMPLE" METHOD

In studying the emotions most of our procedures have suffered from subjectivity. This is no less true of clinical than of ordinary rating and test methods. A technique developed by Goodenough and Olson at the University of Minnesota has had unusual success in placing ordinary observations on a satisfactory objective basis. Data were desired concerning the development of nervous habits and their relation to age, sex, and physical characteristics. In studying this problem the steps were (1) to define nervous habits specifically in terms of certain items of behavior (nail-biting, thumb-sucking, hair-twisting, blinking, and the like). (2) To observe each child in a given sample for short periods (from one to five minutes) twenty different occasions, noting simply the presence or absence of each form of behavior during each period of observation. (3) To obtain a "score" for each child in each type of nervous habit (the score ranging, of course, from 0 to 20), and to analyze the results with reference to their

reliability and relationship with other variables. Olson found no relation between age and nervous habits, but a significantly greater incidence among girls than among boys. At all ages underweight children showed more nervous habits than did children of normal weight.

#### EXPERIMENTAL METHODS

Experimental methods of studying emotions in infants were introduced by Watson and Morgan at Johns Hopkins University in 1917. They approached the problems of emotional development by simplifying and controlling the conditions of observation, and by choosing as subjects young children who were as yet relatively naïve and unencumbered with learned emotional reactions. The far-reaching results of these studies will be considered at a later point in this report.

Following this lead, a number of studies have been made which involve the observation of children in natural but controlled situations. A few examples may be cited.

Marston, in a study of introversion and extroversion, set up a series of laboratory situations designed to distinguish introvert from extrovert tendencies in reactions. The situations provided opportunity for the expression of compliance, social resistance, caution, degree of interest, and self-assertion. The child's degree of compliance to an adult's request to perform a difficult or impossible task was obtained by asking the child to open a Corona typewriter case with complicated fastenings. The child knew that the box contained a number of celluloid ducks, which he could float in a pan of water when he had obtained them. He was allowed three minutes for the task, and was urged to continue if his efforts waned. Marston distinguished five

reaction types among the children studied. They ranged from the most compliant group who worked quietly, without complaint and without urging during the entire period, to the least compliant group who worked vigorously for a period, usually expressing their opinion of the difficulty of the task and giving up when they were satisfied that they couldn't open the box. In between these two extremes were the children who complained of the difficulty of the task but kept at it, those who stopped trying but returned to it when urged, and those who appealed for help but went back to work when requested. The individual reactions to failure are noteworthy. The boy who "guesses that the suitcase is sweaty and tired," the girl who "fell down and hurt her two knees and one thumb," the boy who complained that it was too hard on his sore finger (the sore not being evident to the observer) were all providing excuses which would allow them to maintain their self-respect.

Marston found that by his definition the boys were more markedly extroverted as were also the younger children.

Charlotte Buhler, working with over one hundred infants, studied reactions of dominance and submission when they were placed together in a play pen with only one toy. The possibilities here for individual differences in reaction are almost endless, depending upon the ages and sex of the children, the presence or absence of the mother, and, of course, upon dozens of other factors which are not so easily segregated.

At the California Institute of Child Welfare, we have found a valuable medium for the observation of emotional and social reactions, in a situation designed primarily to study certain aspects of the learning process. Two chil-

dren are brought into a room where there is one doll and bed, a balloon with a string too short for the child to reach, and two boxes which will enable him to reach the balloon if placed together in the right combination. The degrees of patience, persistence, co-operation, and possessiveness shown by the children are fully as significant as the ingenuity which they display in trying to reach the balloon. This type of laboratory study, providing for the observation of a number of children in comparable situations, gives promise of adding much to our knowledge concerning emotional development. At the present time, the chief defect in our results lies in the fact that our programs of research are not unified and that isolated studies fail to yield a complete picture of emotional behavior.

#### INSTRUMENTAL METHODS

Studies which measure children's emotions by means of instrumental devices have been developing rather slowly, largely because of the modification required in the apparatus techniques before they can be applied to children. Most of the instrumental studies of the emotions involve the measurement of changes in physiological functioning which are known to follow emotional excitation. Changes in pulse rate, heart beat, respiration, sweat secretion, pupil dilation can all be recorded instrumentally. But those who have had to cope with a child's distrust of a thermometer or stethoscope can understand the need for ingenuity and tact in using still more complicated devices to measure emotional responses.

At the present time perhaps the most promising instrumental approach is offered by the galvanometer, a physical apparatus which measures changes in the electrical con-



ductivity of the skin accompanying a modified balance in the discharge of impulses through the autonomic nervous system. During a galvanometer experiment a child sits at a play table, a pair of electrodes attached to his feet, and no restriction is placed upon his activity except that he is not allowed to get up and walk around. In an ordinary observational study of the reaction to provocative stimuli (as to a cage of white rats, a tumble toy, an electric bell, etc.), we are able to grade children in a quantitative series from "non-reactive" to "extremely reactive." When we add a galvanometric record to the observational data, we find that our appraisal of a child's emotionality may undergo considerable change. For the visible outward expression of the emotions does not always provide a good index of the inner visceral changes. In a study of over fifty children from three months to six years of age, Dr. Harold Jones has found a certain proportion of "inhibited" children (particularly among the older subjects) whose overt emotional reaction was extremely restricted, and yet who displayed a very great lability of emotional responses as recorded by the galvanometer. On the other hand, some children were tested of a markedly extrovert make-up, whose ordinary emotional expression was wholly superficial, and who gave only rare evidence of visceral reactivity. Instrumental methods have much to contribute to our further knowledge of the emotional processes.

Of the techniques which have been described, no one, taken alone, can give an adequate account of emotional development. A comprehensive study needs to employ many or all of them. The more informal descriptive methods assist in setting the problem, in the preparatory stages of research. They are also of value in connection

with rating scales, inventories, and the like, in supplying contextual background data to supplement the more rigorously controlled experimental programs.

This summary has been confined chiefly to a discussion of research methods which have been derived from psychology and physiology. That other sciences have important contributions to make in this field has become evident with such studies as those of Ludlum, Starr, and Rich on biochemical factors, such as acidity of the saliva, in relation to personality traits.

In these days, to undertake a study in child development requires almost as much forethought and preparation as does a polar expedition. Our personnel must include experts from many exact and practical sciences. Medicine, education, psychology, nutrition, chemistry, and many other branches of learning must all be represented. In order to collect subjects, and the right kind of subjects, we must organize nursery schools, furnish nurseries, develop parent study groups, co-operate with the public schools. If our problems are to yield valid results, we must make home visits, secure data from parents and teachers, observe and measure children with a wide variety of scientific yardsticks, frequently, regularly, and extensively. Our observations should begin at birth or before, and continue through babyhood, childhood, and adolescence, to maturity.

With a program of this magnitude to contemplate, it is obvious that the science of child development is still in its infancy. Some would say that it is still in a prenatal phase.

Although the scientific study of children is a new field, and our information drawn from such studies is still ele-

mentary, empirical data have slowly accumulated and have led us to formulate new theories and to pursue more systematic research. Our conceptions concerning the basic or fundamental emotional patterns and their modifiability have undergone considerable change as the result of studies with children. As I have shown, until recently our formulations concerning the primary emotions have been based upon adult recollections, notes from infant diaries, anecdotes, and the like. As there was no common and reliable source for the collection of evidence, naturally there was little agreement among the authorities as to the nature or number of the original emotional responses. When studies were undertaken which employed a reliable technique for this purpose—the observation of young children under controlled conditions—they received widespread consideration from both scientists and laymen.

The earliest studies in this connection were those of Watson and Morgan. They made a systematic attempt to catalogue the emotional responses present at birth by observing a number of infants in a variety of stimulating circumstances.

As a result of this laboratory study, Watson reported three basic emotions—fear, rage, and love. Fear was the startle reaction in response to a loud sound or sudden loss of support. Rage was the stiffening reaction to hampered movements. Love was the expansive reaction to gently patting and stroking of sensitive skin areas. These three simple types of emotional response were believed to be the nucleus from which all the complex emotions developed.

Just how this elaboration occurred was the problem next to be attacked. Watson demonstrated that fear of a rat could be induced in a child by associating it in his

experience with a loud sound which was terrifying. What is more, the acquired fear became attached to other objects which, like the rat, were furry, namely, hair, cotton, a fur coat. We can imagine that the chain of fear responses did not stop here but might continue to pick up further connections. The woman with the fur coat, the man with a beard, the doll with fuzzy hair might all come to be avoided. Later I was able to reverse this process and cure a child's fear of a rat by associating it with a pleasant experience (usually candy).

This method of complicating the emotional behavior resembles the process used by Pavlov in modifying the stimulus response connections in certain reflexes, and is called the method of conditioning. We can all think of instances in which fears have been similarly acquired in the uncontrolled environment of the home. By the same process, but in relation to the love response, the child comes to associate a feeling of pleasure with the person (usually the mother) who makes him comfortable with food, cuddling, and warmth. This positive response may in turn be transferred to others who resemble the mother in stature, coloring, or manner.

That many of our emotional reactions have been acquired in this way there can be no doubt. But that it is not the only process by which modifications arise has been shown by later research.

Following the methods suggested by Watson's studies, I observed a number of children from three months to seven years of age in a variety of situations designed to expose fears where they already existed. I found that some of the older children showed fears of objects which they were encountering for the first time. In such cases it was not

any specific object but the total situation, including the child's readiness to adjust, which determined the type of response. For example, fear resulted when the child was suddenly confronted with a strange situation for which he had no ready reaction. [A child might greet with enthusiasm an animal he saw released from a cage. However, if he encountered the same animal in a box of blocks, a small suitcase, or his bed, he might be startled.] In this experiment, as you might expect, the younger children were quite indiscriminating in their responses. Any moving object was fixated with the eyes, reached for, crawled after, or run after, according to the age of the child. If secured, it was likely to go to the mouth—whether it was a spoon, a rubber doll, or a frog. However, the older children did not show any such definite and predictable reactions. They were curious, alarmed, enchanted, angered, according to the way the situation and their general degree of reactivity was affected. The item of increasing age alone in most cases seemed responsible for the development of these new responses.

The influence of age on other types of activity has also been noted. At the University of California, we have been observing among other things the reactions of infants to adults other than the mother. At the early age levels, the infants are, as a rule, quite willing to be taken by strange adults. Many of them later develop a phase of unwillingness to leave the mother's arms. The mother usually reports that there has been no specific experience to account for this changed behavior, but that she has noted it at home as well. At a still later period, after the babies have become accustomed to the situation as the result of re-



peated visits, the strangeness reaction again subsides and the children are friendly with the examiners.

Washburn, in a study of infants' social smiles (smiling in response to the smile of another), reports that smiling occurred in every infant from eight to twenty weeks of age. "From then until forty weeks there was an increasing number of negative responses," after which time the smiles again occurred. Washburn says, "Its period of ineffectiveness coincides fairly closely with the period during which the infant is becoming increasingly aware of strangers."

Gesell has also given evidence for the appearance of fear in situations where the possibility of conditioning has been ruled out.

H. E. and M. C. Jones have reported a study in which fear of a snake was absent in all the subjects under two years of age, but present and positively related to age from two to five years. They conclude that

the arousal of fear depends not only upon situational changes, but also upon the individual's general level of development. With a young infant, perhaps the only changes which are fear-producing are those which substitute loud sounds for quiet, pain for comfort, or loss of support for a previous state of bodily balance. As a child develops, his intelligence innately matures, and his perceptions become enriched through experience. New things startle him because of his keener perception of the fact that they are new and unusual. We have an old saying, "They who know nothing fear nothing." It would be equally true to say, "They who know everything fear nothing." Fear arises when we know enough to recognize the potential danger in a stimulus, but have not advanced to the point of a complete comprehension and control of the changing situation.

Further evidence of the effect of total situational factors has been given by Sherman in a series of experiments which paid particular attention to the responses of infants. He found that observers who were ignorant of the causes of emotional outbursts were quite unsuccessful in guessing what emotion the child was expressing. Actually the reactions depended not so much upon the specific stimulus—hampered movements, hunger, pain, or loss of support—as upon the intensity of the stimulus. According to the degree of stimulation, the child showed passivity, aggressiveness, or withdrawal. If mild restraint was applied to the face, the child was unresponsive, or moved his arms and legs slightly. If the restraint was applied suddenly and with intensity, the child kicked, pushed with his hands, and cried. Sherman stressed the point that the responses indicated the child's efforts to adjust to the stimulus.

To summarize our experimental findings concerning the basic emotions, we may conclude that the definition which says, "This object calls out this response" needs to be amended in the light of later research to say, "This object calls out this response—provided that it is presented in exactly this way, with exactly this degree of intensity, to a child who is feeling exactly like this, at exactly this age."

In other words there *are* no basic emotions of the conventional categories, such as, fear, jealousy, reverence, and the like. We need to define the emotions in more dynamic terms which stress "general excitability," "the preparedness of the organism," and the function of adjustment.

We may take Sherman's definition as a type: "An emotional response, like any other, serves to adjust the individual to some stimulating condition; but it differs from

other types of response in that it involves a massive, unpremeditated reaction of the entire body."

This discussion has given a somewhat sketchy record of research on the emotions in one field only, the field of child development. It has made no effort at practical applications. Other speakers will discuss more practical aspects of the subject. I have assumed also that this audience is composed of individuals who are versed in the practical art of interpreting scientific formulations in terms of their own problems, and I am hoping that this paper will afford them opportunities for the exercise of this function.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL TRENDS AND EMOTIONAL THEORY

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When one is to speak about trends, one is expected to have some sort of bird's-eye view of his appointed portion of the sea of life, to be able to detect therein prevailing currents, and to see the direction in which they are set. It is customary when speaking of the future to reach back into the past for the sources of that which is present. But the past, even in the form of the written word, stands in need of so much interpretation that when we have done with it, we find in reality a present construct built up of past materials only. So it is with psychology. Of the future we may prophesy, for its seeds assuredly lie in the present. But, again, when we turn to the present, such a situation meets us that we cannot but envy those prophets who always managed to keep in direct communication with the very fountainhead of cosmic action. For what have we to guide us? From every side there arises a great clamor for recognition of this view of life or that, for this prognostication or this premonition, for the scientific and the purely imaginative, the moral and the industrial. When times are quiet and conditions fairly stable, when in spite of shifting winds the trends of life maintain a certain definite course, one can be a prophet even without aid from the divine digit. But when every shift puts the barque of knowledge on another tack, what mere mortal may arise and say, "*Thither* are we going, and *thus* shall we attain to our desire?"

In no other field of human thought today is there a more intense interest than in that of the study of man. In no field is there to be found greater instability than in the science of psychology, the study of the whole man active. And, when we have examined psychology a little more minutely, we are forced to the admission almost at once that, of all places, we are in the most insecure when we search after the fruit of knowledge in the garden of the emotions. Like the emotions themselves, their study seems to elude all attempts at definition. Emotions are so evanescent, so fragile, that we are often afraid to look at them closely, lest they forthright disappear; and this fear is not by any means groundless. Nowhere do we find diffidence quite so marked among these otherwise confident enough students of the man active as when they turn their attention to the study of the emotional life. Occasionally there is an exception. A man steps boldly forward and affirms that he has at last succeeded in cornering this elusive moment, that he alone has gained that insight into the problem denied his less fortunate fellow-workers. Too often, when we have examined his claims to immortality, we find ourselves only the more deeply plunged into despair.

It is with more than usual diffidence that I approach this problem of the "Whither away?" of emotional theory. Only an unqualified disavowal of any expectation whatever that I shall be able with any certainty to point the way permits me to proceed. My function will only be that of presenting before you a brief sketch of some of the problems we are facing and the way we are attempting to meet them, or in some cases to circumvent them. It will be well, first of all, to look a little behind us on the road to see whence we have come. We are sitting upon the back of the wagon of his-



tory. No view ahead is vouchsafed us. We can only dangle our legs and watch the swiftly receding path unfold beneath our feet, as the future becomes for a fleeting instant present, then rapidly foreshortens into the past. As far back as our myopic vision permits us clearly to see, the deepest impressions are those left by the physiological attempts of the last century. True they are not entirely new ones. Ruts grow out of ruts; they are lost on flat and stony places; they appear and reappear, cross and recross, diverge and converge. But some in spite of change have succeeded in maintaining a certain individuality. One of these, many believe, will always be regarded as having marked out effectively the grooves that lead into the future as fast as this becomes present. This tendency is revealed in the independently conceived theories of the Danish physiologist Lange and the American medical man, philosopher, and psychologist, William James.

Almost no treatise on the emotions fails to outline some form of the James-Lange theory, even if only to annihilate it. We need not concern ourselves with its details; surely these have already been accorded the attention they merit. Suffice it to say here that there was crystallized in that theory a general trend visible even in ancient Greece, a trend toward localization of the emotional life in specific organs of the body. In the most widely accepted form of this view, the emotions appear in the organism as sensations compounded of a great and massive complex. There have not been wanting many and bitter attacks upon this theory. Even physiologists whose names will go down in history for their physiological experimentation have taken sufficient time out on their road to fame to aim a passing whack at this essentially psychological construct. Yet, in

spite of the attacks of its opponents and the misrepresentations of its proponents, it cannot be said of this doctrine that it has been entirely defeated. In some ways its most curious revival is that to be found in a modified form among the sacred writings of the behaviorists.

Before he became an evangelist in the cause of current behaviorism, the provocative John B. Watson, with great frankness, adopted the essential attitude toward the subject of emotion held previously by his spiritual godfather, James. Indeed, the derivation of the behavioristic view in this field is so obvious that, were it not for this open recognition, it would constitute an infringement on the basic patent. The modifications are negative ones, ones of self-denial. It is not intended at this point to offer the specious criticism that the behaviorist has refused his dessert in denying the conscious factor in life; rather we remonstrate wildly with him for having overlooked a source of real support in refusing to include the immediate after-effects, in whatever terms he chooses to couch them, of those "profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole" out of which behavioristic emotions are constructed for public consumption.

In his fundamental experiments on human infants, Watson succeeded in isolating to his own satisfaction three native emotions which the baby was able, apart from all experience, to display. We have here a theoretical development definitely in the direction of what has become known as the atomistic conception in psychology. Emotional life in all its enormous complexity can be reduced to three, and only three, basic emotion elements. To the emotions that he has thus definitely isolated he attaches, with due apologies, the names, *fear*, *rage*, and *love*. On these three hang

all the manifestations of adult emotional life. The application of the principle of conditioning, introduced by the Russian, Pavlov, enables the behaviorist to introduce new situations to which these fundamental modes of behavior may become sensitized; while new combinations of the old elements may arise through their interpenetration with habit-complexes involving similar or related mechanisms. )

The behavioristic approach to the subject of emotions has been selected for special treatment for two reasons. It is quite definitely the child of current human physiology, however reluctant its parent may be to recognize the offspring; and it exemplifies in an instructive manner the influence of what may be termed the *atomistic psychology*. This attitude is said to have gained its impetus through the striking success of chemistry and physics in reducing all complex substances to a few elements, and then building up complex substances again from the elements. Psychology has likewise been busying itself with analyzing its given experience into "elements" of mind or of behavior, which in either case might have been patterned after the chemical ideal. In the field of emotions this has resulted in the reduction of all emotional life to simple unit-experiences or simple unit-acts out of which all complexities imaginable are then constructed. The advantages of such a scheme are obvious. The ultimate elements are simple, clearly defined, and mutually exclusive. Complex behavior may first be reduced to simpler modes of action; and then these components separated out, further analyzed, and the ultimate elements studied. The elemental emotion may be treated almost, if not quite, as though it had an independent existence. One may thus "condition" such elements, recondition them, or make them change places in an astonishing

manner. It seems almost as easy to manipulate behavioristic emotions as to handle chemical elements in a test tube. We appear to see the possibility approaching of building up synthetic children; the homunculus of Goethe's *Faust* seems but a step away. No wonder this theory has proved so fascinating. Indeed, the criticisms leveled at such atomistic views of the emotions never for a moment question their attractiveness; they only doubt whether the theories agree with the facts of life.

In this type of atomistic view we trace a development that has almost reached a limit of specificity. It must not be looked upon as merely an isolated theory; it is only an extreme product of what is a very general psychological trend. It is at once the outgrowth of a dogmatic materialism and of an older and much more influential associationism. The wish to reduce to hypothetical elements all the emotional life is not confined to any one theory or indeed to any one country. It has its roots in philosophical doctrines that go back to the dawn of self-consciousness, to the beginnings of thinking at least once removed from the needs of the alimentary tract. But there is a current that cuts across this one. It is not as sharply defined as the other. There is something broad and diffuse about it. One sometimes wonders where experience ends and a certain hint of the mystical begins.

Like the element doctrines, their diametric opposite knows no particular theory and no land of its own. In this country it appears in a biological form as the organismic view; in England, as the philosophical doctrine of emergent evolution; in Germany, as *Gestalt* psychology. Even these names do not exhaust the field. It is not quite possible to do so as we did with the atomistic theories; we cannot seize

upon an extreme view and make it carry the burdens and the laurels for all. Perhaps the simplest statement of the general attitude underlying this trend in psychology would be that *the whole is always more than the sum of its parts*. This seems to contradict a fundamental axiom. But that must not disturb a modern. One by one the axiomatic becomes today at first doubtful, and later definitely untrue. This scientific destruction of Santa Claus goes on in every sphere of life. It is inescapable.

But perhaps we have never really accepted this axiom in dealing with life. In a sense the claim that the whole, in any dynamic system such as man, is something more than the parts that make it up has been accepted in practice always. What is definitely new is the attempt to integrate such an attitude openly into all our studies of man. We have gone on in the past as though there really were only the parts to be understood, while the whole might become intelligible of itself through a study of its parts. This quite obviously is only partially true of a machine. It is entirely untrue of a dynamic system in which the parts have little significance as compared with that which the whole possesses. For the same parts might form in another constellation something with such different qualities that we should never recognize the result as comparable with the original; and this change might occur through relatively insignificant changes in arrangement. This, in general, is the basis upon which much of the opposition to atomism in psychology rests. In order to avoid reference to any specific school of thought, I have chosen to group such doctrines as "wholeness" or "totality" theories.

Unfortunately for our primary interest in emotional theory, the principal developments in the wholeness theories



have been in the fields of perception and learning. The emotional side has received special consideration on the part of only a few of the more recent workers. Nevertheless, even these present in outline an application to emotional theory that indicates the influence of a definite psychological trend. In the behavioristic view we have seen emotions appearing as more or less discrete forms of behavior, quite distinct from other forms. But in the various totality conceptions we find it only as the outstanding characteristic of the *whole* itself, of the at any moment complete field of experience. No longer can the emotional experience be broken up into gasps, screams, and gurgles. Instead it becomes the characteristic quality of this totality of experience, and therefore quite inseparable from it. Likewise, since experience at any given instant is always in complete wholes, it follows that emotion is ever present. This has been spoken of as the impossibility of man's ever being indifferent. Whenever the human being is responding in any situation whatever, he is having emotional experience.

From our statement that emotion is the characteristic of the whole, it follows that emotion cannot be better understood by breaking the experience up into its components. The age-old method of analysis only succeeds here in destroying that totality upon which the emotional experience depends for its very existence. This perhaps provides us with a clue to the explanation of a familiar psychological difficulty, namely, that all attempts at studying emotional experience from the inside immediately result in its disappearance. And this has a rather direct bearing upon the fragility, the evanescence, of the emotional experience. Changes of mood may sometimes be produced by the slight-

est of changes in the details of our surroundings or ourselves. In fact, the change in detail may be so exceedingly minute and apparently insignificant that we cannot identify it as the effective one at all. Even a complete reversal of emotional tone may grow out of a very slight difference in the *total-pattern* of experience. We constantly find the same sort of thing occurring in visual patterns. The merest shift in the relation of some parts often produces effects that are startlingly different from the original. Thus the instability of emotional life becomes intelligible as a function of the ever changing total pattern of experience.

When we look at the emotional life in this manner, we begin to appreciate its tremendous importance. It becomes not merely an ornament coloring up an otherwise drab existence; not merely a disturbance that baffles every attempt of the organism to achieve rational living. As the characteristic of the totality of experience at any moment, it must at the same time form the very basis of continuity of experience in life. This continuity is a continuity of wholes, a continuity in which each mood represents an expression of the wholeness characteristic; while the parts, on the other hand, may have only a specious existence as such, playing at every moment a different rôle in a new organization.

We have often observed that little children, and in a similar manner some mental defectives, are able to form judgments of persons that are at the same time disconcerting and baffling. They are disconcerting because they often give rise to openly adverse comments on friends whom we have long since taken into our bosoms. They are baffling because they not infrequently turn out to be right, while our more mature judgment made with a larger grasp of individual facts may prove entirely wrong. This is quite in line

with some of our own experiences, when we oftentimes have a feeling that a situation has something intangibly but convincingly wrong about it, or again that it is quite all right. When such experiences occur in an otherwise rationalized existence, we are strongly tempted to appeal to the occult for our explanation. "Second-sight," intuition, thought-transference may be responsible; or perhaps our "freer spirit" feels directly what our shackled senses cannot perceive. When, for instance, we are too far distant to catch the conversation of a pair of persons in whom we have some interest, we may none the less experience an immediate apprehension of their sincerity or of their duplicity. Whatever the situation, the action proves too often that our judgment has been correctly directed for us to ignore the event. Coming directly, and without analysis after the fact, such insight may be often extraordinary. It is, as a matter of fact, another example of this unanalyzable totality characteristic by which we are steering our course. In the young and the primitive, it may be the usual means, because the total experience becomes analyzable only through a process of later sophistication. Accordingly, this low-level judgment remains dominant in all undeveloped persons; and it shows, along with certain defects due to the refinements of emotional expression and repression among civilized adults, some very striking superiorities in the detection of certain types of hypocrisy. The view is of considerable service in stressing the direct and uninterpreted nature of emotional influence.

There is not time to develop either of these interesting viewpoints further. Perhaps we may conclude by standing a little apart from them, so that we may gain a better perspective. Clear as was the behavioristic exposition of emo-

tions at the time of the early experimentations, it has nevertheless not withstood the tests of time and the more extensive research carried on since then. Considerable doubt has arisen in several quarters concerning the genuineness of these emotional elements. Some of the specific stimuli have failed to produce the correct responses; or the responses have refused to stick to the original pattern laid out for them. Most disturbing of all is the objection raised in infant study laboratories that emotions are not so well defined as they were formerly supposed to be. Human emotional life, even at the infant level, seems not to fit into water-tight compartments. Now simplicity in science has enormous advantages; and clarity no less so. Both of these the behaviorist has achieved. But have they been achieved at the expense of fidelity to actual emotional life? That is for future observation and experiment to decide.

The general attitude of the wholeness theories must be welcomed as most refreshing and fruitful, after the centuries of searching analysis to which we have been subjected. It is not, however, without serious defects inherent perhaps in the system. Chief of all these is the impression of great vagueness it gives, a sense of obscurity in expression that is somewhat unfairly interpreted as a sign of unclear thinking on the part of its adherents. There is certainly something elusive about the whole attitude that contrasts sharply with the well-defined doctrine of emotional elements. Another difficulty lies in its lack of contact with physiological processes. As I see it, man is first, last, and always a biological being. The history of the study of man has shown always a tendency for psychology to swing back toward a biological view after it has wandered afield for some time. Yet, one cannot help feeling

that, for all its elusiveness, the view corresponds somehow more closely to the actual characteristics of emotional experience as we *live* it.

And so we return to the question with which we started: To what in the present shall we look for our guide to lead us on into the future? Here we have been riding over all sorts of rough places, exposed to all the hazards of the road, subjected to discomforts, delays, and occasionally jolts; and after it all are we to find ourselves almost exactly at the same point from which we set out? Perhaps not. Places have a way of looking like one another in a very misleading manner. I shall have to leave this for you to decide. At least it cannot be gainsaid that we have had a good look around us on the way. When I think of the responsibility some of you would like to lay upon my shoulders, that of predicting the future of emotional theory in accordance with these psychological trends, I feel like doing what our ancestors in New Amsterdam are said to have done. Diedrich Knickerbocker tells us that the worthy burghers used every day to mount to their roofs, see which way the wind was blowing, and then set all their weather-cocks accordingly. Perhaps I might do something like that. But it would be a little artificial, a trifle forced. If psychology is to be a study of man with the life left in him, it must be permitted to set its own currents of thought. Our task is to keep a weather-eye on the steeples and go about our daily work.



## EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION AND REPRESSION

*Otto Rank, Ph.D., Author and Psychoanalyst, Paris, France*

You all probably know that the emotional life, at least you will know from experience, is the most difficult problem in all psychology. It is not only difficult to experiment in this field, as Dr. Cameron correctly pointed out, but you would find it even more difficult to lecture on it, for even if we understood it completely, as we are far from being able to do, it would mean intellectualizing the emotions, which is just the danger we should avoid. I think it is a similar thought which is commonly expressed. We all seem to come to the same conclusion.

With this view in mind I do not attempt to teach you in a lecture how to understand the emotional life. All I expect to do is to give you my personal impression as to how I approach the problem of influencing the emotional life. This problem remains the same in all human relationships, be it the question of my influencing you in your attitude toward the emotional life of your child, or be it the matter of your handling your own children emotionally. So if I should succeed in influencing you in favor of my viewpoint and you watch me carefully while doing it, then you will probably get the secret of approaching and handling the emotional life.

Meanwhile, I shall attempt to tell you in psychological language how I conceive the emotions to come into play in the child's life and where we have to look for their origin and development in order to be able to handle them better.

All education is fundamentally a training of the will. It is obviously so in the primitive systems of education, and for the most part still so, although unadmittedly, in all our modern methods of education. Indeed, in all education it is a matter of somehow molding the individual (whose most natural self-expression is the will) into an average, collective, social being. This is accomplished by rousing or strengthening in him that which is common to humanity, partly by grinding off that which is too individual, and partly by applying to and imprinting on him the positive community ideals and ideologies, be it religion and morality or knowledge and technical ability. In the primitive, the training of the will coincides with the initiation rites, which break the individual will whereby the traditional ideologies contained in the myths and rites are made use of.

In modern education similar factors operate, only conforming to the changed cultural milieu they are valued differently, that is pedagogically. The impress of the ideologies, the conscious intellectual acquisition of knowledge, is set up as the aim of education, and the training or breaking of the will is tolerated only as a means to this end. Hence, also the two phases of education are strictly separate, whereby, broadly speaking, the training of the will takes place in the home and the intellectual education possible on this home-training basis takes place in the school. It need not be stated here to what wide extent these two competing spheres of school and home intersect and overlap each other in practical education, and what difficulties arise for the child and for the educational aim from the necessarily imperfect co-operation of these two spheres. The school with its colossal program for uniformity conceivably

wants to receive the child so far as possible prepared for its task; on the other hand, the parents, being preoccupied with the training of the child's will and emotions to fit into the small family group, expect in their turn considerable help from the school in the difficulties unavoidably arising in the home.

But education in the home is differentiated from that in the school not only in that the one is predominantly a negative form of will-training and the other is predominantly a positive group education, but in the conflicts and difficulties arising from this there also come into play the emotional factors and affect-attitudes fundamental to these different ideologies. For the parents, however much they may approve community or group education, yet emotionally want to transmit and immortalize their own individual selves in their children. Whether this wish takes on more of an egoistic or more of an ideal form, it is in any case antisocial, although not necessarily in the bad sense of the word. In the school there arises the twofold difficulty that not only the community ideology represented by the school necessarily runs counter to the parental wishes and leanings but also that this community ideology is unavoidably represented by an individual, the teacher, who again tries (although unconsciously) to imprint his or her own individual ideology or, if one likes, his or her personality on the child. The teachers as individuals have, so to say, their own "parental ideology," which is practically the same as wanting to make the child in their own image, or according to the ideal picture of their own selves. Certainly the teacher is restricted in this tendency to a far greater degree than the real parents of the child, and, indeed, by two factors: above all by the community ideology which he

officially represents and which, through his special training for the scholastic profession, has partly become his own ideology (his professional ideology), and, second, through the community ideology of the school itself, in which the child, besides being influenced by the teacher, is also influenced by comrades of the same age and with the same interests and sympathies. This, together with the individual ideology of the pupil and the community ideology of the teacher, is in the same way pitted against that of the parents, so to say, as a child's community ideology.

Without being able to enter here into a description or even an estimation of all these various and unequal influences on the child's life, I should like only to mention one point which is important for understanding the fundamental emotional problem. One might say that the parents are the natural educators of the child's emotional life, and that the teacher is the educator ordained by the community for the systematic training of the child's intellectual life. Since, however, these two spheres are practically not separable at the school age, this view would scarcely have a pedagogic significance unless the parents realize this as their task as emotional educators, and hence prepare themselves better for it. For the school in its age-long development, perhaps of thousands of years, from the rabbinical temple school to our modern school, has sprung up as a firmly erected system with conscious aims. The emotional training, on the other hand, was left to the parents' arbitrariness, certainly always supported by religious tradition, reaching its climax in the intervention of the church on education. This religious influence in its systematic and purposeful aim has eventually become equal to that of state education. The critical phase in which our education at present finds itself

seems to consist of a slackening of the religious ideology in favor of a psychological one, which, according to its scientific nature, aspires to a similar systematic and conscious aim in the sphere of the parental training of the impulses as the school has traditionally developed in relation to the intellectual training. Although the school could welcome this only as an advance in its sense, and certainly could gain only profit from it if the child had gone through a period of systematic discipline of the impulse life before entering the real period of learning, yet from this new movement new competitions and disputes have arisen between school, home, and especially the church, disputes which only gradually can be smoothed out.

In one point certainly one must admit that the opponents of this new psychological factor in parental education are right. Nevertheless, they overlook the fact that their chief objection concerns only the present situation and not the nature of the thing itself. They have for themselves the tradition, thousands of years old, and the experience gained from it; the spokesmen of modernization have, at most, a couple of decades of new psychological orientation behind them, and they have neither a satisfying theoretical system nor any kind of reliable practical method. Indeed, the whole field of the early childhood's impulse education is, for the moment, like an educational laboratory, in which educators experiment theoretically and practically, not always for the good of the child. Now one attempts to influence the child psychologically, now again to enlighten the parents, indeed, to educate them; then again to reform the methods or to change the theories on which they are based. Even a combination of all these desperate attempts



to obtain a satisfying result apparently does not lead to the desired aims.

The newness of our modern viewpoint, the relative suddenness with which the psychological education is demanded in place of collapsing religious ideology, the inexperience of parents and psychologists in this field foreign to them, all this has obviously contributed to the confusion which, for the moment, reigns in the minds of the pedagogues and teachers of elementary classes, as well as in the nurseries at home.

For a systematic and consciously purposed education of the child's impulses, we must first know and understand the child's impulse life. Psychology has this as its aim, an aim we are yet far from reaching today, yet when attained it will be the first real beginnings of a new educational era. Psychoanalysis in this respect has made the first promising advance, but it has remained at a point around which an embittered and fruitless strife has been waging. For from its study of the adult neurotic, psychoanalysis has postulated the sexual impulse as the nucleus of the infantile impulse life, and hence declares sexual education to be the chief task of early childhood's pedagogy. The resistances against this view among parents and educators are, however, not only emotional and moral, but are supported by scientific arguments of other psychologists who have not approached the problem of the child's impulse life from the standpoint of the adult neurotic.

The first, and hitherto strongest, reaction against the Freudian sexualization of the child's impulse life started from Alfred Adler and his school of individual psychology. Adler emphasized the significance of the will psychology in the child; this was not new but profitable. What was new

was his concept of the will as an overcompensatory tendency for the adjustment of organic or psychical inferiority, which no child, as he assumes, can escape in our cultural milieu. He explains the manifestations of will, not as a natural expression of individuality, as I conceive it, but as an exaggerated expression of a neurotic need for proving one's superiority, opposed to social adjustment.

The basis of the child's psychical life, namely the emotions, is badly accounted for by both. In Freud, all emotions originate from the sexual sphere, an assumption which, even if it is proved to be genetically correct, leaves unexplained precisely the essential part of the emotional life, namely, its differentiations. In Adler there is, besides the so-called feeling of inferiority, no other feeling of essential importance, since all other emotions can apparently just as easily be explained from the feeling of inferiority, and, as in Freud, the emotions are derived from the sexual impulse. Even granted that we actually find explained in these two theories the source of our whole emotional life, I maintain that we still need a theory of the emotional life itself in order to understand the manifoldly graded scale of the emotions in the human psychical life.

Since we are not dealing here with a theory of the emotional life but with problems of education, it may be stated on the ground of other experiences that the therapeutic, as well as the pedagogic, experiments of the new generation of psychologists have taught us how inaccessible and difficult to influence the emotion sphere is. Just this fact has led to the setting up of such simplifying theories as those Freud and Adler represent with regard to the emotional life.

The result was that the emotional life of the child, as of the adult, was not understood; it was interpreted, and indeed with the presupposition of not primarily understanding but of changing the individual, or something in him, because it is undesirable. Certainly we consider this a part of the program of education, especially that part which concerns the early impulse life, yet it is no new factor, much less a modern factor in education, for the early education, at least according to our present concept, ought first of all to develop the child's given impulse disposition and not subject it to correction. Indeed, even when it appears to be in need of correction, we must ask ourselves the question whether too early an intervention is not to be avoided just as much as too late an intervention. So the educational ideology of modern psychologists proves to be as conventional as that of the old school of pedagogues; namely, it wants to correct and restrict the child's early manifestations of individuality, only the justification of this bending of the will is now a psychological one, whereas the moral attitude of condemning emotions as bad remains the same.

The former handling of the emotional life in education was relatively simple; one met the child's emotions with one's own feelings, that is, emotionally, without bothering about the origin and significance of the feeling itself, indeed, without always giving an account of its purpose and aim. This primitive method has succeeded fairly well these thousands of years, because feeling reacts most of all on feeling and is influenced by it. For in the moment when one wants to influence the child's emotional development intelligently and not temperamentally, there results for the educator, not only the obvious demand to control his own

affects, but also the impossible demand to be able to measure out his emotions in doses. This homeopathic dosing is, however, impossible in the emotional life and something foreign to its very nature; hence it would unfavorably influence the child's emotional life, even if the educator could measure out his emotions.

Generally, the parents and educators give free rein to their emotional expressions toward the child; this, in and for itself, would not only serve the purpose of unburdening one's own, but also of developing the child's emotional life, if just as free an expression were allowed the child. The opposite is, however, the case, and this suppression of the emotions compels the child to seek other means of expression which are then considered by adults as childish naughtiness or faults, since their real source, the emotional development itself, is not understood. Children thus brought up, when adult, will either keep the same suppression of feeling and on this account will tolerate no expression of emotion in their children, much less arouse it, or, as a reaction to this suppression in childhood, they will later exceed all bounds in emotional outbursts, but will allow no direct emotional reaction to it in their children. But if emotional suppression in the educator himself is just as harmful as an excess of feeling and if measuring out the emotions in doses is impossible, the question is, then, how shall the adult's emotional life be supplied in order to make possible a sound emotional training in the child?

This pedagogic cardinal question seems to me answerable only in an unpedagogic way. The adult's emotional life first of all may be supplied as it will; his task as educator would be to accept the child's emotional life as it develops from the individual and as a reaction to the

parental emotional life. Certainly that means not allowing complete freedom from control in the child's emotional life, but there should be respect for the true nature of the same. The child cannot express affects of a definite kind and definite quantity, at definite times, just to please the parents or educators, and the latter should know from their own experience how unreasonable such a demand would be. If it were not so, all our problems of education would not exist, just as little as would the adult's neurotic problems which have again recently made the reform of education so urgent. So long as the child's emotional expressions are felt by adults as disturbances of their own emotional life, or in so far as they are provoked in the child only for the gratification of adults, there can be no free unfolding or development of emotion in the child. The essence of emotion consists in its spontaneity, however, of its qualitative, quantitative, and temporal indeterminableness, and every educational attempt to influence it in one of these directions must fail if its success is not to be at the cost of the whole emotional development.

The emotions cannot be dosed; they can, however, be formed and influenced, but only by the representative emotional life of the parents; by that I mean representative not in the sense of an ideal but in the sense of an example. In other words, one ought not to pay too much attention to isolated emotions and their affective manifestation, which certainly cannot always be exemplary for the child. But it is a matter of the adult's whole attitude to his emotional life as such, which the child senses and imitates in reacting to it. This whole attitude should operate representatively, in the meaning of a free expression of the emotion. In a word, a free natural expression of emotion in the educator



will also most easily stimulate such an emotion in the child whereby one also ought not to fear acting unpedagogically with a bad manifestation of affect, because with it one serves the higher educational aim of the formation of the human being. We cannot only beget good, beautiful, noble, and moderate emotions in the child; if the child is to have a human emotional life, then the child will always be capable also of the ugly, ignoble, and immoderate affects, which, however, will always be more valuable from a human standpoint than complete suppression of the affect which would then find some outlet in other, not always beautiful, ways.

This leads us to the much-discussed request that the educator shall be consistent, a request that we can support only from the psychological viewpoint. But this consistency ought not to be artificially acquired, not even on the ground of however good a principle of education, if it is not to lose much of its pedagogic value. It should rather correspond to a spontaneous expression of one's own personality which is consistent in being just that. If parents and educators are themselves as much as possible in general and also toward the child, then this will better enable the child to accept, develop, and express his own self as he sees the parents also doing. This kind of personality demonstration, however paradoxical it may sound, will rob the child least of all of its individual peculiarities, because it least of all forces on him the individuality of the parents or educator. The parents also need not learn much for this, at most to become a little freer themselves in their own emotional expression, without having to fear that this could operate as a harmful example. We do not yet know very much about the inheritance of physical dispositions

and peculiarities, and the inheritance of peculiarities of character in the child is still more problematical. Psychoanalysis has again clearly warned us that a large amount of compensation and counterformation occurs in the building of the character, so that, for example, a child may develop particularly well a peculiarity of character just because the father was weak in this respect, even though the child had inherited the disposition to the weakness but had been able to overcome it by compensation.

How important is the parents' whole attitude to the emotional life as such, above all to their own, independently of isolated manifestations of the same, is clearly shown in the essential difficulties which we come across in the early infantile trainings. They begin with the physical training of the suckling in cleanliness and regularity in its physical functions, in a word, the impulse education, which soon passes over into the training of the will in the narrower sense. But we already know from little experience in sex education that it is not sufficient to be less prudish here and not to suppress all manifestations of the sexual impulse, unless the educator's whole attitude to all the child's impulse manifestations is a freer one. For we have learned to understand that the child so reacts to the suppression of an impulse in a definite sphere as if every kind of impulse manifestation was forbidden; so that, for example, the restrictions which may be necessary in relation to his physical functions can very easily be automatically transferred to the sexual impulse manifestations; and, indeed, not merely because they are linked up with the same organ but also because the child gets the impression that every kind of free impulse activity is forbidden or undesirable. A further difficulty is added, namely, that the

child very soon identifies the manifestations of impulse and the suppression of impulse with manifestations of the will and suppression of the will, as later on the child transfers the same conflict to the sphere of the emotions and there also allows only such manifestations as are pleasing to the parents and suppresses others. Certainly the suppression of feeling begins with the suppression of bad feelings, or such as are felt to be bad, and then encroaches upon the whole life of the emotions.

Since we do not yet prescribe a theory of the emotional life which would be the presupposition of every educational understanding, we can here only attempt to estimate the complicated relation of impulse, will, and feeling in its significance for the understanding of early childhood's problems of education. In our cultural milieu, the necessary regulation of childish impulse manifestations is a phase preceding education in the narrower sense and is then followed by the real training of the will as a direct groundwork of school and instruction. The emotional life finds no place at all in this educational scheme; perhaps rightly so, because the community is primarily not interested in the individual's possibilities of happiness, but is only interested in the individual's usefulness and fitness for the community. If the individual, besides fulfilling his social functions, can still be personally happy, so much the better! But this possibility of happiness depends on his emotional life, and like this, it is, so to say, his private concern.

The natural educators of the emotional life, hence, are the parents, as the emotional life altogether is essentially a matter of the home, in a word, is a private concern. I believe it is this fact above all which the parents have

first to comprehend and accept rather than to seek for specific advice in every single difficult situation, which again may be more a matter for the professional educator, psychologist, and therapist. Even with this changed attitude of the parents, which is the first step toward the improvement of conditions, the emotional education will always be difficult enough. It will be so primarily because the education of the emotions is no education in the real sense of the word, as, for example, is the training of the impulses and the will, which mainly consists of guiding and forming given forces. The child brings into the world relatively strong impulses and develops them in the course of its natural growth; these, fundamentally, need only to be tamed and domesticated. On the other hand, there develops with the impulse life and from its restrictions, the child's own will, which later contributes to the formation of his personality. The parents are mainly occupied with the training of this automatically developing will, which seems to afford them the greatest difficulties, and hence they neglect the formation of the emotions. This, however, fundamentally is a new creation, for the child brings into the world a relatively rudimentary emotional life, which it cannot further develop alone out of itself, but only in relation to the persons near to it.

There is a very close psychological relation between the manifestation of the will and the emotions, the complete understanding of which has not yet been made quite accessible to us. It seems to me, however, that the training of the will cannot alone result by means of the parental counter-will, but it takes place also by means of the emotional life or formation of the emotions. The simplest and best known example for this is the overcoming of the

childish stubbornness through love. I do not only mean that feelings can and should be used for the training of the will, but that the child's emotional life must be developed first from the sphere of will by influencing it in a certain way. That means, for example, as the love of the educator can overcome the child's will, so the emotional life in the child itself must break the too strong manifestations of its own will, or, as we say, the child overcomes its own will out of love for the educator and gives it up on its own account, without first being compelled to it. The psychological understanding of this process was hidden as long as we had only in mind the relation of the child to the educator and the duel of wills between the two. The worse or better attitude of the child will depend, however, on its own ability to produce in itself an emotional manifestation instead of an expression of will. In the ideal case, this is love, but also from reactions of regret, penitence, or guilt feeling, good pedagogic effects may be obtained.

If the will itself is, so to say, broken and softened, there result real emotions which I have designated as "uniting," such as devotion, submission, repentance, guilt, all of which one might comprehend under the term "love emotions." On the other hand, there are those feelings which do not result from a softening of the will, but from an inhibition of the will, thus do not weaken the will but, on the contrary, strengthen it; they are the separating reactions, such as stubbornness, rage, pride, fear, and these one might best characterize collectively as "hate-affects." These can easily be aroused in the child by the educator if he forces the training of the will; on the other hand, also the child itself is more easily inclined to their production



because they permit of an outer possibility for discharge, which is less possible in the uniting feelings of love. For the feelings that unite, arise, as already stated, in the individual himself from a renunciation of the achievement of will; hence they presuppose on the whole a higher stage of ego and personality development than one generally finds in the child. This should mean that one has to expect in the child, much more and much earlier, negative feelings (hate-affects) resulting from the inhibition of will than the feelings of love following from self-discipline of which the adult, as a rule, is capable of in varying high degree. The hate-affects mentioned are, however, not only as it were negative feelings, but they prevent in general the arising of the positive love feelings, or at least their expression if they arise.

Here comes into play a process highly important for the understanding of the emotional life, and which I have described as denial of feeling. This takes place when an arising feeling of love is not only not expressed, that is, is suppressed, but is feigned as not existing when the will opposes this emotional expression, because it is submission and surrender. This resistance to the love emotion generally manifests itself as pride or shame, ego reactions which have to do with the nature of the feeling as something purely internal, which the individual wants to keep to himself.

So the emotional life with its mixture of impulsive, willed, and consciously aimed action shows us only too clearly how impossible it is for us to motivate our actions one-sidedly. We have also experienced how difficult it is to investigate the motives of a definite action, since the

same action may spring from different kinds of stimuli and hence can also have the most varied physical effects.

This sufficiently enough complicated state of affairs becomes still more intricate when we have learned to consider that the human emotional life not only arises from the impulsive ego, but is also fed from another source which we might designate as the moral ego. Psychoanalysis in its endeavor to derive all feelings from the sexual impulse has neglected this source, although Freud was later on compelled to a partial recognition of it, whereas Adler now includes it in his concept of social feeling. In the morally educated and ethically adjusted human being, not only individual impulses are operative as motives of action, feeling, and thought, but also the collective endeavors are operative as manifested religiously or socially. This pedagogically important source of the emotional life has hitherto been studied still less than its impulse side, so that our educational understanding shows great gaps and lacks from the standpoint of collective psychology.

For the increase in our pedagogic understanding cannot alone result from an improved insight into the nature, abilities, and needs of the child as an individual, but must also lead to a clear formulation of the real task of education and to the knowledge of its limits. Often enough we experience that a better understanding of the child or a definite situation makes the task of the educator more difficult, if not impossible; similarly, as the criminologist is more confused than helped when he learns to understand the psychical motives in the criminal. For all understanding leads rather to tolerance than to action without which we cannot proceed in the education of the child or as in dealing with antisocial individuals. The new psychological

understanding of the child's emotional life presents the educator with new difficult tasks which formerly did not exist at all in pedagogy. The educator may very well understand an undesirable action of the child's and yet will often be necessitated or compelled to act from purely pedagogic reasons, as if he understood nothing of the psychological motivation. In a certain sense, this is only right; for he does not bother himself about the psychological motivation of good or desirable actions. If he did, he would often find to his astonishment that good actions arise from motives which he must condemn, as, on the other hand, is also shown that an evil act can spring from very good, in themselves praiseworthy, motives. In a word, since pedagogy must have as its aim a definite mode of action, the motivation is left to the individual and is investigated only in the case of an undesirable action. The motivation, by the impulse, will, or emotion, which is behind the action, is, so to say, the private concern of the individual, and the increasing separation of these two spheres has to a large extent also become the source of our conflicts. If modern psychology, and especially psychoanalysis, now investigates not only the mental attitude, as the church has done, but also the impulsive and emotional motivation (the so-called unconscious), it will naturally incline to a radical revaluation of all educational values which, fundamentally, is the same thing as replacing education with psychological understanding, instead of applying it within the confines of education. This use, however, can, after what we have said, be only a very limited one, since a further application necessarily leads to the psychology of motives which operates precisely antipedagogically.

This explains why modern psychology is so difficult to apply constructively to education, whereas it may be helpful therapeutically in cases of maladjustment. On the other hand, the therapeutic and pedagogic application of our understanding of human motives becomes more and more difficult the more we know. Increasing realization of the complexity of causes and effects makes therapeutic and educational intervention more difficult, because knowledge inhibits action.

So here at the end of my speech you see probably more clearly why I do not believe in a purely intellectual approach for the handling of the emotional life. Even if you had fully understood and grasped my viewpoint and went home with the best intention to apply it, you might find that it does not work as you expected it to do. On the other hand, if you did not follow me or did not approve of my attitude but reacted emotionally to it, in dealing with your children it might in the long run have a better effect on them. If I succeeded in rousing you emotionally, besides stimulating you intellectually, then I shall feel my trip to Chicago and my attending this conference have not been in vain.





## ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS



# PHYSIOLOGY OF HUNGER AND APPETITE IN RELATION TO THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF THE CHILD

*Anton J. Carlson, Professor of Physiology,  
University of Chicago*

It would have been more appropriate to discuss hunger before rather than after the luncheon. You might have paid a little more attention. At this very hour I should be speaking to a hundred freshmen out at the University on the functions of the kidneys. I have to switch from the region of the pelvis to the stomach and the brain. I am glad, however, that any errors I may commit on this relation of the emotions to hunger and appetite Drs. Roberts, Myerson, and Jones will promptly correct in the discussion. Some things are obvious. The nutrition of animals and of man up until very recent times has been guided by hunger, by appetite, and by whatever food was available. Hunger and appetite have been the main guide to the kind and quantity of food consumed. It has not been intelligence, except if you include as intelligence the phenomenon of avoiding foods that once made you sick. That is a kind of learning, to be sure; it may be correct, it may also be wrong.

For example, forty years ago when I traveled on an immigrant boat from Liverpool to New York, we had very rough weather in mid-ocean. Most of us were seasick, and we had rancid butter. The appearance of the rancid butter associated with the hundreds of seasick people on the crowded immigrant boat had such an effect on me that I disliked butter for the next ten or fifteen years. That

kind of learning is not intelligence. The past experience of primitive people and of animals has been learning of this crude type. It was only yesterday that man began to secure objective and accurate information of food values, food needs, the nature of hunger and appetite, and the various factors that control it. The start was made in Europe and has been pursued in various countries, notably by the eminent physiologist, Cannon, at Harvard, and a group of workers in our Chicago laboratory. The easiest things to study here, of course, are the objective phenomena. It is a little hard to define how we feel when we are hungry, except that we describe it as a feeling of emptiness or a feeling of pressure or intermittent mild pain in the epigastrium. When a balloon is introduced into the stomach or in the upper end of the small intestines when this subjective feeling is present, then we find that the stomach, the lower end of the esophagus, and the upper end, at least, of the small intestine exhibit periodic contractions. The stronger these contractions, the stronger are the pains or pangs of hunger, and if any of these parts of the gut (the lower esophagus, the stomach, and the upper part of the intestines) should happen to go into spasm, as they sometimes do, then you feel an extremely uncomfortable tension and you become extremely anxious to do something to get rid of that feeling.

As our chairman said, these phenomena can be objectively studied in all types of animals, and we have found that wherever there is a stomach in an animal these phenomena are shown. Undoubtedly, the stomach exhibits these phenomena long before the human baby is born. I have studied this by using a very small balloon on a very small hard rubber tube in prematurely born infants, and the phe-

nomenon is there. As a matter of fact, these very young infants do exhibit nearly continuous hunger pangs. Adult man exhibits a period of gastric hunger activity, lasting from twenty minutes to a half-hour, and then a period of quiescence, anywhere from a half-hour to three or four hours. But in the younger animal (and I include here the human species and the prematurely born infant if healthy), the stomach, though empty, continues these vigorous contractions almost continuously.

It is peculiar that in altered states these contractions of the lower esophagus, the stomach, and the upper end of the small intestine may give rise to an entirely different effect in consciousness, namely, the phenomenon of nausea.

The pathology of hunger has not been extensively studied by these objective methods. Take, for example, the large group of undernourished children that do not seem to be interested in food. A child not interested in food is certainly as functionally pathological as anyone can be. The urge to eat is as fundamental as the urge to reproduction. Failure of the urge to eat, be it organic or functional, is pathology of the first order. These studies have not been extended to that group. They have not been extended to many other types of anorexia, associated with definite disease. So there are many gaps that need to be filled.

What I have to say here largely concerns normal individuals. When these periodic gastric contractions are present, we feel the hunger urge; when they are absent, there is absence of hunger, not necessarily absence of appetite. While physiologists and psychologists are not agreed entirely on this subject, I think it is fair to say



that from the increased knowledge in subjective analysis it seems increasingly probable that the phenomenon of appetite is entirely different from the phenomenon of hunger. The reason, ordinarily, is that the one arouses the other, they become fused in experience, as is the case with the taste of food and the smell of food. Hunger is something that we cannot essentially modify except in this way of depression. It seems to be an inherent primitive reflex. To be sure, the mental states will modify the effects of the gastric movements. When we cannot essentially modify them, the gastric contractions produce an unpleasant mental state, it puts one in a tension that even renders the blood pressure vacillating. We become nervous and restless.

Nothing is more striking, ladies and gentlemen, than to see a dog or a bird, with the cerebrum removed, sitting or lying perfectly quiet so long as its stomach is filled with food, so long as its thirst is satisfied, so long as the bowels and the bladder do not cause disturbance in the brain. Let the stomach get entirely empty, or let the bird or dog be thirsty, and it is aroused to activity perpetually until that craving is satisfied. That happens without the cerebrum, without consciousness, so that nervousness or irritation of the central nervous system that comes from these peripheral mechanisms seems to be inherited, and not built up from experience.

The first objective observations on the effect of the emotions on the gastric motility did not have any relation to hunger. They were made by Professor Cannon at Harvard in a different line of investigation. It was shortly after the epoch-making discovery of the X-ray in physics and the brilliant application of X-ray to study the gastro-

intestinal tract. Most of you know, I think, that we can add a little barium or a little bismuth to a meal, even an ordinary meal such as we had here, and render the whole alimentary canal, from the stomach down as far as these foods are distributed, visible on the fluoroscopic screen in a perfectly normal individual, or in a sick individual, or for that matter, a perfectly normal animal. It was while studying the digestion by means of the X-ray in the cat that Dr. Cannon discovered that emotions stop the stomach and intestinal movements.

The cat was lying perfectly quiet and calm, and then, by accident I think, a dog was brought into the room. The cat became angry or frightened and there was a complete paralysis of the movement of the stomach and of the intestines so long as the cat was angry or scared (I don't know which, probably both), and for some time afterward. That was an animal observation. This has now been extended to man. It has been extended to the secretion of gastric juice and to these hunger movements that I have described.

The statement can be summed up very briefly that the strong emotions (which include pain) will stop or inhibit the secretion of gastric juice, the movements of the stomach and the intestines in digestion, the movements of the esophagus, the stomach, and the upper end of the intestines in hunger. It is not, therefore, difficult to understand why these major or intense emotions should abolish hunger. It is a little more difficult to understand why they should abolish appetite.

How do these emotions abolish hunger? That has not been absolutely cleared up, but it can happen in two ways. In the first place, these regions of the gut that we have

been discussing, the lower esophagus, the whole stomach, and the small intestine, are supplied with so-called sympathetic nerves connecting these parts with the central nervous system. We find, experimentally, that when we irritate these nerves, motility in these parts is stopped. We call them inhibitory nerves. These are nerves that inhibit, and there is abundant evidence that, depending on the intensity of the emotional state, there is simultaneously or subsequently or prior to these emotional states increased activity of most of these involuntary sympathetic nerves. We could then explain these inhibitions, viz. of the movements of digestion, the movements of hunger, the decrease in the secretion of gastric juice, by the overaction of these nerves.

In recent days another factor has come into play as a possibility. I refer to the theory that in these intense emotional states there is an increased outpouring of a chemical substance from the adrenal glands, the two small glands that lie close to the kidney, a chemical (adrenalin) which nearly everywhere in the body acts in the same way on the organs as these sympathetic nerves that I mentioned. There is no question, ladies and gentlemen, that if there is such an excess outpouring of this substance the same inhibitions will be brought about, but we are still not certain whether that excess outpouring occurs.

The secretion of gastric juice depends at least on two factors. One factor depends on the state of appetite or hunger in the brain. When that is present, then the smell, the taste, or the thinking of food will increase or start secretion of gastric juice by action of the so-called secretory nerves. That this factor should fail then in emotion is not so difficult to understand, because the attention with

reference to the cerebrum is switched into other channels. What is more difficult at present to understand is why the part of secretion of gastric juice, which is induced by the presence of food in the stomach and in the intestines, and which is a pure chemical factor not depending at all on the central state, occurring in sleep or under anesthesia, is inhibited by strong emotions. That would seem to demand that there are in this involuntary nervous complex, going out to the gastric glands, some kind of nerves which also inhibit secretion. It is difficult to explain on any other basis.

In my experience, the duration of this depression, the depression of hunger, the depression of digestion motility, the depression of secretion, depends on the intensity of the emotions. In an adult person the period of emotion does not last very long, and I have not made sufficiently extensive studies on children to state whether the paralysis of these functions lasts longer in them.

From a recent review of the literature of our knowledge, made necessary by a kind of compulsory service on the White House Conference on Child Welfare, I am inclined to think that is one of the major gaps in our knowledge of child life.

I noticed that the speakers this morning qualified by being parents. I can qualify, too, as being some kind of parent. I tried to help to raise three, and they are nearly raised; how successfully I should not like to say. One learns as a parent and as a teacher and as an instructor with thirty years' experience in the college and university, where one meets children of all sorts. Certainly it is the impression from my own children, and I think you would probably all agree, that the emotional expressions at least

in the child are less controlled, are more vivid or intense than in the adult. If this general impression (I do not like to speak on this because we physiologists try to limit ourselves to things we know, and we do not know this for certain) or if this surmise is correct, then my guess is (and I only guess it) that this more or less poorly controlled emotional life of the child is a very great factor in the anorexia, in the disturbances of the feeding urge and digestion, that we meet in children. This is stated as a program for investigation.

How are we going to control it? That is another matter entirely, but it is futile to begin to discuss control until we know the facts. So far as I know, there is no peripheral mechanism of appetite, but there is indeed a taste sense in the mouth. The nervous system of the alimentary canal must be normal in order for the appetite to be normal. We can go farther than that and say that the flow of impulses from the entire viscera, subconscious though they are, must largely be normal in order for an appetite to be normal. Any experienced physician knows that you can get anorexia from tumors of the ovaries, from tumors of the uterus, from tumors in the pelvis, from any disturbances in the abdomen that lead to an abnormal flow of impulses to the central nervous system, impulses which do not themselves produce the appetite. It is more like a medium such as the air necessary for the flight of the aeroplane. The air does not give any energy to the flight of the aeroplane; nevertheless, it has to be there. If the medium is too thin, the aeroplane cannot fly. When we have a more or less normal flow of the sensory impulses from the viscera, hunger and appetite are possible. When there is an abnormal kind or amount of impulses



from the viscera the very opposite occurs, namely, the feeling of nausea.

Given, however, that normal factor, then so far as I have been able to analyze appetite, it seems to depend on, or be developed by, experience, and I question whether anything like appetite mechanism is really inherited. Of course, we all know this, those of us who have had experience with children: On the whole, the newborn and even the premature will probably swallow more easily something sweet than something sour. We cannot tell his likes or dislikes, with the exception of the swallowing reflexes. Apart from that, surely human experience shows that you can, by training, learn to like any digestible thing that does not make you seriously sick. You can learn to like every edible thing, and after you have had experience with it sufficiently, you can learn to like it to the point where it becomes a positive drive for you to want the something which, when you first experienced it, was positively disagreeable.

I have had a personal experience of that type. I had never eaten fresh tomatoes until I was fifteen years old—I had never seen them. They do not grow them in that part of the north of Europe where I was raised, and at that time they did not import them. The first time I saw a ripe red tomato I thought it was some new kind of apple. I was fond of apples, so I got one and bit into it, and the disgusting, disagreeable effect on me of that fluid, insipid, warm mass that filled my mouth was something very striking, and I have not forgotten it in forty years. It took me years (I don't know how many), but I gradually trained myself to like the tomato, and I don't know anything now that I like so much as a real ripe, sweet, normal

tomato just picked off the vine. There is nothing fundamental either in my first disgust or in my subsequent like. I use it as an illustration of how essentially everything in appetite, unless it be the primary reaction to sweet, acid, or bitter, is a matter of training or experience. So I think that so far as the emotions influence appetite, it is not a question of inhibiting or depressing peripheral processes, but it is a question of switching regions of attention in the brain.

## CONTROL OF EMOTION THROUGH RELAXATION

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From the standpoint of your interests, the problem of the emotions might readily be divided into two topics: first, what emotions you wish to cultivate in your children, and, second, what emotions you wish to discourage. Under the second of these topics falls the control of emotions through relaxation.

What we definitely know about emotions has resulted chiefly from laboratory investigations on adults. While we are still uninformed on many important as well as fundamental matters, considerable progress has been made. As early as 1881, Mosso, an Italian investigator, showed that during emotion there occurs a change in the circulation of the brain as well as of the arm. Since that time, other investigators have observed effects on the pulse, heart-beat, breathing, and blood-pressure. Even the bladder responds at once by contracting during emotion.

As is well known, bodily changes during emotional states occur in the stomach and intestines. When a cat is markedly frightened, the digestive movements have been found to cease abruptly (Cannon). Likewise the digestive juices may cease to flow (Pavlov). We have devoted intensive study to the behavior of the esophagus during emotion. This muscular tube conveys food from the mouth to the stomach. When our individuals were in a state of excitement, the esophagus, as studied under the X-ray, did not

function properly. It tended to become contracted throughout or in parts, squeezing the food within, instead of passing the food along to the stomach. Corresponding to this constriction or spasm, the individual complained of a feeling of tightness in his chest, or "a lump in his throat," which was sometimes very painful. We could also obtain charts showing whether the esophagus was contracted or relaxed at any minute because our subjects very kindly consented to swallow a small deflated balloon. The balloon could be blown up with a little air by means of a narrow rubber tube which extended from the balloon up his throat and out of his mouth. When his esophagus contracted during emotion or subsequently relaxed, a little air would be squeezed out of, or sucked into, the balloon, and it was easy to obtain a graphic record of these changes in air pressure. In this way we secured evidence that during emotion the esophagus contracted; but after these individuals had been trained to relax, we found that for periods during which our records showed relaxation of that organ, they, without seeing these records, reported an absence of emotion.

I have no plan to say more than a few words about these various laboratory studies, leaving you to look up the matter further if you like. For the most part you will find that the results of writers in these fields agree that one group of muscles or another contract during emotion. Likewise, the nerves which lead to these muscles are necessarily active.

Frequent opportunities to study emotions come to the physician who deals with nervous patients. The knowledge of emotions gained during the practice of medicine, when not achieved by laboratory methods, is likely to be lacking

in precision. But the careful clinician may make a wide range of interesting observations.

The nervous patient generally recounts a history of emotional states, including anxieties, fears, griefs, and other disagreeable experiences. Frequently, however, the complaint is not explicitly made of unpleasant mental states, but rather the patient tells of symptoms from the heart, stomach, intestines, or other internal organs. You will not be surprised at this if you recall that during emotional states the heart rate is likely to be quickened. Consequently the patient complains of what he calls palpitation. Again, you will recall that during the emotion of fear or anxiety, we have found that the esophagus, at least in some individuals, tends to contract spasmodically. I have examined many patients with this condition and have characteristically found them in an emotional state during the time of spasm. Such patients are likely to believe that they have distress in the upper portions of their abdomen, a feeling of pressure or fulness, and at times they may belch frequently. Swallowing food may relieve them during its passage. It is no wonder, then, that such patients, hearing tales of ulcers of the stomach and of appendicitis, develop fears that they, too, have these maladies, and perhaps seek relief through medicines or operations. Needless to say, such remedies fail to prove effective if the cause of the disorder lies in wrong habits of emotional living.

The large intestine, also, in many instances responds during emotion by spasmodic contraction. At least this is suggested by X-rays and the emotional state of patients who complain of frequent bowel movements accompanied by mucus. Frequently, in place of diarrhea, there is constipation. Sometimes there is pain in the abdomen—per-



haps in the appendix or gall-bladder region. Patients with spastic intestines characteristically recount symptoms of high nerve tension—fears, anxieties, and other emotional excesses. Particularly in children, these emotions often cannot definitely be called fear or anger or by any definite names. For instance, I recall a child of five, with frequent bloody bowel movements, whose overemotionality seemed to be occasioned chiefly by the excessive and solicitous attention of an extremely nervous mother. All you could say of the child was that while no definite emotion predominated, she was characteristically in a highly emotional state. As we continued to keep her in bed many hours a day and instructed the mother in being less nervous when handling her, the child became more placid and the intestinal symptoms progressively diminished. Another instance of the absence of any particularly predominant emotion was observed in a child of nine, who had severe attacks of abdominal pain, apparently due to intestinal spasm. She was bright, alert, talkative, and restless. She rather rapidly learned to relax, and as her restlessness decreased, her intestinal symptoms subsided also.

My experience in these matters has been largely limited to adults; but the observations on the two children mentioned suggest that, so far as influence of emotional states is concerned, the same principles apply to children as to adults. Our evidence as to the influence of muscular relaxation in quieting intestinal emotional states is not complete; further investigations are in progress.

Since excess emotion frequently accompanies (or is practically identical with) what is commonly called nervousness, you may be interested in present-day conceptions of this condition. Far back, in 1880, a New York physi-

cian, Dr. Beard, wrote of what he called "neurasthenia" which he believed to be exhaustion of the nerves. He believed that exhaustion brought about a state of "irritable weakness" and that these changes in the nervous substance were responsible for the many nervous symptoms which were prevalent in America even at that early date.

However, since Dr. Beard's time, we have not been able to find marked evidence that the cause of American nervousness, as he called it, lies in fatigue. Examination of the substance of nerves under the microscope has failed to reveal an anatomic basis for what he called "irritable weakness," nor have any experiments on the reactions of nerves as studied by physiologists confirmed his hypothesis. Beard seems to have overlooked the fact that many Americans are continually on the alert, continually doing something, continually tense. He seems to have put the cart before the horse in seeking to explain their nervousness as the result of fatigue, whereas it would seem much more likely that the fatigue follows as the result of the continual nervous-muscular activity that many Americans manifest.

This activity can be detected and measured by various laboratory methods. Possibly I may spend two or three minutes describing one of the more recent methods. You all know how you would measure the speed of a motor-car. You say, for instance, that its rate is fast when it goes sixty miles per hour. Or again, you might say that it goes fast if the number of revolutions of its wheels on the ground is at a high frequency per second. We can make measurements somewhat on this order when dealing with nervousness in human beings. We can test the number of discharges per second from their nerves and muscles. If, ideally, an individual lies upon a couch completely relaxed,

then the rate of discharge per second from his nerves and muscles would be zero. A human motor-nerve commonly discharges at the rate of from one to fifty per second, the muscle discharging immediately afterward at the same rate of discharge as the nerve which supplies it. Fifty is said to be the highest rate of discharge of a muscle fiber, but different fibers discharge in volleys at intervals. Therefore, if you make your records from a whole muscle, you will get a large number of volleys, some simultaneous and others in sequence, as if you were listening to gun-fire. If you wish to count the number of discharges per second, you must take your measurements from a single fiber or a very small group of fibers.

In this sense, then, when we speak of a person as being excessively nervous, we mean that records made from various of his nerve-muscle groups will show that the individual fibers in many instances are discharging at high frequency per second. This gives a graphic meaning to the current saying, "He is living at high speed."

Since conditions of nervousness, including highly emotional states, have been found to involve muscular contraction, it seemed quite logical to look in the direction of relaxation for a means to treat these conditions. But when the average individual who is nervous or emotional lies upon a couch, his emotional state does not necessarily subside. Indeed, in many instances he feels an increase of the disagreeable experience. We are forced to conclude that such measures as simply lying down are not sufficient in themselves, and that if a medical method for the treatment of nervousness is to be secured, it is necessary to develop a more extreme degree of relaxation. If you closely observe a nervous or emotional individual lying down, you

may frequently note that he continues to fidget, to move a leg or arm or a finger from time to time, while his breathing continues rapid. If you take his pulse, you may find that it does not diminish to a normal resting rate. Most commonly his eyeballs continue to move under the closed lids. If you interrupt him, he reports, upon question, that his mind continues to be active. In the studies which we have undertaken up to date, if the esophagus is spastic, it persists in this excited state.

Accordingly, if merely lying down frequently proves ineffective, how shall we produce extreme muscular relaxation? The best method that I have been able to find seeks to accomplish this, not in the course of days, but in the course of months. It seems better to sacrifice speed in securing results in the interest of thoroughness. Therefore the patient is shown how to relax extremely each of the muscle groups until the whole body has been covered. During practice with any particular muscle group he relaxes it farther and farther each moment, past the point where the muscle seems to him perfectly relaxed. For it is found that untrained persons fail to recognize when they are tense in one part or another, and cultivation of the muscle-sense therefore becomes a valuable part of training. Our observations seem to indicate that as the individual practices daily, following biweekly periods of training there is a general diminution of muscular tension and the individual learns to control the presence of tension in specific localities of his body. You will readily see why, from the foregoing characteristics, the term "progressive relaxation" has seemed appropriate for this method of medical training.

After the individual has been trained to achieve complete or almost complete muscular relaxation lying down,

he is trained in the relaxation of various muscle groups while sitting and even while engaging in various daily occupations. That is, if he is in a state of excitement, the attempt is made to show him how to relax away that excitement without lying down. Clinical results suggest that if he is troubled by emotional states such as fears or worries, it is possible to reduce these conditions by teaching him to relax muscular contractions which appear when such fears or worries are present.

Likewise clinical studies of nervous heart disorders and of spastic conditions of the esophagus and intestines, including mucus colitis, indicate that as habits of relaxation become developed the symptoms disappear. Objective tests, including X-rays, also point to the diminution of the underlying disorder. At the same time the reports of the patient agree with the clinical observation that he becomes less inclined to excess emotion. We cannot teach the patient directly to relax the muscles of his internal organs; but laboratory studies on the esophagus suggest that as the trained subject relaxes his voluntary muscles, there follows a corresponding diminution in tension of the (involuntary) no emotion takes place.

As you will recall, the results of many investigators would seem to indicate that during emotion there is always in some part of the body active muscular contraction. In harmony with this, the reports of our subjects who have been trained to relax their muscles extremely agree that when the muscles of the entire body are completely relaxed, no emotion takes place.

Since 1890, a certain test for the presence of emotion has come into wide use. The individual lies upon a couch while a very faint electrical current is passed through his



body. Then something is said or done to excite emotion. Whatever the emotion may be, it is found that, beginning from one to four seconds after the stimulus, the electrical current meets with less resistance in its passage through the body. This is due probably, at least in part, to very slight sweating, which occurs soon after the stimulus. The electrical change, which can readily be measured by an instrument called the galvanometer, is known as the psychogalvanic reflex. We have not as yet begun experiments specifically on that reflex; but frequently in our investigations we have observed what was apparently the psychogalvanic reflex, and we have found that during extreme muscular relaxation this reflex disappears.

You will readily understand why we believe that emotions subside during extreme muscular relaxation if I add that we are gathering evidence indicating that all mental activities subside under such conditions. During certain recent tests, the subject has been requested upon signal to engage in imagining or recalling certain matters and upon the second signal to relax any muscular tensions present. In the tests so far made, very delicate electrical instruments have shown the presence of specific muscular tensions during the mental activity. Upon the complete relaxation of such muscular tension, the mental activity, as reported by the subject, ceased. This is evidence that the cessation of mental activity can be brought about through the relaxation of the specific muscles involved. Previous to these electrical tests, our subjects have independently given reports to the same effect. We now find that in highly trained subjects the relaxation of an act of imagining or recalling can be brought about in as brief a time as a fifth of a second. In clinical experience, we often seem to find that

the individual becomes emotional in consequence of imagining or recalling some particular matters. Therefore, if it is possible to relax the act of imagining or recalling, it would also seem likely that we have in this respect a means to decrease the emotional state.

What is the importance of all this for common daily action? Just this, that practically every act that you engage in, or that your child engages in, can be analyzed in part into a series of muscular contractions. You cannot lift a glass of water, cannot walk or talk except with a specific and complicated series of muscular contractions. These contractions, then, constitute much of the warp and woof of daily living. Accordingly, the topic of muscular tension and relaxation is concerned with the voluntary conduct of living.

Everyone is familiar with the child who makes excessive muscular contractions. To be sure, children are naturally more active than adults. But one can, with care, detect in certain children an excessive restlessness as compared with others of their age.

These children apparently fall into various groups. There is first the group which includes individuals who are bright and overalert but who present no disorder of behavior. You may note an undue quickness in their responses, a high-pitched voice or a tendency to excessive speech, a readiness to fatigue, and in some cases undernutrition. In other instances the condition of high nerve tension is sufficiently marked to produce symptoms from specific organs: those from the stomach and intestines are perhaps the most common. In the second group of conditions falling under the heading high nerve tension belong many or most of the behavior disorders. These include

the conditions of unreasonable fears so often noted in children; the quarrelsomeness or other irritability which in extreme cases amounts to "tantrums"; the habits of excessive weeping or calling aloud to parents.

In this connection something should be said about disordered sleep of children. Our studies have indicated that when muscular relaxation becomes highly advanced so that little or no contraction remains in the various muscle groups of the body, including particularly the eyes and speech apparatus, sleep sets in. But there appear to be two types of sleep: in one type muscular relaxation remains approximately complete, and the result, according to our clinical experience, is restful. In the other type, the individual is not well relaxed. He frequently moves, and, if you waken him suddenly, recounts that he has been dreaming. The restlessness during nightmares is particularly easy to note.

Not enough work has been done to enable me to recount the principal sources of high nerve tension in children. We can of course ask more questions at this point than can as yet be answered. Why do some persons relax naturally and why do others appear chronically tense? How much of this is due to heredity? How much is due to imitation by the child of his parents? Without attempting to answer these various questions, we remark that parents very often fail to note how they themselves overstimulate the child. Frequently the child is exhibited before a meal and made to perform before company, and the same procedure is very likely to be carried out just before bedtime. This is the more likely because the father has not been home all day. In short, the child is most highly stimulated just before bedtime, and thereafter is expected to pass promptly from a state of high excitement into one of complete mus-

cular relaxation. You will readily see that this is not a reasonable way to bring up a child. Likewise scrutiny of the habits of parents toward children readily discloses other kinds of overstimulation.

Clinical observation suggests that habits of nervous irritability on the part of parents frequently have undesirable effects upon the emotions of the child. Parents sometimes confess to such irritability, mentioning overfrequent spanking as a result. It is apparent that habits of relaxation induced in such parents might forestall difficulties for the child. A common experience is that the nervous parent tends in many instances to develop a nervous child.

The tense child, we may assume, tends to become a tense adult. Many of the methods used in showing adults how to relax doubtless could be applied with equal readiness to relaxing children; but as yet we have not had the opportunity to approach this matter systematically. Here our topic becomes broader than the treatment of nervous disorders in children. Progressive relaxation is a medical method; that is, it is designed for the use of physicians and cannot be properly used in the treatment of disorders by individuals who lack medical training. But doctors are generally kept fully occupied with treating children who are not normal. There are not enough doctors to provide for treatment of normal children.

Since relaxation has been found useful in the treatment of certain nervous states, it may prove equally useful in prevention. It would seem a pity to permit conditions to develop so far that a physician is required when this result might possibly have been prevented through training the infant or child to be somewhat relaxed as he grows up.

This opens up the question of the desirability of intro-

ducing methods of relaxation as measures of physical education in nurseries and schools. The need for this was recently emphasized to me by a teacher in a grammar school of Chicago. She related that a questionnaire addressed to the teachers inquired what they found as the greatest need or lack in their children. They agreed that the greatest lack was relaxation. I was recently informed by the directors of the nursery school at Vassar College of conclusions to this same effect.

But the introduction of relaxation as a measure of physical education should not be done hurriedly, or it will not be done well. This topic so appeals to the popular sense of need that it may readily be seized by the wrong element. Danger arises from the fact that the subject of relaxation is far more difficult and complicated than appears on the surface. To prepare a teacher for physical education from the standpoint of showing children how to relax should require three years of graduate university training. As yet we have not trained any such workers. I wish again to emphasize that the application of methods of relaxation to children is still in its infancy.



## THE VALIDITY OF SOME MEASURES OF EMOTIONAL OR NERVOUS INSTABILITY IN CHILDREN

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What is instability? Is there such a thing as a nervous child or an emotionally unstable child? There may be some hesitation over the first question, but the second elicits an almost unanimous affirmative. What then characterizes this child and differentiates him from the average? What *is* instability, emotional or nervous? It is a question of great practical importance.

There are at least four ways of arriving at an answer. The first, historically at least, is to define the word by means of other words, arbitrarily to establish a clear-cut meaning for it which sounds logical, and then proceed by deduction to the consequences of such a condition so defined, or by induction to an elaborate superstructure of concepts. The philosopher has the exclusive rights to the use of this method. The psychologist must resort to other means. Definition of words is not his primary concern but rather the examination and definition of the underlying facts. Now supposedly there are many potential facts—facts waiting to be defined, sifted out from each other, and established to the general satisfaction of everyone. They are, as it were, the essential fire over which the smoke of our words plays and of which on the whole it is an index. Though it be the task of the psychologist to study the fire, he is usually forced to take as his first guide to its location the shifting intangible cloud of words which seems to

point somewhere, which must have come into existence because of something real underneath which it is basically expressing.

This may be taken as the psychologist's first method. He may take the words as they exist and see to what phenomena they are applied. If the smoke comes from a single source each puff should lead us back to the same smoke-stack. If it is not smoke at all but mere haziness, it would lead everywhere, which means it would lead us nowhere. So two years back a class of medical school students was set to rating each other, and teachers to rating their pupils as to nervous instability. Each rater was left to define the term independently as he thought best, and, curiously enough perhaps, not one complained that the term had no meaning for him. Whether or not the meaning was the same for the different raters would be obvious from the results.

The medical students used a five-point scale, the divisions of which were described as: (1) most nervously excitable or unstable; (2) less nervous or unstable; (3) tend in neither direction; (4) somewhat phlegmatic; (5) most phlegmatic in the class.

Sixty-three students received independent ratings from twenty or more associates. From these data the average rating of each student was determined, and it was found that for fifty-five of them the average deviation of the ratings from the average was less than one scale division. There was greater agreement in the placing of some students than of others, and in general there was greater agreement in the ratings of students judged unstable than among those with an average rating at the middle or phlegmatic end of the scale. For further study ten stu-

dents were selected in regard to the placing of whom there was an average deviation of ratings from the average of less than 0.6 of a scale division. Considering the large number of ratings, this represents a remarkably good agreement between the raters and consequently considerable community of meaning in the use of the term—instability.

The same consistency in the application of the word was found among the teachers' ratings. Here only a three-point scale was used, and three to five independent teachers' ratings were obtained of the children in eight different rooms, the third to the sixth grades inclusive, making a total of 258 children in all. There was complete agreement in the placing of 37 per cent, partial agreement in regard to 51 per cent, and 12 per cent complete disagreement. There seems no doubt that back of the terms "emotional or nervous instability" as generally used there is a common basis in fact. Popular unanalyzed judgments—for that is all ratings are—do consistently discriminate between the unstable and the stable child, if we are willing to believe that by "instability" we mean only what the word popularly means.

But is there not another and very different way of arriving at the meaning of instability? Is it necessarily the same thing to feel nervous and to act nervous? We will, in fact, never be sure, for we will never know how a person feels when he acts in what onlookers will label a nervous or emotionally unstable way, and we can never see how we act when we feel nervously upset. We certainly believe we are able to "fool most of the people most of the time" in regard to just how we feel. Many novels have been written the chief interest of which lies in the dichotomy be-

tween the personal conflict going on within and the acts the world sees. Now it may be that whether or not a person is emotionally unstable is a matter which he alone can tell us. It is true he cannot compare himself with others, but he can tell us his feelings, his fears, and his habits of thought, and we, by comparing these with similar reports, can decide objectively how he stands in relation to the rest of the world. This is the principle of the questionnaire. For adults several have been arranged for measuring neurotic tendencies. For children only one has had extensive use—the Matthews revision of the Woodworth scale. It asks such things as:

- Do you like to play with other children?
- Did you ever run away from home?
- Do people find fault with you much?
- Are you afraid of the dark?
- Do you ever dream of people being dead?
- Do you ever make your fingers sore by biting your nails?
- Can you sit still without fidgeting?
- Is there any kind of food that makes you very sick?
- Do you ever feel that nobody loves you?
- Do you like to tease people till they cry?
- Can you stand the sight of blood?
- Do you find school a hard place to get along in?
- Do you live in a make-believe life, in addition to your real life?
- Do things ever seem to get misty before your eyes?
- Do you usually feel well and strong?
- Do you have many headaches?
- Do your teachers generally treat you right?
- Do you have a hard time making up your mind about things?
- Do you make friends easily?
- Did you ever feel that you were very wicked?

And fifty-five more questions of the same sort. When this questionnaire is given to children and the total number of wrong or so-called "critical" answers are counted, it is found that the unstable child again stands out very distinctly from the average or phlegmatic—provided, as before, that we are willing to define instability as that which the questionnaire measures, that we are convinced that these answers point just to neurotic tendencies and to nothing else. As in the case of ratings, the reliability of the method is good, it is only the *validity*—that is, the relation to the quality we are trying to measure—which may be questioned.

It has, of course, been a moot question for years, and one about which scientific controversy has long been waged, as to whether emotion should be considered a state of consciousness of which we are aware or on which we pass a judgment, or a certain kind of behavior which is seen and interpreted in relation either to a basic pattern or—more probably—to the situation in which it occurs, or finally a physiological state regardless of whether or not we are aware of it and whether or not it is expressed by outward and visible signs. This suggests another approach to our question of nervous instability. It may be that there is a neurological basis both for feeling upset and for acting in a different way from other people. It may be that the central nervous system is too responsive, reacts to smaller stimuli, and overreacts to all stimuli so that a headache, or a fear, or a facial twitch results. Again referring to popular opinion, we see a tendency to describe nervousness largely in terms of excessive or inco-ordinated motor reactions. When the teachers who had rated the school children were later asked to explain in the case of each



child rated nervously unstable upon what the judgment was based, such composite descriptions as these were obtained:

"Habitual biting of lips, jerking of head, and wrinkling forehead. Seems to find difficulty in listening without playing with pencil and drawing pictures. Irritable with other children. Loses her temper easily. Nervous, jerky manner of speaking and of moving."

"Uncontrolled motions, seldom still. Gets up frequently and walks about the room. Cannot concentrate on any task for long at a time."

"Restless, tired-looking, weak voice, timid, cries easily, fidgety, high-strung, seems to be at high tension."

"High pitched, rasping voice and quick, catchy laugh or giggle. Difficult for him to sit still."

It would seem probable that in such children the reflexes would be different from those in other children. Two reflexes which could be measured and scored objectively were therefore selected with which to test this assumption—the knee jerk and the Romberg sign, or ability to stand steady with eyes closed and feet together. The knee jerk is a single reflex kick in response to a blow on the patella tendon, and the Romberg test is a more complicated corrective reflex response to the stimuli which would arise from the muscles of the leg when the body deviates from the erect position. Both are independent of the co-operation or effort of the subject. By testing both of these reflexes in the children and the ten selected young adults enough times and under sufficiently varying conditions to make it reasonably certain that the average of the scores obtained was characteristic of the individual rather than an expression of chance extraneous factors, it was found that, as in the ratings and questionnaire scores, consider-

able individual differences existed. Some children and some adults consistently and invariably give a higher knee jerk than others, and likewise the ability of some to stand erect and unswaying with eyes shut far exceeds that ability in others. Both tests were reliable or self-consistent—that is to say, when repeated they gave closely similar results. The individual differences really exist beyond a shadow of doubt.

But does this difference have any relation to differences in nervous instability? Again it depends upon whether or not we are willing to accept a physiological measure as the direct and true index of nervous instability and define the latter in terms of motor reflex activity. As we have indicated, both the Romberg test and the knee jerk are reflex in nature, but physiologically they are not closely related. Many conditions which produce changes in one do not affect the other. But if one of the characteristics of nervous instability is inco-ordination and another a change in reflex excitability, there should be a deviation from the average in both of these measures in the case of the neurotic child. Correlational procedure did reveal a relationship between the measures in both our series—but not perhaps the expected one. In general the child with a low knee jerk is unsteady, while the steady child has an active and prompt knee jerk. The reflex scores were then compared with the questionnaire and rating scores and again a relationship was demonstrated—not a close relation, in fact a very slight one but definite in direction. The child rated nervous tends to have—not an active knee jerk, as one might expect—but a low knee jerk, and he tends to be unsteady, as does also the one with the high questionnaire score. At least the slight relationships between the two

physiological measures and the ratings and questionnaires are as definite as the relation these two have to each other. Not all children with high questionnaire scores are rated nervous, nor do all rated nervous have high questionnaire scores. Again it is only a suggestion of a relationship, a very slight tendency to go together.

In the case of the the ten adults selected because of the consistency of their ratings, the correlation between ratings and questionnaire scores is somewhat higher. It is a curious situation. Four measures which seem to depend on the same thing and which are carefully controlled and statistically reliable, are only sufficiently related to each other as to indicate the direction of the relationship! From a score in no one of them could any prediction be made as to what the other measures in any single case might be. In other words, if instability is behavior in regard to the name of which judges agree, it is *not* a subjective state or a physiological condition. If it is wholly a subjective state it is not the physiological condition or behavior; and if it is the character of the reflexes and co-ordinating mechanisms, it cannot be either of the other two. Yet there is something obviously in common between them all. And what could there be in common between such dissimilar tests except perhaps instability itself, which in its own fashion each purports to measure. Just as Spearman has shown statistically that a certain relationship between dissimilar tests of behavior can only mean that there is an element in common to them all—intelligence—so we by his same technique can show there is general factor here, too—nervous instability.

It is as if each test were a compass. In each the needle fluctuates in response to many magnetic fields, and for each

the fields are different. There is only one force which affects them all alike and produces a deflection toward the north. Not one needle points accurately to it. It would be difficult with only two to tell which is the common component, but with four the chance influences would cancel out and it would be possible to make a fairly good guess as to where north really is. This apparently is a good illustration of the measurement of nervous instability. We have no compass which will lead us unerringly to its detection—not only point it out in every case but point nothing else out by mistake. Judgments based on general experience and casual acquaintance with the individual in question are some guide, but are apt to go very wrong. Questionnaires and admitted symptoms are on the whole indicative—but no more than “on the whole.” It happens repeatedly that that case which is on the very verge of going under in the struggle of adaptation to the environment, which has almost reached the breaking-point, succeeds in putting up a braver front to most of the world than the hypochondriac who only hopes to attract attention. The news of a suicide may come as a surprise to the majority of the judges who have shown their reliability merely by being equally deceived as to the individual's true nature. As to a questionnaire, conscious deception does not invalidate the tool as a whole but may completely invalidate it for diagnostic purposes in a particular case. The unconscious response to the physiological tests is at least free from this source of error. A low knee jerk or marked unsteadiness cannot be masked, and besides their significance is not obvious to the subject. But again let me emphasize that a low knee jerk alone means nothing. Many things other than nervous instability may cause it.

It is the effect of one of those extraneous magnetic fields of our analogy. The same is true of excessive unsteadiness. If, however, the two go together, there is certainly some evidence from our study that the case should be viewed with suspicion, and a careful application of questioning and rating would be justified to determine whether or not all the needles point the same way.

We have been in the habit of considering that the validity of a test is best measured by its agreement with other independent scales, and the two scales most readily available always are ratings and questionnaire. These are usually assumed to be direct measures of the trait in question. Our conclusion here, on the contrary, is that of all the indices of nervous instability the physiological tests are the most direct, but that agreement between measures in our present state of knowledge—or ignorance—is the safest guide in detecting and so defining by its manifestations—nervous or emotional instability.



## A STUDY OF EMOTIONAL MALADJUSTMENT

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I have been asked to describe this afternoon a study of neurotic personality. That problem comes up frequently enough in dealing with college students. Administrative officers, student advisers, and deans have frequently raised the question, "What can be done with students who are emotionally maladjusted?"

Two years ago we started a study of these so-called neurotic traits with our Freshmen at the University of Chicago, and our first object was to get a schedule of questions on the basis of which we could select early in the year those students who might profit by a conversation or two with a psychiatrist. That was the immediate object of the study I am going to describe.

We turned to the various questionnaires and texts in abnormal psychology and psychiatry, and we used most of the available schedules. We collected a list of about 600 questions which could be answered either "yes" or "no." We sorted out these questions into various categories, and we found that the different authorities had, of course, duplicated these items in various ways. We selected one or two questions of each type intended to get at each trait, and we had a collection of about 225 questions that we printed and gave to our Freshmen.

Some of you may already be familiar with the reports of House, Woodworth, Laird, and Allport. Those were some of the sources that we made use of. I will read the instructions that we gave to our students, which will give

you some idea of the setting in which these questions were asked:

In order that your advisers may help you in the best possible way it is desirable that they know something of your personality as well as of your intellectual ability and scholarship. The questions in this blank are intended to indicate various emotional and personality traits. Your answers may reveal a well-adjusted emotional life, or they may show that you have some form of nervousness or worry which you may not yourself understand completely. If your answers show emotional maladjustment, you will have the opportunity to get advice about this aspect of your development. If your answers reveal a well-adjusted personality, that fact will be known to your advisers.

This is not an examination. It is not a test in any sense because there are no right and wrong answers to any of the questions in this blank. Your admission to the University and your scholastic standing will not be affected in any way by your answers to these questions.

Your answers to particular questions will be confidential. They will be known only to two or three persons who will study these blanks and who will summarize your answers in a brief statement for your dean. It has been found that some of the brightest students have emotional and personality difficulties which can be overcome with suitable counsel if the difficulties are known. It will therefore be to your own advantage to answer the questions as truthfully as possible.

In front of each question you will find "yes," "no," and a question mark.

Draw a ring around one of these three answers for each question. Try to answer by "yes" or "no" if it is possible. If you are entirely unable to say even a tentative "yes" or "no" to the question, then draw a ring around the question mark.

That will give some idea of the instructions and setting for these schedules. They were given during Freshmen

Week at the same time the intelligence tests were given and other information obtained about these students intended to familiarize them with the campus.

Then follows a list of 225 questions, all of which I naturally cannot read here, but I will read a few samples. I will read a few of the questions that turned out in the final analysis to be the most diagnostic, and I shall explain briefly how we determined each of these items. A few of these questions are as follows:

Do you have difficulty in starting a conversation with a stranger?

Do you often feel lonesome, even when you are with other people?

Are your feelings easily hurt?

Do ideas often run through your head so that you cannot sleep?

Are you frequently burdened by a sense of remorse?

Do your feelings alternate between happiness and sadness without apparent reason?

The questions are of that general type, and those of you who have read the texts on psychology and abnormal psychology and have seen the other schedules know in general the type of questions we are dealing with.

First of all I had a psychological problem that I wanted to answer besides making the schedule practical and useful. I wanted to know to what extent these various traits that have been described as characteristic of a neurotic personality do tend to be found in the same individuals. We have all sorts of classifications in psychiatry but relatively few studies in which we attempt to find just how these various traits are correlated.

I shall say a word about the interpretation of the answers of these questions. When we say, for example, As

a child, did you like to play alone? Do you usually control your temper? Do you get stage fright? Have your relationships with your mother always been pleasant? and so on, and then take the answer to any one of these questions, it is clear that any one answer is loaded with a considerable chance of error. We never take the answer of a particular student to a particular question and say, "Oh, yes, this is to be interpreted so-and-so." That probably has relatively little significance. It is only when we deal with the summation of these hundreds of questions that cover various aspects of the personality, especially in reference to emotional characteristics, that they can be of any practical consequence.

So I should make this reservation clear at the start, that we do not place much importance on the specific answers to any one of these questions, especially in the written form, unless it is followed out by an interview with further explanations and conversations.

The first thing we did with these questions was to go over them and decide tentatively which answers would be the emotionally maladjusted answers. Then, for example, to the question, As a child, did you like to play alone? the affirmative answer, other things being equal, would be the emotionally maladjusted one. To the question, Do you usually control your temper? the emotionally maladjusted answer would certainly be "no."

It is possible to go through these questions without psychological insight, and on the basis of common sense determine which answer indicates maladjustment. However, with some of the questions it is necessary to have some psychological insight.

We wanted to know whether and to what extent these

various traits hang together, so we went through the whole list of 225 questions and indicated which answer we thought would be the emotionally maladjusted answer. Then, having this tentative answer, we went through the 700 blanks for our students and counted the total number of maladjusted answers, tentatively so classified, for each student. We found a surprising range. We found a range of maladjusted answers from 7 to 134 out of 225 questions; that is, we found at one extreme those students who returned only 7 out of 225 emotionally maladjusted answers, and we found at the other extreme students who returned over half of their answers in what we had classified as the maladjusted way.

In order to determine whether our scoring was consistent we selected two groups of students: one group of fifty who had the largest number of maladjusted answers, and another group of fifty who returned the fewest maladjusted answers. We called them the two extreme groups, Group I and Group II. By Group I, I shall mean the group of fifty Freshmen who returned the smallest number of maladjusted answers, and let Group II represent the group of fifty students who returned the largest number of maladjusted answers.

Then we made an analysis of each of these questions to determine how many maladjusted answers were turned in by Group I and by Group II. If we had guessed wrong as to how these questions were to be rated, then we would not have found a differentiation between these two groups. For example, to the question, As a child, did you like to play alone? we find five maladjusted answers in Group I and eighteen in Group II.



I shall now read a few of these questions that I read before and give you the differentiating counts.

Do you have difficulty in starting a conversation with a stranger? Three and thirty; that is, three out of Group I answered that question in the affirmative, and thirty out of Group II answered it in that way.

Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences? One and forty. Only one out of Group I answered it in the affirmative, and forty out of the fifty in Group II answered it in the maladjusted way.

It so happens that the most differentiating question in the whole list of 225 was this: Do you often feel just miserable? None in Group I answered that in the affirmative, and forty in Group II answered it that way.

It is interesting to note that the same characteristic of the emotionally maladjusted personality turns up here that is described frequently enough in the textbooks. We found that the most differentiating questions are frequently not questions of fact so much as questions about the self-regarding attitude. It is not a question as to whether the subject actually has heart trouble or has some particular ailment or difficulty, but does he think he has that ailment or difficulty? It is the self-regarding attitude that seems to come out as being one of the most outstanding characteristics of the emotionally maladjusted personality, or neurotic personality.

We were interested to make various correlations with known characteristics of these students, and so we correlated the scores obtained on these schedules with such known facts as subsequent scholarship records and intelligence ratings of these students, and the fact that they made or did not make a fraternity (assuming for the mo-

ment that they all wanted to), and some other comparisons. I shall describe them briefly.

We found as to sex a slightly higher score for the women than for the men, but I am not trying to make an interpretation of that because there may be sex differences in attitude toward the schedules or in willingness to reveal personal idiosyncracies in a schedule of this sort. So the sex differences are not large enough perhaps to be significant, although they might be.

We correlated the score on this schedule with the intelligence ratings, and we found to our satisfaction that there is no correlation between the two. In other words, we concluded that there are as many emotionally maladjusted students among the very brilliant as there are among those who are not academically successful.

The question has been raised in several conferences as to whether it would be possible to use a device of this sort to determine fitness for a university career or for college work. That question has been raised not only here in Chicago but elsewhere. Whenever I have a chance to discuss that question, I insist that I will not allow this schedule to be used for that purpose if I can prevent it, because I believe that any institution that would attempt to select its students by favoring the emotionally well-adjusted and eliminating those who are not emotionally well-adjusted would most likely be eliminating some of the best talent.

There seems to be a zero relation between emotional maladjustment and intelligence. We have the assurance, of course, that we are not measuring the same trait twice when we give the intelligence test and this schedule. We also wanted to see if there was any relation between emo-

tional maladjustment and scholarship, and we found that the emotionally maladjusted do better than the emotionally well-adjusted. That was not quite the way I expected it to go. When I did find that the emotionally maladjusted did better than the emotionally well-adjusted, I naturally wanted to find some explanation for it. I attempted to explain it, and I am not sure if it is the right explanation. I attempted to explain it by assuming that perhaps the emotionally well-adjusted students have in general more distractions than the emotionally maladjusted students. Those who are not successful socially, and who turn their attention to achieve in the direction of scholarship, have fewer social distractions than those who are emotionally well-adjusted. Your interpretation might go either way as to whether that is an advantage or not. I do not know that that is the right explanation, but at least it is one way of trying to make sense out of our findings.

I have also studied the schedule of questions with reference to extroversion and introversion, and we find here, as is to be expected, that the introverted traits are to be found more frequently among the emotionally maladjusted than the extrovert traits. I wanted to see whether there was any difference between those men and women who made the fraternities and women's clubs, on the one hand, and those who did not. I did find a significant difference between the two; that is, the emotionally maladjusted students, as determined by this schedule of questions, did not nearly so frequently become members of fraternities or women's clubs as did the others. It would seem to indicate, then, as would be expected on a common-sense basis, that students do spot emotional maladjustment in its various forms and discriminate against such students for social se-

lection of various kinds. This distinction, by the way, held for both the men and the women.

I made a comparison, also, between the Jews and the Gentiles (as far as we could obtain the information from the Registrar's records) on two groups, and I found a very slight difference between the Jews and the Gentiles, both for men and for women. That I have discussed with several of my friends and psychiatrists, and it seems to be the general observation that the Jews are more neurotic than are the Gentiles, but we did not find it so with this schedule.

I also made a tabulation of the forty most differentiating questions in the whole list, and I studied their characteristics. I found that they can be divided into several groups. One group, for instance, has to do with the subject of the family, and I shall read a few of those:

Were your parents happily married? Is your mother dissatisfied with her lot in life? Has any of your family committed suicide? Did you have a happy childhood? Were you your parents' favorite child? Did you get along well with your brothers and sisters? Have you been the scapegoat in the family life? Has your family always treated you right? and so on.

In that list of questions, all of which seemed to be quite strikingly differentiating, there are two questions that interested us because one of them turns out to be differentiating and the other is not. One question reads like this: Was your mother the dominant member of the family? And the other, Was your father the dominant member of the family? One of these is rather differentiating and the other one is not. I will leave it to you to guess which it is. One differentiates and the other does not. It is possible to find psychological theories to check with it. I have tried

these lists on two successive classes, and the list of differentiating questions seems to be about the same.

I should say something about the possibility of lying on this schedule, because it is rather obvious that anyone with a little sense could go through this list of questions and mark the emotionally well-adjusted answers. I am sure a good deal of that was done. Consequently, when I find that a student has a score of only five or ten or a dozen of these 200 questions answered in the maladjusted manner, I am not at all sure whether he was intentionally misrepresenting himself. I do not know how often that was done. I do feel rather sure, however, that those students who answer half of these questions or more in a maladjusted way are probably not misrepresenting themselves, because I can't imagine that anyone would have a motive in doing that. So far as I can tell, the attitude did not seem to be facetious at the time the schedule was filled in. It was filled in during Freshmen Week, and the students don't know each other well enough then to take this schedule facetiously. If I were to try this with a class of Sophomores or Seniors, I might have a riot on my hands.

If we could select the thirty students in the Freshmen class who have the highest score and if we arranged for them to have a conversation or two with a psychiatrist to ascertain whether they needed any further assistance in their personality adjustment, we should have accomplished some good, even if in so doing we failed to catch all of those students who should receive such attention; that is, we would at least find some of the students who are in need of such assistance, even though the rest of the students who also needed such assistance might have misrepresented themselves in this schedule.



Administratively, it seems to be a rather important matter to find as soon as possible in their college career those students who might profit by a conversation with a psychiatrist, and thus bring about personality adjustment rather than let them go along several years until they have found it in their Junior or Senior year, or, what frequently happens, not at all. I think there is that obligation on the part of the university, even though we must admit that a great deal cannot be done. In some cases something of value can be done.

As is to be expected, some of the most differentiating questions seem to concern the subject's sex life; and in a schedule of this sort I am naturally limited more or less as to the extent to which I can include questions on the subject of sex, but some general questions of this sort can be included:

Are you shy with boys? Are you shy with girls? Do you limit your friendship mostly to your own sex? Would you say that you are cynical about members of the opposite sex generally? Is there a conflict in your nature between sex and morality? Have you ever been afraid that you are sexually inferior to other men (or other women)?

Those questions are all rather strikingly differentiating.

I have had the occasion to interview students from both ends of the schedule, and I find that there is a most striking difference between the extremes. One does not talk but a minute or two, not even that, with students from the extremes before he can make a reliable guess as to which end of the scale the student is from. I am not sure that I can demonstrate this, but sometimes I have a feeling that maybe I could make a good guess by a certain anxious look in the eye of the student. I haven't put that to the test

because I might guess wrong. I am not sure that that would work.

We also included some questions on birth order, because I have been more or less interested in the hypothesis about birth order having something to do with maladjusted personality. So I asked these four questions: Did you grow up as an only child? Did you grow up as the youngest child? Did you grow up as the oldest child? Did you grow up as the next to the oldest child?

I did not include these in the scoring because I had no definite ideas that they would be diagnostic. I included them in the schedule without including them in the tentative scores. But I found that none of these questions showed any differentiation. There seems to be no relation between birth order and emotional maladjustment. I am willing to admit that perhaps in some individual cases the fact of birth order might be a significant one in the interpretation of a particular case of emotional maladjustment. But in studying the relation between birth order and emotional maladjustment as interpreted by our schedule of questions, we found no differentiation as we did in some of the other traits.

We tried to make a generalization as to what constitutes the common trait running through all these various questions that seems to be most differentiating. I tried to write a generalization of a trait that would fit all of these specifications, and I shall offer it for what it is worth. We made a generalization that perhaps the fundamental characteristic of the neurotic personality is an imagination that fails to express itself effectively on external social reality. That perhaps is really nothing new. It perhaps restates what has already been learned from various text-

books. However, we do have a list of 225 of these questions from the various textbooks, all tending to describe various characteristics of emotionally maladjusted personality, and those questions which do seem to be most differentiating seem to come under this category. I will read a few sample questions with reference to this tentative definition of an emotionally maladjusted or neurotic personality. If imagination fails to express itself effectively on external social reality, it is only natural to expect that the social expressions of the personality will be inhibited. Examples are the following questions:

Do you have difficulty in starting conversation with a stranger? Do you keep in the background on social occasions? Are you troubled with shyness? If you see an accident, are you quick to take an active part in giving help? Do you often find that you cannot make up your mind until the time for action has passed?

All of them illustrate that special case of the general trait that I have just described. It is only natural to expect a picture of mental hyperactivity, since imagination does not naturally and spontaneously express itself. Examples of this effect are the following:

Are you often in a state of excitement? Does your mind often wander badly so that you lose track of what you are doing? Do ideas often run through your head so that you cannot sleep?

Again, one should also expect that this picture of mental activity, which is inhibited in expression, should lead to excessive worry about the self:

Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences? Are your feelings easily hurt? Are you frequently burdened by a sense of remorse? Are you troubled with the idea that people are watching you on the street?

A personality of this inhibited sort could hardly be expected to have self-confidence in social relations. The same lack of rapport between imagination and social reality makes the subject vacillating in mood. He is on top of the world when imagination is free, and he is down when the lack of rapport between imagination and reality is too painfully in evidence. Examples are the following:

Do your feelings alternate between happiness and sadness without apparent reason? Do your interests change quickly? Do you have ups and downs in mood without apparent cause?

The general trait, then, by which we have attempted to summarize the apparently heterogeneous list of questions would be, "The fundamental characteristic of the neurotic personality is an imagination that fails to express itself effectively on external social reality." Of course, that is a definition on the psychological level. It is my hope that ultimately a neurotic personality will be defined much more definitely than we can define it on the psychological level.

Finally, I should say something about our use of the term "neurotic personality." I have used the term "neurotic personality" because our questions do represent more or less the general description of a neurotic personality, and our attempt has been to see what seems to be the common core running through this general personality type, if there is a type. We have found that these traits do hang together, and that there is a common core running through the hundreds of various questions that do seem to characterize the neurotic personality.

## SOME DETERMINANTS OF EMOTIONAL STABILITY

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Chicago, Ill.*

I might introduce my subject by telling you of a little experience of mine a number of years ago. I remember when I was a senior medical student I had a very good friend who was as fond of the movies as I was. On one occasion we were commenting about one of these illustrative advertisements flashed on the screen between the pictures. This particular advertisement had around it a brilliant frame of red and green strips. My friend insisted that the red frame was standing out for some distance in front of the green frame; whereas I looked as carefully as he and insisted that both of these frames were on the same plane. There was much argument about it.

I recalled this little episode not so long ago when I came upon some experiments that were going on in the psychological laboratory, namely this: If one arranges a chamber that is analogous to the moving-picture theater, inasmuch as everything is dark and there is no opportunity to gauge perspective, and if arrangement is then made so that one can look into this darkened chamber and gaze upon, let us say, colored disks—some red, some green—varying reports as to what is to be seen are obtained from different subjects. One will insist that a given colored disk is in front of or behind another, whereas the conditions of the experiment are such that they are actually on a plane. One can actually measure the differences seen by some of



these observers by moving the little colored disks forward and backward until they appear to be on a plane to the given observer. We have then repeated in the laboratory the exact observation that was noted accidentally.

I also want to tell you about some other observations on deviations in perception that have been made in the laboratory. Under conditions similar to those already described, one can have an observer look upon some small objects, ruling out perspective in the darkened chamber and with proper illumination. One observer will select some little china object or a small toy, and will insist that this one or another one has a position that differs from the others, when there is no actual difference in the set-up; other observers will report correctly what actually exists, namely, that the objects are all of equal distance from the observer.

I should like to give you a third illustration of this nature: If children are allowed to look at a silhouette picture showing many details, for perhaps twenty seconds, and then direct the gaze to a blank surface of gray, a good many will be able to report in great detail exactly what had just been seen. In fact, they *are* seeing the silhouette; they are not remembering it.

We will, for the moment, simply accept the fact that there is experimental proof for this, but we see many variations in children's reports of this phenomenon. Some will insist that they see motion; they will report motion where perhaps it is implied in posture; they will see such motion. Again an adult, a young man who had had some unfortunate experience in military service, was selective in reporting details of such a picture. He did not report two military figures that were part of a grouping in the silhouette.

The point I am trying to make by giving you these illustrations is this: If we examine children, and sometimes adults, we find unexpected variations in such processes as perception. Further, we find there is a marked distinction in the degree of variability manifested by given individuals in the process of perception; that is, there are some persons who would simply find it impossible to respond to a given stimulus other than in conformity with the physical relationships involved. Others psychologically elaborate such stimuli with variations in responses as noted. This variability in the perceptual processes is the crucial point of this type of experimentation in which, then, we are able to point out what we look upon as psycho-physical differences in various individuals.

I should like to drop this consideration for a moment. I want now to call your attention to some other physical factors which are pertinent to our general subject. We are attempting to see what sort of structural or functional differences we can find between groups of children, some of whom are looked upon as better adjusted than others. We will take a group of fifteen enuretic children being raised under institutional conditions and compare them with a group of non-enuretic children in the same home. We were struck by the fact that for the most part there were no outstanding differences between the two groups, although we could demonstrate minor physical differences. On giving these children tests to measure the efficiency of the cardiovascular system, we were able to show some consistent differences between our two groups. The non-enuretic children have distinctly more efficient cardiovascular systems. We are dealing with physically healthy children, so here we merely make the point that in such healthy

children we are able to demonstrate variations in functional efficiency of one or another of the organic systems.

I now wish to call your attention to a third group of somewhat related facts. Again dealing with perfectly healthy individuals—and this time I shall have to go to adults instead of children—there has been emphasized in recent psychiatric study certain physical-psychological relations now of interest to us. The most current work of this sort is that of Professor Ernst Kretschmer, of Marburg. Professor Kretschmer started his work by observing individuals who got into emotional difficulties, being particularly impressed by that group of individuals who are subject to wide fluctuations or wide swings in mood, ranging from depression to elation. It is easy for any psychiatrist to pick out individuals of this sort because they come to him with exaggerations of those swings. Kretschmer was struck with the persistent incidence of certain physical characteristics of persons subject to such swings of mood. I might describe a little exaggeration of physical habitus which goes along with an emotionality of this sort, the type of individual Kretschmer calls the "pyknic type."

The pyknic type of individual is the one who tends to be voluminous in his proportions; namely, his body structure is such that there is a large, rounded chest approaching a barrel in shape, a large abdominal cavity as well, with a tendency to prominence of the abdomen. The head is usually well formed and large without sharp delineation of features, and this rotund individual is likely to be perched on rather slender legs. Perhaps the best character portraying this individual is the physique given in cartoons as the popular conception of Santa Claus.

There goes along with this particular physical physique a tendency to certain types of emotional reaction, some of which I have indicated by speaking of the swings in mood. In addition, this is the type of individual who tends to be in pretty close contact with his immediate environment; that is to say, he attaches a great deal of importance to the outer world about him. He is the hail fellow, well met. There is an *ease* about his living in the world; he feels at home in this world and makes other people feel comfortable. He is interested in practical matters. His enjoyments are practical in their general nature.

I might say that the relationship of this type of physique with the type of temperament I have described is pretty well established statistically, although I will attempt to give no statistics at this time.

Kretschmer describes a contrasting physique which he calls the "leptosome type" of individual. This individual is slender, relatively tall, with well-defined features; typically a rather thin, long face, narrow and flat chest, thin and poorly developed musculature. I am sure that this physical type is as well known to all of us as the other just mentioned. And it is fairly well demonstrated, too, that fundamentally there appears to be allied with this type of physique, emotional reactions and temperament in general that contrast quite sharply with the, at least typical, individual of the pyknic physique.

This tends to be the type of individual who is less fully in immediate contact with the outer world. Rather than fluctuation in mood the emphasis is upon sensitivity with a tendency to withdraw, and the variations have to do with a degree of sensitivity rather than the fluctuation. In the stable individual of this sort, we see a certain reserve.

These persons sometimes impress us as being "aristocratic" in demeanor. In the exaggerated instances of this sort, there is always the accentuation upon withdrawal from the outer world and a greater tendency to investment of interest in the individual himself. The individual is likely to retire into such activities that have to do with the arts, music, perhaps research, or such things as are more dependent upon himself and upon a situation that does not require live contact with the outer world, but rather contact with the controlled and selected environment of which he is already master. There is, too, in individuals of this sort a distinctive difference in the general tenor of existence. There is not the easy flow of relationship, but always something of a barrier that expresses itself in the various degrees of retreat into more personal, more solitary, more selective types of activity and interest.

Now, then, I have pointed out to you, very roughly as the chairman warned you I should, three types of observation and experimentation, all of which are now being rather actively pursued in an attempt to more fully evaluate our problems that have to do with conduct and with the reaction of the individual, particularly of the child.

Our first group of experiments points out the fallacy of expecting given experience to mean the same thing to various individuals, even under given conditions. Most of our thinking in recent years has (and correctly) been along the lines of control of experience in training, but we are able to see that we have different sorts of possibilities for reaction in different individuals, even perhaps in the same family group. The response, let us say, of a child in whom there is this tremendous lability of perception is, obviously, going to be a different sort of thing



than is the response of the child in whom the fundamental set-up is such that his perception of what happens is more in keeping with the purely physical relationships. In these more labile individuals, we find that group in whom the emotional factors are going to be more largely determinant of response than in the physically more stable individuals. In other words, if we fail to find in a given child the type of response that we think of as consistent with given stimulus in experience, it behooves us to go a bit farther than we have been accustomed to do in evaluating his propensities of this sort.

Then, too, if one takes the second type of factor, namely, where we are able to show definitely variations in functional efficiency in one of the organic systems, here, too, we have failed in the past to appreciate that factors of this sort can be operative in contributing to that constellation of factors that makes up for the given behavior in the given instance. Third, the relationship of general physique to capacities for response indicated by this work of Kretschmer is of obvious significance, if we are really to evaluate the material we are dealing with in attempting to understand the responses of children.

We have been putting a great deal of emphasis upon traumatic situations, early experience, the immediate training factor, without taking into consideration these types of variations which determine the possibility of the individual to respond as we expect him to. If we follow our inventory of the individual along these lines and attempt to relate these sorts of deviations to deviations in behavior in response to a given experience, then perhaps we will be able to go farther in explaining some of those situations in which

we have failed to predict accurately behavior under a given training situation.

This roughly covers three types of thinking that I think have perhaps been brought a little inadequately to the attention of this group in the past, and I welcome your comments upon it.

## PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERVIEW AS A METHOD OF RESEARCH ON PERSONALITIES

*Harold D. Lasswell, University of Chicago*

You will recall that Professor Freud invented the psychoanalytic interview thirty years ago as a means of curing sufferers from certain mental disorders. Dr. Breuer had discovered that the symptoms of a hysterical patient would disappear under hypnosis as soon as the original situation in which the symptoms had arisen was recalled. Freud had his difficulties with hypnosis and presently asked his patients to lie still while awake and try to remember the first occurrence of the symptoms which troubled them. Sometimes a patient would remain for hours without uttering a word, apparently unable to recall a single episode. Finally Freud hit upon the expedient of asking his subjects to say anything that crossed their minds, regardless of its relevance, propriety, or triviality. He found that he could often discover clues to the precise nature of the original episode by watching these random productions. Indeed, he made the discovery that these productions, which seemed random enough from the conscious standpoint of the patient, did not escape from a deterministic universe, but displayed orderly laws of their own.

By applying a very simple expedient, Freud gained intellectual control over a remarkably wide range of personality manifestations. He consistently applied the idea that we do everything we do because we want to do it. After all, this is the pattern of thinking to which we are all accustomed over a limited area of experience. If we see

John Brown walk up to a man, hit him over the head, and take his watch, we at once jump to the conclusion that John Brown wanted to steal a man's watch. We are able to say that if John Brown is honest he will admit, if asked, that he had wanted to steal the watch. We could thus predict that under certain conditions of intimacy an actor in a situation would acknowledge that what he did had been preceded or accompanied by the particular kind of subjective event which we describe as wanting to steal a watch.

All this is laboring the obvious. But the application which Freud made of this scheme of thinking was bold and new. Suppose that John Brown merely dreams about hitting a man and taking his watch. The fact that John Brown lets the man get hit and hurt in the dream suggests that he has some hostile impulses against the party who figures in the dream. We may also assume that this hatred is worked off in the dream because it is not worked out in active waking life. We may thus infer that Brown cherishes a grudge of some kind which he is hardly willing to admit to himself even when he is awake, and which he tries to push out of consciousness. We may predict that if Brown is in a situation in which he tries to be perfectly honest with himself that he will sooner or later recognize his hostility against the dream figure. Freud was able to make predictions of this kind on the basis of dreams, word slips, random movements, and many other acts which were formerly dismissed as chance occurrences. He also found that he short-cut the patient's laborious work efforts to remember the traumatic (the original) episode by proposing interpretations.

It is at this point that cautious psychologists have picked their most serious quarrels with the psychoanalytical findings. They have said that the patient produces the kinds of material which the analyst suggests to him, and that the whole process is one of putting the rabbits into the hat that you want to pull out. They have seized upon apparent schisms in the psychoanalytical fold, and declared that you eventually dream about *anima* figures if you are analyzed by Jung, that you relive birth traumas if you are analyzed by Rank, and that you welter in a galaxy of anal, oral, and urethral symbols if you are deeply analyzed by Freud. You talk about inferiority feelings if you work with Adler, and castrative anxiety if you work with Freud or his immediate circle.

You might suppose that after thirty years of labor there would be in existence a body of documents which could be consulted by a group of competent specialists who were trying to reconcile their differences and doubts about what actually goes on during the analytical situation. You would want these documents to show every word which passed between the interviewer and the subject for the whole period. You would want these documents to include supplementary notes by the analyst which would report upon the physical movements of the subject during each hour. You would want at least some of these documents to present the results of accurate measuring devices which showed how some of the bodily changes actually varied throughout the interviews (the galvanic reflex, the couch movements, respiration, blood pressure, and various other phenomena can be recorded with great precision).

We would then be in a position to talk about the quantitative dimensions of different emotional changes in the in-



interview, and to discuss concretely the relation between a given pattern of words used by the analyst and a given pattern of words used by the subject. We would be able to compare the behavior of healthy subjects with the behavior of subjects who suffer from outspoken mental maladies.

At the present time the interview situation is poorly reflected in the notes taken by the analyst at the expiration of each period. Nobody knows what processes distort the recording practices of different listeners, and nobody knows the value of the published scraps.

The obstacles which lie in the path of a research program which calls for objective records of as much as possible of what transpires in the interview situation are not to be minimized. The bulk of a verbatim report of an hour's conversation per day over several months is almost overwhelming. But historians are accustomed to plow through whole libraries of pages about Napoleon or Bismarck, and from the standpoint of a comprehensive theory of personality development, any personality is almost as good as any other, although high elaboration and distinguished achievement are advantages.

There are some points in favor of applying this technique of personality study to people who are normal, at least in the sense that they are suspected of normality by themselves and others. There is a moral to be learned from some of Freud's early mistakes when he assigned critical significance to certain childhood experiences which later investigation showed were very common. The clinical caricature is invaluable for the high relief in which certain tendencies of the normal are revealed. Indeed, "normality" is more difficult to understand than disease, from one point of

view, since it involves a complicated integration of many tendencies, a flexible capacity to snap from one mood, pre-occupation, and overt activity to another, as the changing demands of reality require. The pathological mind, if one may indulge a lame analogy, is like an automobile with its control lever stuck in one gear: the normal mind can shift. One has a queer feeling as one passes around the wards of a hospital for the custody of the more seriously disordered patients that if one could assemble the scattered parts of the mind that one could create at least one master mind. There in one corner is a melancholic who is stuck in the mood of despondency; in another corner is a manic-depressive who is in the expansive, elated phase; elsewhere is a man whose self-esteem has achieved cosmic dimensions; in the back wards is a deteriorated mind in perpetual repose. Normality is complexity and integration, and it should be approached as directly as possible as a control on the pathological.

The main advantage which the normal subject hopes to glean from the analytical interview is a judgment of the importance of this, in comparison with other, psychological methods. Records being as they are today, only one who has been through the mill can talk with much assurance about what happens, and if he has a critical mind, he is not too sure then. The analytical interview is a discipline in self-scrutiny. The subject learns to exploit a new method of using the mind, which he tries to cultivate and to correlate with the logical methods to which he is partly accustomed in ordinary adult life. The new technique of using the mind is the free-phantasy technique, whose chief function is to produce new material for logical consideration.

The interview necessitates the reactivation of the individual's struggle with his antisocial impulses. This happens, be the subject sick or well, for every individual possesses more or less active and powerful antisocial drives. Every personality displays some pathology in the form of reminders of the Oedipus phase of growth. The socially adjusted portion of the personality takes up the battle again against the unsublimated drives, and a considerable amount of neurotic anxiety is generated in the process. The problem is to encourage the subject to face these unadjusted remnants frankly, to bring them to the full focus of waking consciousness, and to discharge their bound energy. This comes to pass in the roundabout way of recapturing the original episodes in which the neurotic solution was invented. The work of reminiscence is the preliminary to liberation and understanding.

The interview substitutes the thinking-out for the acting-out of personality drives. One learns to recover the critical points in one's past history by watching the present for clues to the full meaning of the present situation, and this includes the inspection of reminiscences. A reminiscence is always relevant to a present situation, and serves the double rôle of annotating the present and reporting the past. The interview experience is long and arduous, and the subject learns very slowly to deal with himself as an object in a world of objects, and to free his judgment more and more from the distorting effects of primitive psychological structures.

The analytical situation is so arranged as to facilitate this process of self-inspection. The provocations to act out rather than think out are reduced by simplifying the sensory present. The subject lies in a relaxed position, and is

thus able to observe those stiffenings of the body, those variations in respiration, those oscillations of visceral tension, those impulses to scratch and finger which escape ordinary attention, but which are indicative of the meanings put in the current situation.

The sensory environment remains substantially constant, and the interviewer handles the situation on a rather fixed routine. The subject is temporarily encysted from the demands of professional and conventional tasks, but the interviewer is present to prevent the individual from dissipating his energy in musings which are quickly forgotten. The interviewer is a prod to free associations and a spur to the critical consideration of the material supplied by the freely moving fancy. The necessity for verbalization brings the acts of phantasy into a clearer focus than usual, which is a necessary preliminary to moments of sustained logical reflection. Since the interviewer permits the subject to disregard the usual amenities of society, and to let his phantasies fly for the sake of finding where they land, regressive responses are permitted to appear. That is, the individual is not required to adjust to a conventional world of adult reality, but is permitted to reactivate earlier forms of dealing with the world. In the world of adult reality, the multiple tendencies of the individual are canalized into conventionally acceptable forms, and the most maladapted drives may display themselves in unobtrusive variations on the pattern.

When conventional reality is no longer present, and the individual is encouraged to watch his partly forming responses, rather than to co-ordinate, condense, ignore, or suppress them, these tendencies spread forth diffusely in imagination and reminiscence. When this process continues

far enough, the individual achieves a high degree of insight into the genetic development of his current preoccupations and traits.

Since the analytical process is a period of strain for the subject, it may be wondered why it is bearable. Fortunately for the investigator, there are many advantages to the participant which sustain and fortify his conscious purpose to persevere until understanding has been substantially deepened. The analyst treats every manifestation of the personality, no matter how trivial, with respectful interest. This is exaggerated unconsciously by the subject, who greatly overestimates the personal affection which the interviewer has for him. Some of the energy of the personality is always free to begin new object attachments, and this energy is concentrated upon the interviewer. The subject is permitted to talk at length about himself, and when the interviewer listens attentively and patiently, the subject identifies himself with the listener on the basis of a common attitude of interest in a beloved object.

The interviewer's ascendancy in technical knowledge (his authority) resembles the authority of the adults who were once supposed to possess unlimited knowledge. The day-by-day solicitude tends to reinstate the emotions of the early family situation in which the child could play irresponsibly, under the watchful, responsible care of the adult. The subject relaxes the effort to keep baudy, disloyal, mean, and revengeful thoughts from welling into his mind. The frank expression of these thoughts in ordinary social life would bring down punishment upon his head, or mark him out as a victim of mental disorder. The subject is enabled to welter in unsocial or antisocial ravings and imaginings, and the process of developing these symptoms in the



presence of another person becomes an absorbing part of his daily, weekly, and monthly existence. The subject intensifies his warm emotional interest in the one who exempts him from society's code of reticence. This is a mark of the analyst's tremendous power, and also of the analyst's special interest in the subject. The free-phantasy procedure even exempts the individual from abiding by the ordinary forms of logic and grammar. He is also able to enjoy the pleasure of impressing someone else with the brilliance of his language. From time to time, new insight comes into old habits and worries, and the zest of intellectual comprehension is added to the other pleasures.

At first sight the teaching or research interview might seem to sacrifice the most powerful motive upon which the interviewing procedure has relied, namely, that of securing relief from disturbing symptoms. The individual who is suffering from some crude pathological disturbance, like a functional gastro-intestinal disorder, psychological impotence, obsessive ideas and compulsions comes to the interviewer as a weak person seeking aid of a stronger. If he has been shuttled from one internist to another, perhaps receiving derisive looks and contemptuous preachments, the objective interest with which the psychotherapist treats his symptoms produces a keen conscious and unconscious gratification. Even the symptoms are beloved parts of the self, and, like the ugly duckling, they are sometimes treated with special affection (Ferenczi).

The hope of being relieved of the annoying symptoms, which is consciously present in many pathological cases, is supported on the unconscious level by an old infantile attitude which expects the interviewer to work miracles. Even some of the antisocial impulses of the personality may wel-

come the therapeutic situation. These antisocial tendencies are themselves not entirely gratified in the symptoms, for the nature of a symptom is a compromise between these antisocial tendencies and the socialized impulses of the self. Nunberg has pointed out that the unsocialized portions of the personality may support the misguided hope that the outcome of therapy will be the boundless and unlimited gratification of their demands. There is also evidence of the existence of a compulsion to confess (Reik) to antisocial tendencies, which are rejected by the socialized self, and thus to gratify an unconscious need of punishment.

Now the sense of being sick and the desire to get well are not entirely absent from any normal person. No one is entirely free from remnants of his adjustive problems, and no one is entirely satisfied with himself. At the beginning of the interview, this motive may appear in consciousness as nothing more substantial than the innocuous belief that any increase in self-knowledge will enable one to deal even more satisfactorily with personal problems as they arise.

Among the other motives which play into the analytical situation, and enable the subject to go through with it, may be mentioned a few very primitive ones. Life has meant the blocking of many impulses by authorities whose power cannot be successfully defied on the spot. Hatreds can only express themselves under these conditions—with some prospects of success—when they seek to overcome the superior by trying to take his power into one's self by copying him. That is to say, the individual seeks to identify himself with the one who possesses superior knowledge in the analytical situation and, by becoming like him, to secure independence, and thus to annihilate him as an intimidating and obstructive external object. There may be a desire to

secure a weapon by means of which other people may be eviscerated and deprived of their power to outstrip the individual. On the conscious level, these motives are partly visible in excessive aspirations for self-mastery and control. This taking-in and biting-off of the analyst's power is also rooted in some of the earliest reaction patterns which the infant displays toward objects. The sheer pleasure of talking and of giving and withholding information are also present.

As the subject withdraws attention from the original symptoms or motives, concentrates on the game of dilating upon the past, and indulges in prohibited delights, the analytical situation becomes an orgy of illicit pleasure. Emotions are released from old channels and find new objects of crystallization, especially in the person of the analyst. The interviewer who permits this "transference" is now in a position to aid the subject in coming to grips with the underlying unsocialized impulses of the personality. The behavior of the subject has by this time given a host of clues to the history of his emotional growth. The analyst continues to stimulate the individual to scrutinize his associations, to state honestly the wayward wishes which flit across his mind, or lurk half-seen in the marginal recess of attention. Back and forth, bit by bit, there is reconstructed the subjective history of a life.

To put it metaphorically, old sores run anew, smoldering embers of jealousy and lust flame once more, and ancient wounds yawn again. Reminiscence regilds the faded tapestries of the past and restores to the full glare of consciousness the cobwebs of the mind which house the spiders of malevolence and lechery. Primitive meanings, once appropriate to a situation, and later projected unintentionally

into the adult world, are recovered and criticized in the light of their appropriateness to society. Regressive reliving, which is powerfully supported by narcissism and the repetitive compulsion, is observed and overcome.

It should not be supposed that the secrets of the mind are exposed for the asking. The method of repression is a primitive means by which the feeble, nascent self seeks protection from impulses which, if tolerated, if not shut out with unreflecting violence, would overrun it (Alexander). When the self becomes strong and stable, primitive impulses can be permitted to develop further in consciousness without imminent danger that they will pass over into action by controlling the motor apparatus.

Now the critical, reflecting, deciding self must not be crippled by an unduly strong conscience. The structure which we know as the conscience is begun in early childhood, and is formed by the incorporation into the self of the orders and commands which are administered by authority. When the self is weak, as during these formative years, the conscience relies on crude methods to protect its hard-won ascendancy over the antisocial drives in the personality. It visits penalties of anxiety upon the self whenever there are any signs of leniency toward these impulses. The conscience keeps its summary, sadistic quality long after, and neurotics are properly said to suffer from an excess of conscience. Blind denial of the existence of fundamental trends in the personality must be supplanted, and the *obiter dicta* of the conscience subjected to the criticism of the more mature and experienced self.

An obstacle to this procedure is furnished by those energies of the personality which are specialized in resisting the antisocial impulses which have been repressed and denied

direct and undisguised access to consciousness. Any lowering of resistance subjects the individual to acute anxiety, as the conflict between the socialized and the unsocialized drives is reinstated. All sorts of subterfuges are hit upon to obviate the necessity for enduring this anxiety and bringing the hidden into consciousness, where it can lose its charge. The overcoming of this resistance to taking up the battle again is a major process in the prolonged analysis.

The recapitulation of the drives which the individual has experienced throughout his life is the process which lends unique value to the psychoanalytic interview record. The literature of psychoanalysis is full of sample phantasies which are assigned to places in the hypothetical sequence of personality growth. Over twenty years ago Freud wrote some preliminary remarks on character types, especially stressing the rôle of certain excretory pleasures in the development of some psychological structures. The sucking, biting, and anal retention interests of the infant and young child have been the subject of theoretical treatment by several analysts, among whom Abraham is the most important. Ferenczi has sketched a comprehensive theory of the rise of genital interests on the part of the child, and this has been amplified in various directions by Reich. The differences between male and female development have been sketched by Sachs, Deutsch, and Horney.

It is not within the necessary limits of this paper to go farther into the nature of the hypotheses which have been proposed by these various investigators. We will be able to formulate them more precisely when we have succeeded in objectifying what happens in the course of the interview, and this is to be achieved along the lines previously sketched. Some day we can state hypotheses more definitely



which can be taken and tested by non-analytical methods. Some of these conceptions can be confirmed or eliminated by the direct observation of children of all age groups. It is quite possible, however paradoxical it may sound, that the best way to study some phases of infancy and childhood will be to study the adult. There is reason to believe that the superior expressive power of the adult, whether in words or in drawing, may render explicit many states which are beyond the range of one who merely looks at movements.

If we find that the subjective reconstructions during the adult analysis check closely with the results secured by modified analytical and behavioristic procedures applied directly to older children, we will have more confidence in the material which purports to relate to very early experience. We may also test out, so far as possible, the "historicity" of the reminiscences produced at different phases of the analysis. It should be said in passing that the analysis of children requires important revisions in the externals of the technique, as Anna Freud has shown. The objectification of the procedure is attended by some special difficulties on account of the mobility of the subjects, and the greater activity of the analyst, who cannot evade the direct assumption of educational responsibilities.

I want to stop at this point to comment upon the significance of the fact that there should be such a thing as the psychoanalytic method of dealing with the genesis of personality. How does it happen that at the end of the nineteenth century there appeared in Western European civilization this remarkably intricate procedure? Why do we regard it as worth while to spend months or even years in constant introspection?

Viewed in the large, I suppose this is among the most spectacular signs of the valuational crisis in our civilization. Here is an effort to stimulate the individual to the reconstruction of values, not on the basis of imposed authority, but through prolonged scrutiny of the self as a process. The processes of the human personality are subjected to the same patient, arduous, and minute inspection which has proved so successful when applied to the objects of the physical world by the naturalist, astronomer, and microscopic specialist. The end-result of a long and successful analysis is an individual who is able to interpret his relation to the world in terms of a few master symbols. These symbols take on meaning because they have been acquired in the course of a long apprenticeship under the exacting eye of another. These symbols define for the individual in comprehensive terms his relation to unfolding reality. They permit smoothness of adjustment and offer a means of relief from disproportionate feelings of futility, despondency, persecution, and omniscience.

The appearance of a system of communicable master symbols for the definition of one's relation to the universe is anything but a novel phenomenon in the culture history of mankind. At one time a leading question was, "What is God's will for me?" and the belief was that this could be made manifest after the reading of Holy Writ, reverent supplication, and sudden revelation. Our Western civilization has sapped at the pillars of this structure of thinking. We are committed to the persistent querying of the world of change, and the problem is always, *How* does it change? *How* do the routines of the seeable, smellable, touchable, audible, tasteable universe actually work? In what characteristic order do the subjective events of the mind follow

one another? In what order do subjective and objective events occur? And no matter how many intermediate links in the sequence have been named there always remain new intermediate and new all-embracing frames of reference to be identified and placed in orderly relationship.

Values are sought to be defined, not on the authority of another, but in the act of scrutinizing processes. We place enormous value upon the quest for sequences and discover our new values in the act of broadening or deepening our understanding of change. If you tell a sophisticated carrier of Western culture that God reveals his wisdom after the reading of a printed passage, he will be less impressed by what is put in than by what is left out of the account. What relation is there between what is read and what is decided? Can you set up controlled repetitions for the sake of testing the predictive value of these generalizations? Are there other words which can be read but which will result in the same decisions when the reader has the same pecuniary stake in acting a certain way? And so on and on.

You have noticed that the symbols supplied by analysis are not "ought" words but "process" words. You are not told to die for your country; you are told to face all the values which you can find in the situation. This does not, however, eliminate the "arbitrary" character of decisions actually reached. The decision comes with all the shock of revelation, of inevitability, of unexpectedness; the individual may only control decisions by rehearsing the pertinent values until he finds himself in the clutches of a judgment. This willingness to accept uncertainty, to scrutinize intermediate terms and pertinent values, is an outcome of the analytical discipline.

Such a procedure grew up in a civilization whose values

have been in confusion since the medieval cosmology broke down. President Masaryk, serious thinker and scholarly writer, began his sociological work with a study of suicide, which he found to be a rough index of the value strains in culture. When emotional bonds bind the individual to exponents of life-patterns of different design, the mental stage is set for both creative originality and destructive disintegration. The individual must assume the load of working out his own scheme of values, and many are disorganized in the attempt.

This prolonged exercise in self-examination, which has grown out of the chronic crisis in values, provides a means of discovering the implications for personality growth of various culture patterns. The subjective history of the individual is spread out before us, and we are in a position to find how the different ways of dealing with the developing child modify the traits and interests of the children who are exposed to them. What difference does it make that the children in one culture are weaned at one year and the children in another culture are weaned at three? Does the infliction of physical punishment on children more often produce cruelty than overreactive gentleness? What does it matter if children are taken away from the nurse-mother at an early age and reared in groups?

Of special interest to the student of personality differentiation in America would be comparisons with cultures of relatively well-articulated values. One has the impression that those who settled America came from varied and closely knit cultures, and that they were compelled to relinquish the richest and most differentiated values which they brought with them for the sake of rough-and-ready co-operation in defense and breadwinning. This has left us with

an impoverished reality. It is little exaggeration to say that everything is a "problem" in America from the resiliency of the perambulator to the architecture of the crematorium. If you compare the articulateness of a French schoolboy with his American contemporary, you are at once aware that the French boy has a great advantage. This, I submit, is not because our pedagogues are bad, but because our pedagogues and our parents are themselves entangled in the valuational uncertainty of American civilization.

Personality documents may give us clues to the factors which lead to personal disorganization. But that is not the full extent of our interests. We should be glad to find correlations between broken homes and broken lives, but we should like to find subtle connections between early experience and highly differentiated expression in music, sculpture, drama, fiction, science, administration, and philosophy. What, for instance, lies behind the fact that some writers, like Rousseau, proceed impressionistically, and others, like Mark, are unsatisfied until they have finished a huge collection of systematically ordered facts? What is there in the developmental history of a denunciatory agitator like Hyndeman which differentiates him from an enthusiast like William Morris?

Thus far we have been interpreting human behavior in terms of various "tendencies." A tendency postulates a relationship between two events, one of which is taken as the terminal situation and the other as an approximation. We say that a man is trying to catch a train when we interpret one aspect of his behavior in terms of the end-situation stated. Terms like "wishes," "desires," "instincts," "impulses," "drives," and "motives" are used for the interpretation of human behavior. If the list of "tendency" con-



cepts is kept small, the attention of the observer is drawn toward relationships which may have eluded him before. Thus for some purposes it is useful to think of light depressions, states of lassitude, functional bodily disorders, and provocative behavior toward the environment as degrees of approximation toward self-destruction. Indeed, a comprehensive analysis of human conduct can be made by using such heroic simplifications as the tendencies toward murder, incest, and suicide.

The principal reason why the tendency style of thinking is useful is that the phenomena which are discernible at any cross-section of the personality are inexhaustible. If the observer tries to enumerate all the body movements, all the electronic gyrations, all the *nuances* of social adjustment which are thinkable in such a cross-section, he is likely to become lost in aimless classification. Such an observer is quite likely to prove unable to discover hypotheses about the connections between one variable and another. The human mind is able to operate with a very small number of categories with which to introduce order into events, especially when these are still defined in qualitative terms. Clarity of thought demands economy in the orienting objects of thought.

How a tendency conception may lead to a fruitful search for predictively valuable particulars is shown in the case of Freud. By means of a few bold tendency simplifications, he brought into the range of observation whole categories of data which proved to have high predictive value. Perhaps his most important systematic contribution is the "Three Contributions to Sexual Theory," which puts in rather definite shape a whole series of hypotheses about the forms of

early experience which link up with subsequent normal and perverse sexual growth.

The limitation upon the tendency theories is that they may encourage negligence in passing over to the clear statement of antecedent-subsequent relations. One is tempted to indulge in dialectic over whether nursing should be treated as an approximation to the fully completed pattern of adult sexuality, and to fail to ask whether a weaning protest of such-and-such proportions, as viewed by a specified observer, is associated with behavior of such-and-such sort when one is deprived of a love object in subsequent life.

I suggest that the pattern of thinking which will be particularly productive in dealing with personality phenomena conceives the personality as a system of substitutive reactions. Comparisons at a given cross-section can be made on the basis of the form of the substitutive reaction which appears when interferences arise at any part of the system.

For the purpose of summing up the personality as viewed through any time period, we may use these four terms: object orientations, adjustive thinking, autistic reveries, and somatic reactions. Let me choose certain very general illustrations of what is meant here. Mr. A is a member of the city council of one of our largest cities. On two occasions when he has been defeated for re-election, he has become morbidly depressed to such a degree that he has been confined to a sanitarium under psychiatric care. Thus Mr. A met a deprivation in the sphere of his orientation to social objects (political activity) by developing exaggerated autistic reveries (depressive preoccupations).

The case of Mr. B may be thrown up against that of Mr. A. When Mr. B lost out in his campaign for re-election

to the legislature, he began to worry about his health, and although the physicians could find no adequate explanation of his trouble, he developed a host of gastro-intestinal disturbances which incapacitated him for regular professional life. His substitutive reaction was somatic.

Another man, Mr. C, was defeated and spent most of his time writing a well-recognized book on political theory. His substitutive reaction was in the sphere of consecutive, theoretical, adjustive thinking.

Now it is interesting and important that when the life-histories of these men became available, it was shown that these reactions had been organized rather early. Mr. B, to choose one instance, had shown physical symptoms after losing a contest for the presidency of his class in college, and in adolescent and preadolescent deprivation situations.

These rather glaring instances of drastic substitutive reactions perhaps serve the purpose of casting into high relief the essential conception of the personality as a system. When a system is tampered with, changes of a characteristic nature may occur throughout it or anywhere in it. Now the prolonged interview as developed by Freud enables the observer to study the substitutive reactions of the personality with diligent care. Some personalities show a relative predominance of persecutory phantasies at one stage of the interview; others develop headaches and gastro-intestinal symptoms of a mild character at the same stage. The experienced analyst is on the alert for every clue to the reactive system, and the possibility of removing his "hunches" from the realm of art into the area of dependable knowledge depends upon the development of objective records of what transpires in the interview, and the bringing of this material into relation to other pertinent data.

Psychoanalysis, then, has provided us with the most comprehensive set of procedures and hypotheses yet known for the study of personality growth. Further progress toward verification and reformulation depends particularly upon the development of objective accounts of what happens during the prolonged interview.





**CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CHILD'S  
EMOTIONAL LIFE WITH REF-  
ERENCE TO SOCIAL  
RELATIONSHIPS**



## ADULT INSTITUTIONS AND THE CHILD'S PERSONALITY

*Floyd H. Allport, Syracuse University*

One of the outstanding instances of the social wisdom of Charles Horton Cooley was his observation that the individual and the group are one and the same. This statement has become a kind of faith or creed to which we have returned at various times when tempted to stray. Yet, in spite of lip service to this ideal, it is to be feared that on many occasions we forget that the individual and the social are but one order of experience. There has grown up a tendency to think of the social world as a kind of social organism, and to picture human culture as though it were something over and above human beings and independent of them.

In the practical sphere there has arisen a kind of formula, which is used by social workers, by teachers, by parents, and perhaps by all who have to do with the training of children, to the effect that we should endeavor to *adjust the individual to society*. This seems like a harmless formula which we have long accepted as a truism. What I should like to do this morning is to challenge it. When we speak of adjusting the individual to society, we really mean adjusting him to himself and to other individuals. One may say, of course, that this is the same thing. But I think that it is not; for there are occasions when we use the conception of the social order in such a manner as to mean not individuals, but something else. In particular, this is true when we think of the things which are called our social institu-

tions, such as government, education, business, industry, religion, and the family. There is a tendency to regard such social aggregates as these as something quite different from, or at least greater than, individuals.

My purpose, first, is to show that the notion of "adjusting individuals to society" may lead to the impression of a social world over and above individuals, a concept which obscures our view of what is really happening to the individuals concerned. And in this obscurity those of us who are grown up are probably more deeply involved than are the children whom we teach.

Second, success in adjusting the individual to social institutions does not meet the full need for guidance on the part of the child.

Third, we cannot deal successfully with the child's personality problems by adjusting him to the social order, because we do not know what his social order will be when he is grown up.

A few words should be said, before proceeding, about the nature of institutions and institutional behavior. We might classify all human conduct under two heads. The first of these I shall call "common habits," similar forms of behavior, or common segments of behavior. We all treat a dollar bill as worth about the same amount of goods. When in driving our automobiles we see the red traffic signal flash, we all stop. When we meet a judge in court, a minister in his church, or a teacher in her classroom, we have certain ways of addressing these persons and certain forms of behavior toward them. When we get on the elevated train or the street car, the fare box is before us and we drop our money into it. In all these acts, and I cite but a few of the many thousands that we perform almost daily, each of us

behaves in the same way as everyone else. There are very few individual differences in such behavior. It is also clear that unless we possessed these similar common ways of behaving, it would be impossible to have our organized society and our social institutions.

It is also noteworthy that, in reacting in identical ways to these situations, we are really reacting to a kind of symbol or an abstract situation. One fare box is like every other; one dollar bill is like any other; one judge is like every other at least in the respect that he observes certain legal precedents and procedures. It therefore follows that, so far as our behavior is of this common-segment kind, we are unable to develop unique forms of responses. In so far as institutional behavior controls our lives, there is no chance for the development of what we know as personality. It is fortunate, therefore, that these common segments of conduct are limited to a portion only of our acts.

The other type of behavior, which may be called the face-to-face variety, occurs in situations in which one person reacts to another in a direct manner, without the need or use of any predicted or expected conduct. The informal conversation, the meeting of friends on the street, and like situations may call out from either of the participants any one of thousands of possible reactions, so that points of view may be brought out, specific habits evoked or formed, and a certain uniqueness of human contacts and personality established. When we go on the elevated and drop our fare in the box, we do not try to use this face-to-face type of behavior. We do not try to make a personal impression upon the guard on duty. We do not say that we are poor, or that we have left our pocketbook at home. We do not appeal to his human understanding or his sympathies. We



simply drop in our fare as everyone else does. If our entire lives were like this incident of putting the money in the fare box, we should never attain self-expression and we should never develop our unique personalities.

Human behavior, then, is made up of these two general classes: the free, spontaneous, face-to-face behavior in which we can express and develop our personalities, and the common, or like, behaviors in which we must behave like everyone else. In the latter type, the like or common behavior, lie our social institutions. How, with respect to these general categories, does the young child react to his social environment? I believe that, prior to any teaching in regard to institutions, he reacts only by the direct, face-to-face type of behavior in which the entire personality is expressed. He gives his approval or his condemnation as he sees fit, without regard to the customary or conventional social approval or disapproval. He reacts to people as unique individuals, not as beings having a fixed social rôle or status, in which they are the same as everyone else in a given class. He regards them as specific persons who react to him or to whom he reacts.

This original viewpoint of childhood is illustrated by the following experience which I recently had with two boys. One of these lads, whom I shall call Richard W., was eleven years of age; the other, my own son Edward, was two years younger. One day when Richard W. and I were riding alone in my automobile, I gave him, half playfully, a peremptory order. He replied, "I won't do it. I don't have to mind you. I only mind my father."

"Why don't you have to mind me?" I asked.

He answered, "Because you are not in the same family."

This ingenious reply gave me the idea of trying the

same question on my own boy, who was somewhat younger. Accordingly, when I could arrange a confidential interview with him, I inquired, "Do you have to mind Mr. W.?" (indicating Richard's father).

The boy said, "No."

I then said, "Why don't you mind him?"

"Because I don't have to," he replied.

Again I queried, "Why don't you have to mind him?"

"*Because I don't have to, that's all!*"

We have here two points of view in regard to society. That of the older boy, Richard, was somewhat sophisticated. It was less naïve and perhaps for that reason, less true than Edward's. The reason why Richard had to mind his own father was really not because his father was in the same family; but because he (Richard) had been punished for *not* minding. Richard, however, was old enough to know the relationships of other men in society to their sons and to realize that they would support his own father (for example, in the trial of the case before a judge in the juvenile court) in the insistence upon the obedience of his own son. Even in court, however, Richard would not have to mind because his father was in the same family, but because the judge had some means of punishment at his disposal which, in the end, would prove effective. In other words, the reason why Richard had to mind his father was *because he had to*. But where, one will ask, does the family come in? The family, in this institutional, or legal, sense, may be thought of as a convenient formula for rationalizing or justifying our procedure in making our children obey us, and in gaining the approval of other parents for this compulsion. It is a kind of pact between parents in society, a useful pact on the whole. But still it is not the pact, but

the *actual parent*, who coerces the child. Edward obviously knew nothing of these more complex social relationships. He was less sophisticated. Perhaps for that reason, however, he saw facts a little more clearly than Richard who had evidently forgotten the fundamental, psychological relationship which existed between himself and his father in the question of obedience.

We are beginning at Syracuse University a study of what children at various age levels think about social institutions. One of our graduate students prepared a story of certain human episodes which, though familiar to all, had their institutional settings and relationships badly confused. Then he secured a group of children, ranging in age from seven to fifteen, from a nearby church-school and read them this story. Before commencing he said, "I am going to read you a story. I think there is something wrong with it. If you find anything wrong, let me know when I am through." The story ran as follows:

Once there was a policeman who slept all day in his house. He never went out in the daytime, but only at night. He wore a brown suit and a red necktie. Sometimes he wore a hat and sometimes he wore a cap drawn over his forehead.

One night he crept out of his house and went down the street in the dark until he came to a store. All the lights in the store were turned out, because the storekeeper was at home in bed. He stopped to see if anyone was coming. He looked up the street and down the street, but he couldn't see anybody at all. Then he went around in the alley to the back door. The door was locked, but he broke the lock and went in. He felt his way about until he came to the cash register. Then he reached in and took the money. He put the money in his pocket and felt his way to the door.

In the alley a robber was walking along and whistling.

The robber saw the policeman come out of the door, and he grabbed the policeman and held him.

"What were you doing in that store?" the robber asked.

"I was only looking for the storekeeper to ask him if I could have a job in his store," said the policeman, trembling.

"I don't believe you," said the robber. "Let me search you."

"I won't," said the policeman, and he tried to get away. The robber held him tightly. He felt in the policeman's pockets and found the money.

"Where did you get all this money?" asked the robber.

"I don't know how it got there," said the policeman. "Someone must have put it there for a joke."

Come along with me," said the robber, and he took the policeman to the hospital. The policeman went to bed in the hospital. He slept all night, and when he woke up in the morning the robber was waiting for him. The policeman put on his clothes, and then both of them ate breakfast.

Then the robber took the policeman to the church. The minister was sitting in the pulpit, and the choir was in the loft.

The robber went up to the minister and said, "I caught this man stealing money in a store last night."

The minister looked very severe and said to the policeman, "Did you steal this money?"

The policeman was going to tell another lie and say he was only looking for a job, but he knew he would have to confess later on; so he said, "Yes."

The minister looked up at the choir and said, "You have heard what this man said. Do you think he is guilty?"

The people in the choir got up and went into a little room behind the organ. In a minute they came back, and one of them stood up, while the others sat down in the choir loft.

"Please, Mr. Minister," he said, "we think he is guilty."

"All right," said the minister.

He looked at the policeman very sternly. Then he

pointed his finger at him and said, "You must go to school and stay there for two years."

The policeman began to cry, but the robber took him out of the church and put him in the school.<sup>1</sup>

We shall continue at this point in the language of the student who was conducting the experiment.

Soon after beginning the story it was noted that several of the older children smiled; but no one made any noise until I came to the place where the robber took the policeman to the hospital. Then several of them laughed aloud slightly.

When I had finished, a girl of about twelve said, "I know what was wrong."

"What was it?" I asked.

"The policeman should have caught the robber, instead of the robber catching the policeman."

"But why shouldn't the robber catch the policeman?" I asked.

"Because policemen catch robbers."

"Do they?" I asked. "Well, why do they catch robbers?"

"Because that's their job."

I asked, "Do policemen catch robbers just for fun?"

"No. They do it because they have to."

"Why do they have to?"

"Because they get paid for it."

"Why did the robber take the policeman to the church?"

A girl answered, "Because he had been bad."

"What do you mean by saying he was bad?"

Another girl answered, "He broke a law."

I asked, "Why is it bad to break a law?"

One girl immediately answered, "Because if one person could break a law and it wasn't bad, then everybody could break the laws, and robbers could steal everything we had."

I asked, "If you did something wrong, and a policeman caught you, would he take you to a minister?"

<sup>1</sup>For this material and the record of the conversation following I am indebted to Mr. Arthur Jenness.



"Yes," said one of the girls.

"No," said a boy. "He would take you to a police station." There seemed to be quite a bit of disagreement on this.

I asked the girl, "Why should a policeman take you to a minister?"

"Because he knows what is right and wrong."

"Can a minister send anyone to jail?" I asked.

Several children said, "But he didn't send the man to jail. He sent him to school."

"Why did he send him to school?" I asked.

"Because he didn't know anything," said a girl.

"Is that the reason?" I asked the children.

"Yes," they said in chorus.

The responses to this story, as indicated by the account of the student just given, contain a queer mixture of naïveté and native shrewdness. In the reply that policemen catch robbers because they are paid for it, we can give the child who answered credit for a very genuine and realistic statement. An older person might have said, "We have laws. Our legislators make these laws, the courts administer them, and the police carry out the orders of the courts. Therefore, policemen catch robbers." But this formula, to my notion, would not have been as fundamentally true an answer as that which the child gave.

Or, let us consider the explanation of why it is bad to break a law. It seems to me that the little girl who answered that question hit the truth of the matter more squarely than the two volumes of Austin's *Jurisprudence*. Learned jurists have traditionally implied that law, whether human or divine, has some ultimate moral sanction of its own. It is bad to break a law, simply because it is a law. But here is a mere child who says it is bad to break a law

*because we consider it so; that is, because, if people could break these laws without being considered wicked in so doing, those of us who have property would suffer. Good and bad, in other words, are concepts for the service of human beings in society, rather than the absolute will of society itself.*

As the child grows older, these naïve but true notions of human relationships become obscured by thinking in terms of institutions which are thought to be over the heads of individuals, controlling their thoughts and actions. The child begins to think of law, for example, as a kind of stern parent. Since he has been trained in obedience to his actual parent, that obedience is transferred to the institution of "the law" or "the government." There arises an emotional conditioning to these words and a fear which few of us ever completely shake off.

Many will say that we are merely fighting a straw man. As grown-ups we all know that institutions are only abstract notions and not persons; and we do not deceive ourselves if occasionally we adopt a personal attitude toward them. Yes, we *do* know that *intellectually*; and in a thoughtful discussion this question never arises. But when it comes to some political crisis, some social upheaval, a war, a strike, even an election, these emotional habits which we have possessed since childhood toward the institutional symbols of the state, government, church, family, country, and the like are reinvoked and are used to control human belief and action with all the intensity of crowd compulsion.

We might go on tracing the growth of the notions of institutions which children acquire in their later childhood or adolescence and carry on into their adult life. Let us consider, for example, money. First there is a stage of simple

exchange between children, a personal, face-to-face relationship, with no money at all. Only objects are exchanged. Later on, the child finds that money is "magic": it can be used to obtain anything he wants. He gets a notion of a world of wealth over and above the human beings who are using it. He sees the wealth of the nation, the circulation of money, and the expansion of business in the country as though they were things in themselves, rather than the actual give and take between individuals. We thus come as children to believe that this abstract "wealth of the country" measures the actual prosperity of each individual. We have many illusions from the impressions we have received in childhood concerning our institutions. The psychology of nationalism has a similar genetic history. Through the study of history and related topics, the child frequently comes to believe that the nation is something more than the individuals concerned, something to be fought for in time of war.

Ideas regarding the family are also very important. The child gradually learns that his father and mother are not simple biological organisms in his environment, but that they have a definite social rôle and status. Certain social images are built up in his mind concerning his parents. The father-image represents a rather stern, but reasonably kindly, person, who insists upon strict discipline and demands courage and industry of his children. The mother-image represents a character endowed with tenderness and affection, persuasive, sympathetic, and willing to sacrifice herself for her children. Boys and girls are accordingly supposed to have definite attitudes toward their parents in keeping with these images, so that they treat their fathers in definite and somewhat different ways from their mothers.

Such social images and common ways of behaving are thought to exist by themselves as "institutions," and to compel people, as it were, to play these rôles which society has fastened upon them.

In certain cases these rôles may accurately fit the individuals who enact them. But in many instances they are used to emphasize or control certain types of reactions on the part of the children. Frequently the customary images are quite contrary to fact, the institutional status assigned to parents may not represent their actual personalities or motives at all. We may witness the exploitation of these stereotypes not only in family life, but in the community outside the home. I am not thinking merely of the control through the juvenile court and similar agencies (which is usually helpful) but of economic profiteering. Mother's Day is an exploitation of a social image which everyone must live up to by sending his mother candy, flowers, or telegrams, if he is to retain the approval of society. Father's Day, also, is coming to the front since Mother's Day has proved so profitable to merchants and telegraph companies.

Children often think that parents as such should be certain kinds of persons, whether they are so by nature or not. The well-known "foster-child fantasy," which has been studied by Professor Conklin, of the University of Oregon, is illustrated by the large number of college students who have at some time during their childhood thought their supposed parents were not their actual parents. Some of these students have even gone back to their birthplaces to investigate the matter. This fiction, in certain instances at least originated from the fact that a stereotype, or social image, had been built up about the father or the

mother which later had to be broken down. The father was not the hero of early childhood, after all; and the child had to face that fact and make a readjustment. Unwilling to meet the situation frankly, the child in many cases has sought refuge in the realm of fancy.

In general we may say that children go through three stages with regard to their conception of the social order. There is, first, the naïve perception of the actual physical relationships, the actions of the child toward other people, and the things they do to him, without any notion of institutions or institutional controls. Second, and somewhat later, the child learns, and often in a somewhat emotional way, the meaning of institutional symbols. This is the age when he is quick to believe in the reality of the "nation," the "gang," or the "family" as apart from individuals. He is highly idealistic and not very critical. Then, finally, there arrives the mature stage in which he learns the rational aspects of the folk ways and the customs of society. He understands something of the *functioning* of government, law, and other institutions. He has a more adequate intellectual picture; but he still retains a kind of emotional susceptibility to symbols which tend to define the social order as a realm above, or separate from, the lives of individuals. It is in the freedom from these encumbering fictions that the child is wiser than the man.

Concerning the goal of "adjusting the individual to society," the second point to which I wish to call attention is that this formula does not provide an adequate measure of our success in dealing with any particular case which calls for guidance. We must admit, of course, that in many instances it is a fair *partial* measure; for if the individual can be adapted to the social institutions under



which he must live, then a large part of the problem is solved. Such seems to be the case in many instances of broken homes, desertion, and juvenile delinquency. Frequently the child has been allowed to run wild, and has formed habits of satisfying his needs in ways which do not take into account the rights and needs of others. Delinquents are as a rule singularly detached from the ordinary institutional or "common segment" behaviors of life. They have no home worthy of the name; they have broken off through truancy their relationship to the school; they do not go to church or Sunday school; their health is not guarded by attendance at medical centers or clinics. They are, in short, derelicts so far as the pattern of common habits which makes up society is concerned. Hence a necessary part of the treatment consists in trying to bring the individual back to society. The attempt is made to secure a good home for him, to insure his attendance at school and church, and to make him in other ways a more conforming citizen of his community.

But although this treatment unquestionably helps, in that it reduces friction and produces harmony in the social order, it is not necessarily the final or most satisfactory solution. There are cases, for example, of a rival foreign culture, or perhaps the culture of gang life, in which the child has been reared. In this situation he may be trained to change his habits, and to adjust to socialized ways of living in such a manner that he will no longer be a social problem. There may, however, be left in his habit system an unresolved conflict. He may not have received the guidance necessary for his remaking as an individual. Enforcing conformity to an institutional pattern will control common-segment behaviors; but it will not guide the developing

expression of the desires, ambitions, and motives of a personality.

There are also families in which the husband and wife have differing notions of the familial institution, a conflict-situation which results in a loss of contact with the children and an eventual disruption of the home. Here the problem arises: What do we mean by adjusting the child to society? Shall we adapt him to the institutions of his father or of his mother? Or, if we could secure his conformity to either pattern, would that solve the problem in an adequate way for the individual concerned?

From this standpoint let us consider the excellent case presented by Professor Ernest W. Burgess in *The Family*, for March, 1926. The father of the "Marx" family held the firm and emotional conviction that family ought to be a very rigid affair, and that the father should wield a despotic authority over the children, demanding of them the strictest obedience at all times. He had acquired this notion from his own German background and traditional family pattern, strengthened by his experience with discipline in the army. The mother, on the other hand, was an American girl who had been reared under very different traditions. Her feeling was that family life should be the meeting ground for a group held together by mutual loyalty, and should provide helpfulness, respect, affection, and a democratic status for all. In the conflict between these two familial concepts the children were left in a rather sad predicament. There were three boys. The eldest, who was somewhat of a black sheep, continually got into a good deal of trouble in the community and presented a difficult problem for his father, who knew of no way to deal with him except by harsh methods. The two younger boys had

tried to break away from the family discord and discover their notion of the family from the home life of other boys in the community.

Professor Burgess has analyzed this case as a conflict of societal patterns or of cultures. The struggle between these different institutions of the family, or, rather, the different ways of conceiving the institution, had produced discord, loss of helpful contact with the children, and problems arising between the members of the family and the neighborhood. I should like, however, to invite your attention to a different interpretation. It is possible to approach this case-study by asking, not what were the patterns of family life which governed this family, but what each individual was trying to do as a single human personality. We might then perhaps discover that the father held his particular belief in regard to family discipline because he himself was, or wanted to be, a domineering person. That may have been the nature of his personality. Because of inferior education and social standing he may have had little opportunity to express this trait in society at large; while in his home he had the opportunity and he sought to use it. He said, it is true, that in his own family he was going to keep on with the methods which had been traditional in his family line; that he was just going to do as his father and grandfather had done. But this does not mean that we must regard the "family pattern" as the *cause* of his behavior. It is quite as probable that it was used as a means of justification; in other words, that he rationalized his position by referring to it as a tried and traditional method of family life.

When we turn to the boys, it becomes even clearer that they were not trying to uphold any definite institu-

tional pattern; for, having known no previous background of family life, they did not have any pattern to uphold. They were, instead, searching for some satisfactory *modus vivendi*; and until they got out into the community and saw how other children behaved toward their parents, they had no criterion to follow, but only the views of their parents which were unworkable because contradictory. The children, then, were trying not so much to establish an institution of the family as to live their own lives, to follow their interests, and to gain their personal satisfactions—in short, to do the things that boys normally want to do. We shall probably, therefore, gain a clearer view of the situation if we think in terms of the drives and wishes of the separate persons involved than if we picture a “social order” which was trying to get itself realized within this family.

Upon the view that this case was merely one of conflict between institutional familial patterns, we would have to conclude that the whole trouble could have been settled merely by adopting the one pattern or the other. For upon this assumption the difficulty lay, not so much in any particular pattern (they had all been respectable patterns at some time in society), but in the disorganization resulting from their conflict. In that case let us ask Professor Burgess whether he would be willing to predict that, if we should adopt and make effective for this family the pattern of the father, that is, if the children and the wife should conform peaceably to that type of family life, their troubles would be over. Although this would seem to be a logical conclusion, I fear that few of us would believe it to be a true one; for the acceptance of the father's position might mean the thwarting of the development of the children.

They would be hampered and repressed in their activities in the measure that they submitted their personalities to the father's domination. There would be social harmony, the family would be held together; but there would be discord and mental conflict within the individuals. Thus under the slogan of adjusting the individual to society, we may frequently have "social" peace and tranquillity, but an accompanying maladjustment of the individual. A penitentiary, if managed rigorously enough, may appear to be a perfectly ordered institution. Few would contend, however, that a prison system, however orderly, is a good method for making criminals contented or for training them and removing conflicts within their personalities.

Many other illustrations could be given of the attempt to foster a certain notion of the family as an institution, according to the desires of certain individuals in the family concerned. A young woman who has been reared in a refined and cultured home, and who has always taken a great interest in art, music, and literature, will probably look forward to a marriage with an "ideal" man who shall possess the same interests and accomplishments. In the impetuous short-sightedness of courtship she may accept and marry a man who she thinks is of just this sort, but who later turns out to be very different. His main interests may prove to be athletic sports, business, industry, or, in fact, anything but the things upon which she places the greatest value. What shall she do? Shall she retain her old conception and ideal of the cultured family and blame her husband for not being that kind of man? Or shall she relinquish, or at least compromise, her ideal, and, admitting that she was wrong concerning her husband's characteristics, frankly accept him as he is?



Upon the answer to this question will depend the happiness and stability of this particular marriage.

And so with the children. If they are forced to accept the institution of the family as it is supposed to be, if they are thoroughly inoculated with the social image concerning parents and children, they are likely to become thwarted in their own development. The potentialities which they may have for certain traits and for entering certain vocations may never receive fulfilment. They may be torn between desires which they long to realize and a love and respect which the parent feels cannot be rendered without conformity to the family institution as the parent or the community interprets it. Among young people in college we see the fruits of many of these conflicts. The essential difficulty in securing an adjustment to the maturer viewpoint in religion is frequently due to emotional conditioning of religious subjects by attitudes toward parents. It is difficult to break away from infantile conceptions because these views are tied up with the love of the parent himself.

Children often discover clever means of satisfying the social demand for conformity to institutions, while at the same time retaining some degree of self-expression in the things they wish to do. Robert, a boy of nine, was a model child in school. The teacher could not say enough in his praise. He was helpful and co-operative in every way. The teacher was amazed, therefore, when the father called at the school and informed her that at home Robert was exactly the reverse. There he was generally mean and disagreeable, would bully the younger children, and try to assert his will and get his own way on every occasion. Now the institutional ideal maintained at the school was that

of strict discipline, but with reward and recognition for any who carefully obeyed the rules and was helpful to the teacher. The family slogan at home was that of personal liberty and freedom of self-expression. The parents perhaps gave too many privileges to their children in the interests of this ideal. Robert had therefore taken advantage of the home situation and had carried the free expression of his personality to extremes which were trying for all concerned and especially dubious from the standpoint of social training. Here we have two institutions of society, the home and the school. Robert is adjusted to one but not to the other. Should we try to get him to be adjusted to both?

I do not believe this is the way to go about it. If we work from the standpoint primarily of securing adjustment to these institutions, we shall miss the entire point of the case. Shall we say the fault is with the home, and if we will only make the home a little more like the school, good behavior in both spheres may be predicted? This is a short-sighted view, for it would render the child's character undependable except under the conditions of school life and discipline. There would be little growth to meet the broader experiences which life must hold in store. The first thing to do is to inquire why the boy should have these two opposite forms of behavior, why he should be self-contradictory in his actions within these two spheres. In this case, for example, it was learned that the probable reason for Robert's discrepancy of behavior at home and at school lay in a certain trait of his own personality, namely, the desire to gain social recognition by being outstanding in some way from other children. At school he was able to do this by being the most co-operative and best behaved

boy in the classroom. In the home, where the premium was placed rather upon originality than upon conformity, he was better able to achieve attention by being the *worst behaved* child in the family. If, then, we recognize this trait in the child and see how the same trait, when working through different institutional situations, may produce opposite results, we have a new means of understanding and attacking the problem. Our problem is now not the adjustment of the child to society, but primarily the discovery of a means through which his dominant personal traits may receive expression while at the same time a reasonable harmony with his fellows may be accomplished. Our emphasis is not upon the social situation, or the adjustment of the child to the situation for the purpose of securing social order, but upon the attainment of a socialized self-expression for the child.

Professor E. R. Groves has pointed out the importance of minor frictions and conflicts in the family life. The family in which everything is in perfect harmony is probably to be suspected. The child may be sacrificing his own development to the family ideal, or to the institutional type or familial image held up within the community. A certain amount of what Professor Groves calls "family growing pains" is a necessary assurance that the integrity and development of the individual is receiving some recognition. Psychiatrists who work with problem children have come to the conclusion that, for diagnostic purposes, the "perfectly behaved" child is to be suspected, even more than the intractable child, of a possible serious mental maladjustment. The "model" child may be accepting a purely institutional rôle rather than facing problems and difficulties squarely. He may be seeking an excessively in-

troverted adjustment, a life of compensatory imagery, or may be developing traits of insincerity and hypocrisy.

We must therefore conclude that, for securing social harmony in living together, which is really an important object, the formula of adjusting the child to society or to social institutions is a useful one; but that it is not a sufficient criterion for the guidance of children with regard to their entire development as individual personalities in dynamic relation to the social order in which they live.

Finally, the formula of adjusting the individual to society is impracticable as a guide for child-training because we do not know what the society of the future will be. Institutions change. The common segments of behavior which make up our institutional life are continually giving way to new forms. If we look at individuals, at the course being taken by children and young people today, we can get, perhaps, some clue of what our future institutions may be like. Though this clue is vague, it is at least something to work upon. Vast and uncertain as this field may be, it cannot be neglected by those in charge of the guidance of children.

In all spheres of life we find examples of the transformation of society through the change of individual personalities. When our children have grown up, they will possess new viewpoints, new attitudes, new philosophies of life. In the political field, as political scientists have told us repeatedly, the old notion of a representative democracy is breaking down. In the present complex age we can no longer have truly representative government under any scheme now known. The business of government has become vastly technical and complicated. Social problems, touching millions of people, have become so intricate

that only experts can handle them. We can vote only for party candidates or upon a few issues of which we have little understanding. Radically contrasting political experiments are being tried in various parts of the world. What kind of personalities will be developed in the citizens of the future to meet these changes? What new political viewpoints will be acquired and taught? That is an issue for which in some degree we must prepare our own children. Yet we do not see what the outcome will be, nor do we understand the complexion of the age for which the characters of our children and grandchildren must be formed. We cannot escape the problem, and yet we cannot solve it. But in any case we shall do better if we pay greater attention to the individualities that are emerging in the children of today than to an attempt to harness these children to the institutions of yesterday.

In the field of religion it seems likely that the men and women of the future will no longer believe in the image of a transcendent deity. But they will retain, no doubt, the essential inner motive which we call religion. What is to be the future trend in religion so far as individual personality is concerned? Our children must live in this coming period and their children after them; and that is the religious order for which we are training them. What habits and attitudes shall we give them in regard to the church, the deity, and life in general, to fit them for such a change? Here, again, present established society can tell us nothing; but the freely developing child and youth may reveal much.

In industry we are faced by the sweeping effect of machine production upon the life of the worker, upon the conduct of the home, and upon family relationships. Critics



are pointing out the defects of this overspecialized age of business, with its minute division of labor, its narrowing effect upon the worker's life, its relation to ill health, to old age employment, to industrial diseases, to standards of commercialization, and the like. The characters of our young people are changing to meet this new order, or rather the régime itself is being embodied and given reality in the changing personalities of the young. We do not find the new economic system wholly commendable. Sociologists refer to a "cultural lag" in our institutions. Our old methods are unsatisfactory for the use of our new tools. Sometime, we hope, this "lag" will be caught up, and we shall know how to adjust ourselves to the sweeping changes of our machine age and the many evils which are threatening to devastate human life. What will the personalities of the individuals living in that age be like? That, again, is a question whose answer we must seek, not in the traditional adjustment of the individual to society, but in the glimmerings of the future as revealed in the personalities of the children of today.

In sex relationships, in attitudes toward family life, in the double standard of morals, and in our entire moral code for men and women, we are on the threshold of great changes. Shall the morals of men and women be just alike? If so, shall the single code be that accepted by men or that common among women? Or, will there be an entirely new moral standard? And what kind of personality will have to be developed in order to use this standard successfully, in order to secure through it the fullest and richest satisfaction in life? What shall we teach about home and family relationships in an age which is shifting from the notion of the family as a unit for procreation to the family

as an arrangement whereby two people can live together congenially upon a sex basis, with children as a purely incidental result? How shall we train children for their future rôles in families of this sort? Then, too, what can be said of the future social personality of women? What ideal can we hold up to the young girl of today? What kind of woman shall we train her to be? From personal experience I know this problem to be very difficult. I have nothing but the older standards to go by, and these no longer apply. When my boy stubs his toe and starts to cry, I say, "Be a man." When my little daughter stubs her toe and starts crying, what can I say? The connotations involved in "Be a woman" or "Be a lady" simply do not fit in an age in which we expect women to be hardy and courageous and to face life with the same outlook as men. Here again, our sons and daughters, not the society into which they have been born, must teach us.

These considerations illustrate the folly of thinking of a set of institutions and customs over and above individuals, requiring us to adjust ourselves to their demands. The social order itself lies in human personalities; and the order of the future is to be found in the desires, interests, and viewpoints of the children who are now with us. In looking at this problem, therefore, we should avoid the hypostatization of social institutions above the individual. Treating the individual and social realms as separate is one of the chief causes of the cultural lag which sociologists deplore.

There are many concrete situations in the home and school in which these problems arise. How, for example, shall we teach attitudes regarding sex privacy to children? My children since babyhood have associated freely together

when naked without shameful feelings of any sort. What instruction shall I give them as they grow older? As a conventionally proper father, I feel that I should teach them all these habits of sex privacy which are summed up under the strange euphemism of "modesty." Yet their original behavior seems to me to be much more natural, sincere, scientifically genuine than the artificial customs they will have to learn. This is a difficult dilemma, but one which cannot be avoided. I try to meet the situation by saying to my children, "You must learn to keep a certain privacy when you are naked, because if you do not, you will get into trouble with other people. That is the way other people do, or at least what they *say* should be done; so you will have to do that way, too." This statement, I trust, removes from custom any sanction or control as a superhuman code of morals. It renders impossible any such notion as sin, and stresses only the element of conformity, and that merely in order to avoid trouble with one's fellows. Hence if my children, in company with their fellows, should wish later to change their habits and to adopt customs which will be in closer harmony with the personal values of individuals living in the future, there will be complete freedom for them to do so.

In general it is probably a good plan, in the teaching of institutional behavior to children, to keep in mind the following suggestions: First, teach common-segment habits tentatively, not as something to be sacredly maintained throughout life, but as a code which may be changed later on, and which is now learned and adopted merely for the sake of getting on with others. Second, actively encourage the deliberate and thoughtful change of institutional habits as the children are developing into men and woman. Help,

in other words, to adjust "society" to the individual. Third, remove moral sanctions and the notion of sin from the adherence of custom. Fourth, do not teach the institutions as something over and above the children's heads. Convey an impression of society, not as a great reality separate from the lives of individuals, but only as lying within the individuals themselves. Finally, avoid emotional appeals, and refrain from conditioning the emotional responses of children to the symbols that represent our institutions.

If the foregoing analysis and suggestions are well founded, we are confronted by the need of a new and broader conception of the environment on the part of social workers, teachers, and parents. We see the need of supplementing the narrower view of the child's immediate neighborhood and family by society at large. We enter here upon a problem which is both vast and intricate, a problem whose issues are uncertain, and in which there are no definite standards of judgment. We must employ, not only the fundamental knowledge of the doctor and the clinical psychologist, but also the viewpoint of the social psychologist and the social scientist. For the old and dubious formula, the adjustment of the individual to society, we should substitute as an objective *the progressive unfolding of a personality in a world of one's fellow-beings*. This broader conception of social work and child guidance will require to an unusual degree the qualities of humility, tolerance, insight, scientific attitude toward human problems, and the readiness to conduct careful experiments in all fields of human relationship.

What principles can be set up to guide us in this difficult quest? I know of none. I have no rule to offer. We can rely only upon frank, sincere experiments, profiting by our

failures and by our successes. In this attempt it may be that we shall secure the most successful guidance if we learn to follow as well as to lead. In many fields we can learn as much from our boys and girls as they can learn from us. For the children of the present contain within them the seeds of the future. They possess potentialities for human personality and for a social order which we may never see.



## THE FAMILY AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

*Benjamin C. Gruenberg, Educator, Writer*

I have a newspaper here dated March 1, which has a little box in the upper left-hand corner saying, "A real home paper, dependable, reliable, progressive, of local and national scope." I shall read only the upper half of the first page and not all of that: "Ten year old attacked in tailor shop"—"Raper's own daughter is victim of another man with father knowing"—"Jealous husband slays estranged wife; kills self"—"Woman is lynched in North Carolina"—"Mother of sixteen months' old baby brutally slain by husband"—"Bishop Lawson discusses Fairies' Ball" (a ball of homosexuals, held in New York recently). I need not read any more. It does not say anywhere else in this paper how to identify a real home, for which this paper is intended.

The only paper I have had a chance to read, dated the seventh of March, 1930, was not labeled a "real home paper" but it was labeled "Home Edition," and it told about a woman of forty-nine seeking a divorce from a husband of twenty-eight, married ten years; it told about (a tone of pride in this) "only seven burglaries reported yesterday." The same kind of stuff only more so, because it is from a larger community.

From the biological point of view I wish to make only one statement and then try, if I can, to cover the subject. As the biologist sees an organism, a child for example, it has two kinds of relations to its world. One of these is that it is constantly taking hold of the outside world and making

it part of itself. A plant grows because it converts what is not yet itself into itself. Babies and worms and birds do exactly the same thing. We reach out into the world and make parts of it our own; I shall not say as much of it as we can, but parts of it. The other aspect of being alive is imposing ourselves upon the world, making ourselves fit into the world, which is just the obverse of making the world fit into us. I do not say that assimilation is more important than adjustment; I am not sure even that they are different. Very often assimilation means adjustment. The earthworm, for example, makes its progress through the soil by swallowing the earth in front of it as it goes and passing it on through its intestines. The same progress of assimilation or of taking in the world means also adjustment; I fit into my world as I make the world a part of myself. Any attempt to make a sharp distinction between these two phases leads us into metaphysics.

The problem which I have been asked to discuss is that of the family and the social environment, primarily, of course, in the light of our major topic of the emotional development of the child. At some stage in the little child's development, sometimes earlier, sometimes later, parents become alarmed lest the movies produce untoward effects upon the ideals and the attitudes of the hitherto unspoiled girl or boy; or the parents become disturbed because the child might overhear bad words in the street, and they fear that naughty thoughts may creep in with the words; or we become uneasy about the so-called comic strip, which always belittles the things we value, which always cultivates cynicism, makes fun of our ideals; or we suspect that some of the display advertising or even the headlines are not suited to edify or improve the young idea which we are

hoping to teach to shoot straight, if left to ourselves. There is no doubt that these various experiences can and often do influence the developing child's attitudes, his ideas of right and wrong, his feelings of attraction and aversion. Stories, plays, pictures can make the villain look charming and the ways of the unrighteous appear most fascinating. Every well-meaning parent naturally seeks to protect his children from such destructive and demoralizing influences; some of us even go as far as to join with others to pass a law.

Long before the child is exposed to the movies, the comics, and to other people's children, there have already been established numerous fundamental attitudes and the corresponding emotions. Indeed, the child may be said to start out upon his emotional development handicapped by his parents. Where the normal course of events should really be determined by the child's needs and by his distinctive characteristics as an individual, there are so many deep-seated fears, so many unfulfilled desires, so many provoking frustrations that interfere with his development.

Here is a mother who is very much disappointed because the sex of her first child is not what she had hoped for. She makes it very difficult for that child to be a normal boy or girl, as the case may be, as the fates had intended—the fates and the x-chromosomes of which you have heard. If the father is oversensitive about his stature or about his muscular development, he will transfer his timidity to his offspring and make a bully or a shyster lawyer, where the gods had promised a prince of peace.

The investigators are finding out a secret which Plato knew many years ago, namely, that parents may cause serious handicap to the happiness and healthy development of their children. This is not to say that children would be

better off with fewer parents, or with none at all. We cannot recommend the elimination of parents from human society, but we may hope to improve our technique as parents so as to mitigate the hardships to which we unwittingly expose practically every newborn child.

The parents and the home which they make have a useful function in the life of the child. They have to provide food, shelter, and clothing; they have to guard his health; they have to insure a reasonable degree of regularity and punctuality in school attendance; but there is even more than that to do.

For most people the attitudes of the family as experienced by the child during infancy remain, in a large measure, a permanent part of the individual's life. It is these attitudes and the feelings associated with them that determine the individual's responses to the numberless situations which he daily has to meet, both the institutional ones and the face-to-face situations of which Dr. Allport spoke. It is these acquired attitudes also that make up, day by day, the impression upon the outside world which thus estimates him as a personality; but it is also these attitudes and the corresponding responses that make up his own emotional life, his satisfactions and disappointments, his fears, his aspirations, his prides.

What do we, then, as parents do to influence the emotional life of the child? First of all, we build up very elaborate patterns of likes and dislikes, of envies and jealousies, of resentments and satisfactions, in most cases entirely out of proportion to the practical needs, and not always in relation to the genuine values. These feelings become attached to things as well as to people, to symbols as well as to institutions, to ideas as well as to relationships. It is

not rare to meet somebody who thinks that all children should be brought up as orphans, not because there is anything against the parents but because there is some feeling about the in-laws. We call feelings thus developed *prejudices* for short. By treating prejudices as trivial, as universal human failings, we overlook their importance in the building of character and personality.

Long before the child leaves the side of the perambulator, he is likely to have discovered that the adults around him have certain feelings about folk with a radically different kind of complexion, and he will have adopted similar feelings. Before he learns enough of the vernacular to formulate his curiosity regarding the mystery of where babies come from, he will in most cases have discovered that certain subjects of inquiry are not considered nice, and he will then grow up with disturbing conflicts of feeling regarding sex. There are still people in this country who are disturbed to a point approaching disgust by hearing ungrammatical speech; not many, perhaps, but I have met some. There are others who are disturbed by a feeling of outrage at the sight of a girl smoking. This is a declining minority, perhaps, but so much are we influenced by such associations that one may venture to predict that in the course of years (unless the promoters of smoking find new and better methods), the boys will stop smoking entirely since they will be growing up in a world of smoking girls. There are people who are disposed to go wild on seeing the color orange, and there are even more people who go wild on seeing red, unless it is completely surrounded by white and blue. That these deep feelings, and others perhaps of a more pleasant tone, are not universal parts of human nature we may see from the fact that at other times and in



other climates the same facts of experience yield totally different patterns of pleasure and pain. That they are quite unrelated to the development of intelligence and reason we may see from the endless debates that are provoked by the very differences in tastes and attitudes that make the human procession so diverting.

The capacity for fear and anger, for affection and hatred, is unquestionably inherent in the normal human organism. The specific combinations that we find in a given individual, or that distinguish races and nationalities, or families in the same community, are quite as certainly social products, the results of something happening to the child. The worries of a Samoan dandy are different from those of a Palm Beach dandy; just as the hopes and fears of a trapper are different from the corresponding emotions of a flapper, or of a factory operator, or of a market speculator. That is, the objects of hope and fear, the sources of delight or irritation, are different, and they are determined by what has been happening from infancy.

Not many years ago, in this city, a teacher of science discovered, for the first time, that there is not a natural fear of snakes. A boy came into the classroom at the university school, in one of the lower grades, with a snake sticking out of his shirt front; he had been carrying it inside his shirt to keep it warm. The teacher was a "nature" teacher, and he had to find out that there is not a natural fear of snakes; even snakes we have to learn to fear.

If it is true that emotional patterns begin to take form in infancy, it is fair to ask what hope there is of ever changing the standards and the values of a civilization. Do we not continue from generation to generation to transmit our socially inherited prejudices and ideals? To a

very large extent we do. But it is equally characteristic of human beings, or at least of some of them, to ask questions, to challenge custom, to criticize the conventions. Perhaps this, too, is an imposed emotional pattern, because we do not all do it. At any rate, there it is; and, moreover, all of us are more or less driven to taking thought when things do not go altogether right. Then there is hope, for such moments of taking thought, or at least of meeting difficulties, are not very rare. The implications of this question as to whether we can bring about changes within our own culture point, of course, to the responsibility of adults, particularly of parents, with respect to continuing those environmental conditions that tend to reshape for each generation the systems of emotional reaction which we find interfering with healthful and happy living.

If we are disturbed by the low tone of commercialized entertainments, or if we are annoyed by the prevalence of divorce in other people's families, or by wasteful and dishonest administration of public affairs, it is because we have become sensitized to these performances, to think them outrageous. If, on the other hand, we accept these things complacently as in the nature of the world, or as manifestations of a wise, if sometimes inscrutable, Providence, it is then because we have become inured. In any case we have to consider what there is to do, what it is possible to do, to avoid the conditions that we find objectionable, whichever they are, and that we fear may injure the development of the children.

Some of you may have read in the papers of three lawyers in New York being on trial for disbarment because they have been bribing sheriffs and jurymen. Please do not think I am bragging when I say that one of those

three lawyers was a pupil of mine once. Many things have happened to him since. The last time I saw him, about ten years ago, he told me with eagerness that he had just become a member in good standing in a famous organization known as Tammany Hall; as he did not get from my expression that I was also enthusiastic, he tried to explain why he had joined. His explanation was very simple. "By joining this organization," he said, "I can get cases referred to me and I can also get attention from the judges before whom I bring cases that I would not otherwise get." It was very simple, very naïve, and very genuine. I feel that in a situation of that kind it is simply impossible to argue. Any argument that I might offer would be entirely unrelated to his felt needs.

More recently, a lawyer told me of a client of his who had made plans for putting up a large building, plans that had been approved by the building department; all the legal technicalities had been complied with and he was ready to go ahead, but he got notice from one of the underlings in the building department that he had to "see" somebody. He did see somebody to the extent of \$90,000. His lawyer told him he did not have to pay that: all his papers were in form, he could have gone ahead and nobody could have stopped him legally; but he said it was worth \$90,000 to avoid the interference and the delays which the department could bring to bear upon him, even if they could not legally prevent his putting up the building eventually.

This person who joined Tammany Hall and this man who paid \$90,000 started out honestly, just as honestly as you and I started out, and they found situations into which they had to fit themselves. They had to compromise with themselves; they had to give up parts of themselves in order

to go ahead to do what they wanted to do. I am not trying to defend either of these individuals or the institutions. My point is that continuing to live means making adjustments.

The community expects some things of the family just as the family expects some things of the community, or, at any rate, the family becomes aware of certain conflicts between its expectations and desires and those that the outside world puts up. Among the processes that impinge unfavorably upon children and that are, for the most part, controlled by the parents of other children are the various social, economic, and political activities which have become so highly specialized in modern times, so that the individual parent feels quite helpless before them. For example, the ordinary parent knows that the presence in his community of so-called commercialized vice is potentially disastrous for his children; but what can he do about it? The parent is resentful of the commercial exploitation of the ignorance and vanity of young boys and girls through fraudulent and misleading advertisements, through wasteful promotion of fashions, through numberless catch-penny devices, such as Cousin's Day, Nephew's Day, Uncle's Day (very soon you will be refreshed by the announcement of a "Better Dressed Children's Week"), or by the promotion of sensational pictures or vulgar plays. I suppose that those of you who are at all experimental have found out that in most cases the placards and announcements about the motion pictures are much worse than the pictures themselves; but they are there for a purpose. Yet our resentments seem seldom to reach beyond the particular novelty that, for the moment, robs the child or annoys the parent. Is it not important to ask how these people come to be

engaged in this low business of robbing and demoralizing our children?

Take the prevailing attitude in any group—a family, a school, a district, a city—with respect to work. We know that craftsmanship and the pride in craft have disappeared very largely; there is very little of these left. Our institutionalizing of exchange of goods and services has almost eliminated the feeling of service in the work we do. The form of the machine technology makes it almost impossible for the vast majority of us to find any satisfaction in the work as a means of self-expression. We seldom have an opportunity to see the outcome of our efforts and to glory in the sense of achievement. For most people, work means drudgery with some compensations; necessary drudgery, more or less uncomfortable, perhaps generally speaking increasingly less uncomfortable, and yet it is a drudgery with its compensations, such as they are.

Is it possible with these things happening all around to cultivate an attitude in children with respect to work as meaning something other than the means whereby you get the green papers with which you buy things that you want?

We have in our heterogeneous population and in our rapidly changing technology and organization a hang-over of feudal attitudes in an age that has tried to be democratic: our attitude toward the worker, our attitude toward the person who serves us is a feudal attitude. The child picks up that attitude and carries it over into adult life, unless something happens to change it. Our forms of teaching take on a dogmatic form, although we have presumably passed from an age of dogma to an age of science, because we as adults have not yet learned a different way of impart-



ing to children, except through authoritative words. Similarly, our attitude with respect to the material values tends to continue commercial or mercantile, when our technology has already become, for the most part, an engineering technology, which is concerned, not primarily with profits through barter or profits through exploitation, but fundamentally with the effective organization of materials and processes for optimal production at minimum human effort. Our engineers are finding better ways of doing things while reducing human cost in human tear and wear; our commercial organization is concerned primarily with making us buy so that somebody can make a profit, regardless of whether we need these things.

We as adults or parents notice there is something wrong in the picture only when it strikes our children adversely. Again, parents are frequently disturbed by finding their children deeply disturbed by foolish or extravagant aspirations, because a good many of these are being artificially forced upon the young people by way of suggestion. Johnnie wants a tuxedo; he is not out of high school yet. In some parts of the community that is a matter of course; in others it is outrageous. He wants mother to put up dances like the McWiggles'. Everybody in the family but father thinks a snappier car is vindicated. The children are a little ashamed of the old folks' speech, or their manners, or of the old furniture, so they do not invite company in. What is the young generation coming to?

These manifestations naturally disturb us; they sometimes cause angry feelings, but here, too, we need to ask how these young people come to such flighty notions? We seek somebody to blame. It must be the movies that do it, or the sensational papers, or the advertising; it rarely

occurs to us that we are doing it ourselves in our frantic and futile efforts to keep up with the celebrated Jones family. Should we not also ask ourselves how *we* came to be engaged in this silly business?

There are two outstanding causes of starved and perverted emotional life in our times. These are the degradations of sex through our puritanical traditions and the glorification of personal success through competitive pursuits, especially in business. The relation of the former factor to the present-age emotional maladjustment has been pointed out by psychologists and psychiatrists for a generation past. The relation of the latter to the problem has not been so widely emphasized. Since early infancy the child is exposed to invidious contrast to others. We would not deliberately cultivate envy and jealousy; yet we do everything we can to cultivate irrelevant emulation and rivalries, with their concomitant failures. We can stimulate effort, undoubtedly, by suitable models of achievement, by praise, by competitive interests; but there is no warrant for stimulating the short-winded girl to try for a tennis championship. That is so obvious, I have found no one yet who does it. Or to stimulate the color blind boy to try for painting. Of course, we do not find he is color blind, often, until he gets mixed up with paints. A series of duels or of boxing matches or litigations can never give us more than 50 per cent of successes; we all know enough arithmetic for that. Horse races, however, always yield more than 50 per cent of failures; and yet we tell our children that if they will only exert themselves a little harder they, too, will run faster than all the others. See how nicely Alice writes, how fast Freddie figures, how smart Helen

is in history. Why don't you chin yourself a hundred times like Charlie, or sing solos in the assembly like Sally?

We have discovered the fact of individual difference; everyone of us has discovered it at least for himself. Most of us have given up trying for medals in high jumping; we pretend there is nothing in it. Every child at some stage must learn to renounce aspirations in spite of the encouragements of the elders, in spite of the stimulation of successful rivals, perhaps because of the very success of the rivals.

A report recently issued by the New York State Department of Education reveals the interesting fact that in New York City 11 per cent of the school children are behind grade three terms or more. I do not know whether that is alarming, because I do not know whether you do better than that. Eleven per cent of the children being three terms behind their grade does look serious in itself when you consider that this means something like 125,000 or 130,000 children who are three terms or more behind grade. It raises a hundred questions as to what we are trying to do with children in school, as to whether their being behind grade is a reflection on the children or a reflection on the administrators, or on the teachers. I should not want to answer that offhand, but certainly there appears to be here a tragic effort to do something which, in the nature of things, is impossible and therefore involves failure for thousands of people as a foregone conclusion.

We have to accept these individual differences and the children have to learn to accept these differences without prejudice. The child has to learn that he is different from others without apologizing for it, and without bragging about it. He is going to learn that, however, only if

his parents have already learned it, only if his teachers have already learned it. So long as the parents and the other elders maintain an attitude of invidious implication for every contrast, the child cannot learn it.

Quite recently I was delighted to find a woman who had had many years of educational experience having learned this important lesson. For years I thought she was doing a good deal of harm in her institution because she had not learned it, but last week I found that she has learned to say, at least, "different, but not better or worse." That is a good set of words for her to have learned. How far this set of words will penetrate below the surface into her emotional life, I do not know. At least, it is something to learn the words; at least that is the way we often do begin with folks.

The conflicting differences, the fact that some of us can jump high without breaking our necks and some of us cannot jump high at all, the fact that some of us can run and some of us cannot run so fast, the fact that some of us spell without effort and others never learn to spell without effort to themselves and the family, the child must learn to accept, and he learns it where the adults do not interfere, without prejudice, without reproach. You see that very well in children playing among themselves with a minimum of adult interference. When boys used to go out to play baseball on an empty lot, they would find for themselves, among themselves, which was the most useful to the team as catcher or as pitcher or as fielder. It was not a question of asking family history or pedigrees; it was not a question of asking about ability in school subjects; it was not a case of a standard test for mental ability. They discovered empirically, and they made up their teams exactly on the

optimum basis. If there was doubt as to which of two boys would make the better pitcher, they would let the two take turns. If there was doubt as to somebody's value as a batter, the captain would maneuver to get him to the bat the fewest number of times. Each individual is used by the gang for his maximum service to the gang, and the fact that one fellow cannot hit the ball with the bat as frequently as Babe Ruth, or the fact that he cannot catch a ball as surely as the other fellow, may prejudice his position in the group of players, but it does not prejudice his social status or the esteem in which his fellows hold him for his other qualities. That is something which children do learn of themselves and which they could continue to apply as they grow older but for the interference of our older ambitions, our prides, our own defeated aspirations, and our tendency to institutionalize. Similarly, there is this confusion which the child suffers from a variety of patterns that he discovers in his environment. I think Dr. Allport is right in emphasizing the need to know what each *individual* is trying to do, for so far as the individual is concerned, he is meeting within himself a conflict of impulses, a conflict of rivalry, a conflict of stimuli. He is driven in different directions and must eventually make his own way by adopting one or another, or, as in most cases, a compromise. The parents are equally liked by the child, but having different standards of value the child may eventually discover either that one of them is more useful to him, or that neither of them is important to him; which may be generally significant. If the mother likes opera, for whatever reason, and the father likes baseball, for whatever reason, the child does not have to decide that he likes one better than the other. He may decide to cut out



both opera and baseball. The same thing, of course, is true when he discovers variations among other people whom he likes. A child learns to admire a teacher and then discovers that this teacher reads the kinds of novels that mother disapproves. What is a person to do, throw the teacher over or throw the mother over? No, not necessarily either. You may discover that very nice people read the kinds of novels we do not read, or you may discover that some very nice people go to the movies on Sunday.

It is through these discoveries of difference that the child has to make adjustments and will make adjustments, unless the parents are so rigidly dogmatic as to fix permanently his scale of values or moralities during the earlier years. The child has to get away from the parents even if he does not get "a year of adventure." Sometime, we say, the apron string has to be untied. Many of us think of this ceremony as of a given period, a given date perhaps, although we think of it in a metaphorical sense. We do not actually perform the ritual, but we do, many of us, think of its happening at adolescence or at the time the boy or girl goes to college.

If the apron string is to be effectively untied, it can be only because the knot has never been too tight to begin with, and because it has been slipping loose from the very beginning; that is to say, the liberation of the child from the dominations of the family is a progressive one. The child learns to walk on his own as he acquires the strength and skill to walk upon his own, and not as he reaches a certain birthday, not as he attains a certain proficiency in school work, not as the church performs a certain ceremony. It is a continuous process, going on all the time. Every day the child is by so much more capable of walking alone.

The constant opportunity to walk alone, the opportunity to make choices, to make decisions, to make independent decisions even at the risk of making serious mistakes, is the road along which the child does come to live without fear and without reproach, with due regard for his parents, with due regard for other people, and with more or less spiritual independence.

The gang, the friends which the child picks up, the spontaneous groupings which we find children make even as early as three years, if we give them a chance, are in many respects the best schools for acquiring what we call social adjustment, with a retention of individuality and with the required responsibility, and yet without undue domination by the others.

The danger at these early levels, so far as the parent is concerned, is that the child will form attachments, associations, which we disapprove. He will take up with neighbors' children (everybody knows what neighbors' children are); and yet we have to allow, I think, the experimentation even at the risk of mistakes, because it is only by becoming acquainted with neighbors' children that he learns to be a neighbor. It is only by becoming acquainted with neighbors' children and meeting their demands that he learns what his obligations are to others. And it is also only through the life of the group of his own choosing that he develops those idealisms which we value in adults but which we do our best to repress in children because they did not pick the right neighbors' children.

To conclude I want to say two things: first, that according to the horse-race theory of human relations and personal satisfaction it is only the exceptional, the superlative, who has any chance at all to obtain fulfilment. Our children

are drugged into accepting failure as the normal lot of the vast majority by the charming and plausible doctrine of equal opportunity for all; or perhaps they are merely diverted by the excitement of the race in which they must perforce take part, against their sounder tastes and better judgment. As for us parents, we can hardly complain so long as we let them accept a treadmill gait which leads to nowhere, even though we were ourselves brought to accept it by the environment which our parents had provided for us.

The other thing is to come back to the question whether, being the kind of people we are because our parents were the kind of people they were, there is any hope for our children being other than we make them. Yes, I think there is, because we all learn. We continue to make mistakes in spite of our parents' best efforts, and therefore we learn. With the home less of a household than ever because the laundry tubs and the bake oven and the churn and the other appurtenances have been removed, there is more opportunity than ever for the home to be merely a scheme of human relationships. There are people who act upon one another: it is through this interaction of people in the home (stripped, in spite of the Jones family, of a good many superfluities) that parents themselves are learning something about new ways of living, and particularly of new ways of living with children.

The parent-education movement has many sources, like a river fed by many small streams. One of the important contributions is the increasing self-consciousness of the parents with respect to what had happened to them while they were children, and with respect to their own lack of equipment for living with children. There is a growing

awareness on the part of parents of new discoveries being made by researches in psychology, in the clinics, in the so-called pure sciences, and in sociology. There is a growing desire to integrate these new experiences, new discoveries for the benefit of themselves as well as of their children. Inasmuch as adults can learn, there is hope for parents; and inasmuch as there is hope for parents there is hope for the next generation of children.

## ADVENTURING IN ADOLESCENCE

*Cornelia Stratton Parker, Author and Lecturer*

There is no need for my speaking to this group on the loosening of parental ties in late adolescence. You know the necessity as well as you do for keeping the windows open at night, There are other bonds which should be eased in late adolescence. It is about the loosening of these that I wish to speak, and how—the loosening of certain cultural ties, besides family ties. If family ties were all, I could readily agree that college might be enough of a break to insure that special readjustment. Others being necessary, something more than college must offer the break—an opportunity for a new viewpoint in such matters as material possessions, comforts of the body, the flesh; a loosening of class and social ties—the sort of social life which has been led up to late adolescence; an easing of all those bonds which have bound adolescents to such institutions as adolescence has had contact with up to nineteen, twenty, or twenty-one years of age. College may mean a closer binding of these dependencies.

I should like a cutting free that would be glamorous, adventuresome enough to fit into the spirit of youth before that spirit has been brought down to a world which has to be all too prosaic at times. The experiment I have to offer should be taken before maturity has set in; it should be taken before there is any thought of “settling down,” before a girl looms too permanently on the horizon, before there is a definite thought of a career.

What I have to suggest in theory and in practice I call



the "year of adventure." It should be the right of every youth (I mean it for a girl and I mean it for a boy, but I shall talk in this ten minutes as if it were merely for the boy, to save pronouns) to have a year of adventure. I mean that literally: a year—a summer is all too short, more than a year may be too long. But the emphasis is not on time, the emphasis is on the word "adventure": one year, then, in which a boy could go wherever he pleased, do whatever he pleased, need ask advice of no one, need take advice from no one. There should be one string only attached to the experience—during that year the boy must be self-supporting.

You suggest, "Wouldn't a job, when a job comes, provide such a loosening of ties?"

If you can ask that, you have missed the whole spirit of what I mean by a year of adventure. For most jobs to be successful at all, something of canniness must creep in, much of the practical and monetary emphasis of life, a self-imposed demand to "get ahead;" and there is also a concern to make the social contacts which are going to further the practical side of life.

In this year of adventure there is no such measuring of the passing of the days. Measurable profit is absolutely out of the question. There is no asking where am I getting or where is this getting me. It is not even to be tainted by the commercialism that might follow if a boy were to write up his adventures in a book. Youth should step out, and my theory is that it were better did he step out alone, with a wave of the hand toward home.

"Where are you going to sleep tonight?"

"I don't know."

"Where are you going to be next month?"

"I don't know."

"Where could I address a Christmas letter?"

"For goodness sake! don't ask that. How do I know where I'll be at Christmas?"

There is one question an adult can ask about this year of adventure: When should it be taken? If you don't believe in a year of adventure, before college the boy is too young; during college he must not break into his studies; and after college isn't it really time he got down to his "life's work?" If you believe in it, the question when depends first on the boy concerned. There must be a certain amount of maturity before such a year can mean what it ought to mean. There must not be too much maturity. I once "enthused" a university professor to the point where he announced, "I should like to see such an experience prescribed for the Sophomore year in college!"

That very word "prescribed" might spoil it. Yet perhaps after all immediately following the Freshman year in college would be the wisest time, granting that one year of college might give a certain additional background of value to start with. Let the year come before the more serious period of study has set in.

Two arguments, if one were not "sold on" the idea of a year of adventure, could immediately be raised, aside from the fact that there is no good time for the year to be taken.

There is the type of parent who says, "Aren't you afraid to have a son go off like that for a year, go any place he wants, do anything he wants?" One mother asks that question and means that she has a moral fear, imagining dissipation, principally women. Woe to the mother, and her son, who has so raised him that he can't be trusted out

in the world around twenty! Another mother fears for the life of her boy—might there not be some accident? Many a boy who does not take this year of adventure still will not die in his bed at seventy—as if dying in bed at seventy were the great goal in life.

There is such a thing after all in the parental attitude toward children which is covered by the English word “faith.”

A second argument which can be raised against this year of adventure—maybe a boy doesn’t want to take a year of adventure. For that, I say, well may a parent wear mourning!

If you think there should be some predictability to the working out of this idea, I can mention only the one practical case I know of, in the family I know the most about, where one-third of the family has taken its year of adventure. After supplying a boy with eight years of Europe and such cultural background as that might mean, plus one year of Harvard, which might pride itself on having supplied something of additional culture, the first longing desire of that boy was to drive a taxi in New York.

“Why?” you ask.

If there is one question which is not to be asked for one solid year it is *why*. There are no why’s to a year of adventure. There are no where’s, except in retrospect. You can ask, “Where have you been?” You never ask, “Where are you going?” Thanksgiving in the Panama Canal, Christmas in Shanghai, Easter in a logging mill in Oregon, a birthday in a Canadian town of three hundred population, dramatically ending the year by sailing back through the Panama Canal to enter college, and running head on into the hurricane of two years ago when a crew aboard

a leaky freighter had to spend a steady twenty-four hours, no time off, throwing the cargo overboard so that the boat would not sink; and coming up the walk the last minute a boy could enter Harvard as a Sophomore with a shirt which measured a foot across the back and ten inches to the front. A year of adventure should have no practical value, and yet when a certain boy was asked what was the most important result of his year of adventure, his answer was, "To know that wherever I might be in this world I could always make my living."

There are those now who manage to get a year of adventure, boys who take it, but my point is that normally a boy comes by it under protest if he doesn't actually run away from home. He leaves behind a poor mother with a broken heart who knows she is never going to see her child again. Perhaps we need not prescribe a course in adventure as the equivalent of the Sophomore year at college, but at least we should recognize that youth has the right to steer clear for a year of everything which might be considered valuable from a "practical" point of view.

These could be the results of a year of adventure: muscles toughened, strengthened, as no year in college with all the athletics of college might ever develop them; an independence gathered from living life stripped of every accepted material comfort; a knowledge of the world (yes, one can acquire that traveling *de luxe*, but it is come by a different way if every cent of money spent is being earned, and sometimes in a strange land); a knowledge of people which would be gained no other way—an understanding of races, of classes, of an out-of-the-ordinary variety of human beings. I know of nothing else which could give in a like way an experience in hardships that is vitally valuable

for youth at this time. Hunger, yes—to realize what it is to be hungry and far away from home; it does a boy no harm. Loneliness, yes—let a boy know loneliness with perhaps half the world between himself and home. And out of it all a set of values, a sense of values, which are that boy's own by the end of the year, and which only an objective and subjective distance from the familiar, familiar in space, familiar in kind, familiar in quality and quantity—that sort of a distance between a boy and his past—could ever make possible.



## EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS OF ADOLESCENCE

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It was Stanley Hall who first drew a picture so vivid, so striking in its lights and shadows that it claimed the attention of all who were interested in the adolescent. His portrayal of the "storm and stress" of this period of life was indeed so impressive that the fact itself was quite generally and uncritically accepted until within comparatively recent times. Since, however, there has been a greater emphasis on experimentation, with criticism of the questionnaire method used by Hall, these earlier findings have awakened considerable skepticism.

Perhaps most striking in contrast to Stanley Hall's study, in approach, method, and findings, is the very recent work of Mead presented in her book *Coming of Age in Samoa*. Mead, an anthropologist, presents a brief for the value of the anthropological approach whereby human beings are studied under different cultural conditions—namely, those of primitive peoples in which society is simple and in which the various threads that go to make up daily life can be more readily unravelled. She therefore chose to study adolescent girls in Samoa by the case method, living among a small group for some nine months, coming to know them in their daily life. Thus she felt able to answer the question: "Are the disturbances which vex our adolescents due to the nature of adolescence itself or to the civilization?" Her main desire was to learn whether the "storm and stress," considered the outstanding characteristic of adolescence by Stanley Hall, was

inherent in the biological structure itself or merely the product of civilization, not a necessary concomitant of processes of growth.

Still more recent than Mead's book is another dealing with the same general topic, *The Adolescent: His Conflicts and Escapes*, by Schwab and Veeder, two physicians of St. Louis, each of whom has had considerable first-hand contact with young people of the adolescent age. As is connoted in the title of their book, these authors subscribe, in some measure at least or in idea if not in all its implications, to the earlier view of Hall. Adolescent conflict is apparently their main theme—and conflict usually betokens emotional stress.

Another school of modern thinkers has contributed to a statement of the problems of this life-period, discussing its characteristics, largely emotional, and offering suggestions of methods of study and of therapy. This is the psychoanalytic school, particularly the group represented by Freud and his followers.

Is there anything common to all these views? Or, comparing one with the other, what do they teach us? Can discrepancies or seeming contradictions be reconciled? What can be gleaned from first-hand contacts with adolescents such as are made in child guidance clinics? What is true for America in general, and what is helpful in relation to the problems of young people of our present day?

Perhaps before attempting an answer to the foregoing questions, it would be wise to sketch very briefly the hinterland, so to speak, of the adolescent period.

There is no difference of opinion in the definition of adolescence or of the physical facts that constitute the background. Probably everyone would agree that by

adolescence is meant that period between childhood and maturity when the boy or girl is no longer to be regarded as a child and yet has not attained the full stature of adulthood. More specifically, the main facts are these: the average age of onset of adolescence is for girls between the thirteenth and fourteenth year, and approximately a year later for boys, but the range of individual difference in the age of onset is considerable. For American girls, the period anywhere between the twelfth and sixteenth year is to be considered normal, while from thirteen to sixteen is the normal range for boys.

Next, it is always to be remembered that adolescence covers quite a period of years. One does not pass through this period briefly. Here again there is a considerable variation from one person to another. In the case of girls, the adolescent period usually is a matter of five or six years, while on the average the duration is even longer for boys, the period being more often from seven to nine years. We may say that roughly the adolescent period of girls is synchronous with the "teen" period, while with boys the end of adolescence corresponds more nearly with attaining the "age of majority."

The other important background fact is that the adolescent years are those of tremendous body growth. At this time, or immediately before the beginning—that is, at the pre-pubescent stage—the glands of internal secretion become exceedingly active, and these glands, as is now generally known, have a regulating influence on the growth and the development of the primary and secondary sex characteristics. Earlier it was believed that it was primarily the activity of the sex glands that conditioned these changes; now it is recognized that the functioning of the

sex glands is secondary to increased or changed activity of all the glands of internal secretion. For example, if the thyroid or pituitary glands are underactive the sex glands do not develop at the usual time, and the reverse is also true. With their increased activity, the skeletal system increases, there is a marked accretion of growth. We are all familiar with the so-called adolescent spurt evidencing itself in height. Accompanying this there are marked changes in the muscular system which must keep pace with the skeletal, and paralleling this are striking changes in the internal organs. For example, the heart doubles its size between the tenth and sixteenth year. The specific organs which have to do with sex functions show a rapid growth and development. Everyone is familiar from first-hand observation with the outward signs of adolescent bodily changes—the changes in body contour and in bony structure of the face, the growth and distribution of body hair, the change in voice of the adolescent boy, etc.

These physical aspects of adolescence are found universally, in Samoa as well as in America. That there are marked individual differences in the extent to which they obtain, for example, that some adolescents grow much more and much more rapidly than others, is an aspect that is equally as important as the fact of their occurrence.

It is when we turn to the problem of mental and particularly of emotional changes correlated with the physical that we find differences of opinion. Stanley Hall seems to take it for granted that with these vast changes occurring in the physical organism, there must be concomitant upheavals and disturbances in the emotional life. This would seem understandable if not altogether neces-

sary; if the human organism is in a state of constant change, if there is lack of harmony and balance, why should there not be lack of equilibrium in the subtler aspects of life, namely, in the emotions, which after all are commonly defined as somatic changes or even, by the behaviorists, as "intra-organic" behavior consisting largely in action of the glands and unstriped muscles.

Yet, Mead proposes to substantiate the thesis that there is no necessary correlation between the physical and emotional life. She does not believe that the physical changes which are going on in the bodies of adolescents must have definite psychological accompaniments. She proposes to show that the patterns of behavior which are regarded for the most part as outward expression of inner urges are much more largely due to the conditions of environment than to inner necessity.

Schwab and Veeder believe that conflict must accompany growth. It is a necessary condition of continuing life itself, and without it the adolescent could not attain the characteristics of adulthood nor could society progress.

It is well-nigh impossible to present briefly the Freudian view in its entirety. Perhaps we need only say here that according to their generalizations, based on their clinical findings, the adolescent relives all those emotional experiences that accompanied the parent-child relationships of early years—relationships accompanied by emotions so strong and influential that the child is never free of their after-effects. The choice of the mother as the first love-object, the later strong attachment to the parent of the opposite sex with hostility and jealousy directed toward the other parent—this constitutes the essence of the early love-life including the so-called Oedipus situation.



At adolescence there is a revival of the Oedipus situation with all its emotional tensions and phantasies, and, in addition, there are complications that arise from the necessity of giving up the parent as a love-object and finding substitutive emotional satisfaction outside the family circle, that is, in some exogamous love-object. The amount of emotional disturbance that is involved in this normal passing through of the adolescent period will depend, according to their theory, upon the conditions that existed in the emotional life during the child's first five years, for the life at adolescence is but a repatterning of the earlier situation.

As one studies the adolescent in the guidance clinic, what are some of the problems of emotional life that occur with enough frequency to lead one to believe that they are characteristic of the adolescent period of development? What substantiation do they offer or what contradiction of the views of the various authors who have dealt with this subject? What problems of emotional life are found or what situations regularly emotion-provoking? Parenthetically, it must be insisted that we are not here concerned with the neurotic or abnormal adolescent.

We believe the most general characteristics may be subsumed under the following six groups:

Perhaps the one phrase used as frequently as, or even more frequently than, any other in connection with the interpretation of problems of conduct or personality revealed in the study of the young adolescent is *adolescent instability*. This is seen in various manifestations, in unevenness of output of energy, in extreme variability of interests, ambitions, and desires, in excessive lack of control of emotional expression. Anyone who studies problem young people in America becomes familiar with the complaint that

the young boy or girl is lazy and overenergetic by fits and starts, that school work will be well done today and neglected tomorrow. When failure to maintain accustomed standards in school performance is attributed to the fact that extremely rapid growth may be causing lack of vigor in attacking school work, the answer frequently given by parents or the teacher is that this cannot be the real cause since there is plenty of evidence that energy is quite adequate for doing what the individual is interested in doing. For instance, although there may not seem strength adequate for preparing homework well, still the individual can participate most vigorously in athletics. But the truth of the matter would seem to be that it is not so much quantity of energy that is involved as instability of output.

This is just as clearly evidenced in the things that awaken interest. Today's enthusiasms may become matters of boredom before long. The desire one day may be to become a missionary, and e'er long this has been completely forgotten and the goal of life is to be a dancer. Many an adolescent has said, "I don't know what I want to be. One day I think I want to be one thing and the next day something else, only I know I want to be someone great."

Instability in emotional life exhibits itself in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most frequent form is shown in fluctuation of moods not extreme enough to be considered in the least abnormal, but varying from cheerfulness and buoyancy and optimism to discontent, disappointment, and dissatisfaction. While we may not agree with Stanley Hall's enormous emphasis on this characteristic of adolescence, we may yet find numerous instances in which there is, on the one hand, a new and strongly emotional interest in religion and, on the other, equally as emotionally colored skepticism

about beliefs accepted unquestioningly until this time. Likes and dislikes are pronounced; high altruism alternates with crass selfishness.

Mead tells us that among Samoan adolescents there is very little evidence of instability, due largely to the fact that life is so simple that the individual is called upon to make few choices; relationships with people are largely superficial. There is little depth of feeling, and likes and dislikes are not extreme. The pattern of life is early established, few careers are open to the individual; hence there is little of conflict and little opportunity for the display of instabilities. This is notably true for girls, and yet, as one reads the details of life in Samoa, one wonders about these matters—do young people live day by day on an even keel with little change of desire and purpose? Is there no swing from content to discontent with one's lot in life, with the monotony that exists, with the youth with whom one is engaging in sex experimentation? Perhaps not; still knowing the extent to which instability exists among the youth of our own country, one wonders. This is all the more true in relation to boys when there seems to be an enormous clash between the desire for distinction in the group and the desire to avoid this for the sake of not assuming the responsibilities that go with the distinction.

According to Freudian psychology, instability of adolescence is to be expected, and the basis for it is quite clear. The young adolescent is reliving some of the problems of his early years, while at the same time new urges beset him. Freud speaks of the "double-thrust" of sex life at adolescence, meaning thereby the welling up of infantile drives, revived at this period, and new impulses that arise in the course of normal development at this time of life

which must, by the end of the adolescent period, have merged into what constitutes adult sexual expression. During this period, until the adult goal is reached, there is conflict, emotional disturbance which exhibits itself in various kinds of instability.

The second characteristic of adolescence found basic to many of its problems is what we may call adolescent rebellion or *desire for emancipation* coincident with which one finds numerous emotional manifestations. Perhaps with the emphasis that modern psychiatry has placed on the need for emancipation, this particular difficulty arises or will arise less frequently or less virulently than was true some years ago. However it still occurs with great frequency in cases that one sees in the ordinary clinic. Though rebellion is undoubtedly not inherent in adolescent development but much more largely dependent upon upbringing, still the need for emancipation is one of the generally accepted aspects of the adolescent period.

In our own experience many of our adolescent runaways are to be explained as an effort to cut one's self free from too close family control. For example, take even the ordinary Italian girl, docile, obedient, uncomplainingly a family drudge; suddenly she may become irritable, disrespectful, discontented. Or perhaps there is no outward evidence of change in personality. Some day without warning the girl has disappeared. With the onset of adolescence the family control, earlier accepted as a matter of course, becomes too irksome to be bearable and the desire for independence too strong to be denied. Flight is the easiest expression of this feeling, partly conscious and perhaps largely unconscious.

Freud and his followers have made it very clear that, according to their views, there is an absolute necessity for this freeing process if adult goals are ever to be achieved. They have interpreted the adult neurotic as the person still infantile, who has failed, for various reasons, to emancipate himself and thus to be able to "grow-up." Samoan life corroborates this finding, for, on the one hand, neurosis is practically unknown there and, on the other, the problem of emancipation is extraordinarily lacking since each boy and girl is free to leave his home at any time and can find shelter among any one of his relatives. Emancipation is achieved, but without struggle, because there is a less closely knit family group.

Thus it will be seen that there is quite general agreement upon the naturalness of desire for increasing freedom at adolescence. And it is therefore quite understandable that many of the problems that arise hark back to disregard by the family of this very fundamental need. Many a problem of personality change and misconduct may be best understood as a gesture of independence.

The third characteristic of the adolescent period which looms large in problem cases we may phrase as *the desire for new experience*. This is one of the four wishes considered fundamental by W. I. Thomas. It is quite easy to comprehend the drive for something new at this period of life. Here is the young person with his rapid growth, with his capacity for increased energy, with labile emotions. Why would there not be correlated with this a desire for a wider sphere of activity, for broader horizons, for new worlds to conquer.

This adolescent characteristic shows itself not only in



physical and intellectual spheres, but also in the emotional life. This it is that probably accounts for the fact that so many of the youth of today are seeking "thrills." Stratton speaks of excitement as an undifferentiated emotion as important as fear, or anger, or joy. Only, he says, it is more general than any of the others. This characteristic is recognized by all authorities, though the Freudian group are only concerned with the manifestation in relation to sex life. Much is made of this impulse in the discussion by Schwab and Veeder; and in Samoa, too, life alters itself somewhat in the adolescent period, although the range of new experience is quite limited.

The difficulty in present-day life lies, not in the fact itself that the desire for new experience arises or is increased at adolescence, but in the fact that it is so difficult to find suitable outlets toward which to direct it. In America, particularly, our children are so indulged that early they have been given a taste of almost all that exists. With our increasing wealth and our proneness for indulging children, so much has been given them in their earlier years that there is little wholesome left for the satisfaction of this normal fundamental need. Children, in all economic levels, are well-nigh satiated by the time they reach mid-adolescence; they have had crowded into this short span such a variety of stimuli, such a multiplicity of experiences, that only the most extreme affords them the kind of excitement that they crave. What were once adult social activities—formal dances, *thé dansants*, and so on—are commonplace, early experienced events. Hence when they reach the adolescent stage, with its normal desire for something new, there is little left for gratifying this urge. The questions become then, Where can be found new realms for

conquest in the mental and emotional spheres? Undoubtedly some of the bizarre, apparently non-understandable delinquency of youth is to be explained on this basis.

The fourth characteristic of adolescence is one that is quite closely related to several already mentioned, but is worth restating with a shift of emphasis—this is the *accentuation of ego feeling* that displays itself in a variety of ways. It is quite a common occurrence to have parents, teachers, and social workers characterize the problem-adolescent as exhibiting a strong tendency to “show off,” to wish to be always in the “limelight,” or to seek always the “center of the stage.” These phrases picture a normal expression of increasing ego feeling. It is what Schwab calls “a new sense of personal awareness,” best understood and evaluated as one reflects upon the physiological background already mentioned. With the increasing growth characteristic at this time, with the partly conscious, partly unconscious feeling that something new has come into his life, the young adolescent is tremendously conscious of self and in quite a new way. He begins to feel himself a personage, and this is accentuated by his efforts at emancipation and self-direction. This more or less vague “sharpening of his conception of himself as a unit” leads him to exhibit various characteristics and to present certain problems. The selfishness and egoism so commonly criticized in the young person of this age are the natural accompaniments of growth. How many a parent has been distressed at the sudden injection into the family circle of the opinions of the young member of the family who suddenly seems to feel that his point of view is the all-important one!

Or, on the other hand, with this newer consciousness of

self there comes frequently an increase of feelings of inadequacy and inferiority. The young person may become timid, self-depreciating, more lacking than earlier in self-confidence. This is complicated by the fact that there is at this time a new desire for recognition. The young boy or girl with renewed narcissism and feeling of ego expansion has a strong craving for popularity, or at least for friendliness and recognition on the part of his fellow-adolescents. This is the underlying cause of many situations that seem to bespeak unfortunate personality changes or even misconduct.

A correlated aspect is the re-evaluations that occur at about this time of life. The young adolescent wants very ardently things that seem to have extraordinary values in his eyes which to the adult seem very paltry or even unnecessary. A certain bit of finery, silk stockings, or fancy shoes may be the storm center of a family situation largely because the meaning of this particular article is so different in the eyes of the two generations, the adult and the adolescent. To the parent or the social worker, fancy or plain shoes are a small matter; to the adolescent girl it may mean the difference between happiness and discontent, and this because they represent to the adolescent the standards of the group, the thing which makes one the equal of classmates. In other words, they become a distinct expression of social status that is very precious as a symbol, as ego externalization.

A fifth point in the consideration of the adolescent is one that perhaps is less generally recognized and that varies in extent from person to person, but which, nevertheless, occurs with great frequency, and indeed, according

to the psychoanalytic group, occurs in everyone. This is the question of *daydreaming*, or *phantasy life*. It is true that this is not an altogether new aspect of mental life appearing for the first time at adolescence. Generally speaking, we may say that there is a period in early childhood when imagination is vivid, that period when children love to make believe, to play father and mother, and to dramatize many of their daily experiences. Normally, this phantasy life decreases as the child grows older and has to meet the world of reality in school and in play. With adolescence there is a normal reawakening of the life of imagination. Not only is there a renewed enjoyment of phantasy life, but the content of the phantasies is altered. The most common types of daydream at this period are the romantic and the heroic.

The psychoanalysts tell us that the phantasy life of this period concerns itself largely with sexual phantasies that hark back to the Oedipus situation, and one of this school, Dr. Helene Deutsch, has written most interestingly on the typical forms that these Oedipus phantasies take among girls. Another, Dr. Hans Sachs, has pointed out the similarities and differences in the phantasy and art world, emphasizing how for the adolescent early creative impulses express themselves in the daydream. The phantasies of the adolescent boy have been noted and discussed primarily by psychiatrists in relationship to the sexual problems of this period, while all who have had much first-hand experience with young people are aware of the relationship between daydreaming and the aspirations that constitute another characteristic of mental and emotional life.

Emotional stresses, disappointments with strong emotional coloring, experiences that satisfy and bring with

them strong emotional reactions—all these have a direct relationship to the world of phantasy which enhances or compensates, increases or offers outlet for emotions that are unsatisfied or inadequately expressed in the world of reality.

The problem becomes here not the presence or absence of phantasy, but the extent of it and the content with which it is concerned. Most often it is kept unrevealed, and when the whole or bits are brought to light, it goes without saying that a serious attitude must be assumed concerning it.

Sixth and last is the whole matter of emotional life in relation to *sexual impulses and interests*. All who have had any experience with the adolescent know the large and vital rôle that the emotions related to sex life play; to some this constitutes all that the word adolescence suggests. In Samoan life, for example, the sexual constitutes practically the whole of adolescent interests; through the sexual sphere comes emancipation and the feeling of having reached beyond the stage of childhood. It offers the largest proportion of new experiences and almost the only outlet for the growing feeling of self-expansion. According to Freudian conceptions, the normal development of the pubertal and adolescent stage is achieved only with the combining of the various sexual impulses into adult sexual urge and expression. Emancipation means only sexual emancipation, the passing over from the mother as a love-object to a brief period of homosexual interest and attraction and then on to heterosexual love-choice.

It is certainly clear that in order to reach normal adult stature the adolescent must pass, during these years that comprise the adolescent period, from early lack of sex con-



sciousness to a stage characterized by the exact opposite, namely, sex consciousness, and thence to the stage of attraction to the opposite sex. The preadolescent boy or girl has very little use for those of the opposite sex. The boy considers his sisters and her friends a nuisance; the girl considers her brothers and his friends rough and rather to be avoided. Thereupon ensues a time when each is shy and self-conscious in the presence of the other; this to be followed e'er long by a stage in which each is attracted by, and wishes to be attractive to, the opposite sex. This last is the stage when in ordinary parlance the boy is in varying degrees "girl crazy" and the girl, in some measure, "boy crazy."

This is the normal course of development without which the individual is unlikely to grow into adult healthy social relationships. In a book by Floyd Dell about to be published this author includes as one of the standards of modern adulthood the achieving of full heterosexuality, and he calls this "the positive aspect of emancipation." He offers a most interesting interpretation and explanation of situations in which difficulties arise in the course of this normal progress. "Adolescence," he says, "represents the danger point in modern individual life precisely because of the sharp transition it affords between the patriarchal home and modern society." (To interpret this clearly, it is necessary to follow the main argument of the book, which, briefly, is that present-day civilization is an attempt to break away from a patriarchal social scheme that still obtains quite largely in the home.) However many problems may occur in the emotional life of the individual in relation to sexual development, the general course that

must be pursued is clear. That there are dangers to be encountered on the way is due to the complexities of the environment, complexities that hark back to early years.

For it need hardly be said that though we have discussed adolescence as though it were a period of life with sharp demarcations, this is only for the sake of logical presentation. Psychologically—and as a matter of actual fact—there is no boundary line one side of which lies childhood and on the other the adolescent period. The specific problems that arise during the latter period are conditioned primarily by what has gone before, and the specific manner in which normal adolescent needs, desires, and interests are met depends very largely upon the conditions and the training that obtain from infancy onward.

Practically, the obvious generalization that may now be made is that training for adolescence begins long before adolescence itself is reached. Indeed, knowing the normal course of development, the needs and characteristics of these years, the intelligent parent will lay his plans for wise strategy from the time the child is born. Aside from the Freudian view that adolescent reactions are but a re-patterning of the early parent-relationships, intelligent emancipation connotes gradual releasing of the individual and ever increasing emphasis on self-direction and wise choices, so that there is no conflict and rebellion at any time. So, too, achieving of heterosexuality means effectual sex education, in turn dependent upon a conception of wholesome relationship derived from the pattern of parental behavior and from training that results in right social attitudes toward one's fellow-men.

## EDUCATIONAL IDEALS AND THEIR DISTORTION BY SOCIETY

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### I

I do not know whether any of you has ever heard of the Duke of Cambridge. He belonged to the times when aristocrats still had faith in their providential election to aristocracy, when they moved about the world with the freedom and ease that come to generations of security and privilege. Uncle of Queen Victoria and off-chance heir to the throne of England, the Duke was at home in every presence, including God's. Even a preschool child of modernistic parents could not vie with his free and easy assurance. Divine service awoke no more awe in him than afternoon tea. His biographers report responses which he used to make that can still not be found in any prayer-book. "Let us pray," the Bishop would say. "By all means" would say the Duke. "God, give us rain," the Bishop would plead. And the ducal response would be, "No good as long as the wind is in the east."

His comment on the prayer for rain suggests that he had in his peculiar aristocratic mind a genuine sense of the relation of ideals to realities. It is a sense which I wish that those of us who are messing in education nowadays could have more fully. We are, in our desires at least, likely to be too idealistic in view of all the facts in the case. For example, we are terribly concerned about the child as such, and we should be. In many ways the child is the most important item of our environment, provided other items

have ceased to be matters of concern—little things, like food and love and the like. The preoccupation, characteristic of a certain income level, with the educational process, and with the mechanisms by whose means this success is channeled and education executed upon the young, leads us in the course of time to believe that educational ideals are primary ideals. Teachers and all others where livelihoods are more or less dependent on the educational establishment will believe so anyhow; they have a vested interest in the primacy of education. The rest who come to this opinion come either because they are relieved from anxiety about really primary interests, or because the child and its education have become to them a symbol and rationalization of those interests.

For, genetically at least, educational ideals are not primary but secondary. They derive from other ideals of which most of us are not at all articulately aware. Those others determine what our ideals of education shall be. Willy-nilly, they set the objectives of education; they define the standards and impose the methods. In the vernacular of current educational psychology, education is an instrument of adjustment of the individual to society, whatever that may mean—and it means a great number and variety of things, things so many and so contradictory that you pay your money and take your choice according to the doctrines of the educational sect to which you belong.

## II

The quality and character of education as an instrument of adjustment are predetermined by the sort of social objective one aims to attain. This objective is usually designated in the form of an abstraction. We say “edu-

cation for citizenship" or "education for efficiency," and so on. What, however, we really mean when we use these vague—or as our Freudian friends would say, multivalent—ambiguous terms, is this: that there are certain personages whom we read about in the newspapers, see sometimes in public places, see projected on the stage, in the movies, and in books, whom we would like our children to resemble. These personages form, on the whole, a class. Together they merge into a composite figure, social, moral, religious, economic, and intellectual, which constitutes a society's spiritual vision of its type, its projected image of its favorite personality. This ghostly presence is the ideal which governs education, the real educational objective.

This personality-image, though it dominates education, is never definite, never clearly recognized and consciously acquiesced in by psychologists of education, by textbook writers or teachers or fathers and mothers and other persons to whom education is a prime interest. The personality-image is rather in the background of their consciousness, a cloud in their minds, an extremely vague thing determined more by what it excludes than by what it embraces. The precise core and nucleus around which it is gathered is the character of a society's ruling class and its mores—its ways of working, its ways of playing, its technique of worship, its taboos, and its prestige-values. The arts, the literature, and the religion of a time embody all these items in unmistakable symbols which give substance and dramatic form to naturally transitory moods, attitudes, and events.

A time's religion is not necessarily a matter of its established churches and institutional inheritances. For example, the objects which in our day stimulate religious



responses are not intrinsically the traditional ones. The traditional objects are components in stimuli only to the degree in which they are capable of being made over into the image of the ruling class. And their elasticity in this respect leaves, on the whole, nothing to be desired. Thus, if you wish to observe how Jesus Christ enters into the ideals of contemporary United States, in so far as these exercise a directive influence on education, you should read a best seller called *The Man Nobody Knows*. You will find there a reincarnation of the character of that polymorphous, multivalent symbol which is Christ in the image of a 100 per cent go-getting American business man. Similarly, serious work like Sinclair Lewis' or Theodore Dreiser's, light stuff like *Saturday Evening Post* or *American Magazine* fiction are determined by hardly conscious reference to a pattern which seems to get its distinctive lines from a dramatic impersonation of that which our time acknowledges as "success." The arts may denounce or praise this pattern but it remains both their center and their frame of reference.

And our time is not exceptional in this regard. To the curious student of history every civilized society in which education has been a conscious institutional establishment is a society in which some definite personality-image of the society's high caste has governed the ideals of education.

Consider such a document as Plato's *Republic*. This sets forth, at the core, a theory of education. What rules it, so far as the relevant parts of the educational process are concerned, is an image of athletic, military young men of family disciplined and regimented to fit well in a

society living mostly at war, and so finally committing suicide.

Or regard the educational standards established by the Roman Catholic church in the course of the Middle Ages. See them in the light of the characteristic ruling types of these times. Observe that there were, broadly speaking, two such types. One, the celibate clergyman who has a fixed status and duty in hierarchical priestly establishments endowed with great properties, sovereign secular powers and supernatural prerogatives, and needing therefore to administer the business of the ecclesiastical economy as well as to save souls. The other, the feudal landlord, an illiterate and anarchic fighting man, living mostly by force and often by fraud. Both types impose themselves by coercion and are subject to constant resistance. They do not "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." They prefer, hence, and they require submission, obedience, conformity. These enter as rules into the medieval educational ideals.

Pass on to the Renaissance, that time of a renewed free interest in education and much rich writing about its whys and wherefores. You find in these writings—in such works as those of Aeneas Silvius, who later became Pope Pius II, or of Baldassare Castiglione, whose *Courtier* was translated into every European language, and defined the ideal type for every court in Europe—you find in these writings the idealization of a type of subtle fighting man, whose end in life is to act as a sort of chief-of-staff to the new risen monarchic absolutists of the age. Education was "humanist." Humanism was then a lusty, gustful interest in life, not the priggish academic reaction against life which today associates that name to itself, and humanist

education was designed to produce a warlike, swashbuckling individual who dresses magnificently, who loves and fights like Don Juan at the drop of a hat, who is punctilious about points of honor when they become an issue, but behaves like a practical man when they do not, who loves language especially Greek and Latin for its own sake, and plays with ideas for the fun of it, who perpetrates jokes on others and knows how to take them himself, who is skeptical of all things of this life, including religion and its priests, but who clings to a vision of another world in which he may enjoy what this one does not yield him. Beneath the entire humanist warfare against the ecclesiastical establishment, he's the unconscious pattern of the humanist redefinitions of the educational ideal, derived from the dominant social type: the absolute ruler, legitimate or condottieri, ecclesiastical or secular, whose will and patronage sustain the humanist life and humanist endeavor.

Pass from Renaissance Europe to Seventeenth Century New England, then a British colony of English dissenters. The initiators of education in America, they defined its aims and methods in the light of the personality-image of the gentleman covenantor or the Puritan divine. These are men of passion hemmed in by taboos and hedged about with fears—fear of life and of the goods which are its satisfactions, fear of death and of a possible after-life. The taboos are barriers against the consequences of the fears. The fears are integrated and dramatized in the personality of the devil. The taboos are dramatized and integrated in the providence of God. Existence is a bitter warfare to defend one's duties to God against the temptations of the devil. Now pick up the characteristic text-

book of elementary education in Colonial times; pick up the so-called New England sciences, and what do you find as pabulum for the mind and heart of the Colonial infant? First: an alphabet which recapitulates the Colonist version of the myth of Christian salvation from

In Adam's fall  
We sinnéd all,

to

Zaccheus, he  
Did climb the tree  
Our Lord to see.

That high argument, facilitated by rhyme, starts off the infant Puritan at the age of three on the highway to salvation. It is followed by the solemn charge to promise "to fear God and honor the king." After this comes an alphabet of lessons consisting mostly of text from Scripture. Then follow the Lord's Prayer, the Apostle's Creed and the Ten Commandments. These are eased off by pious verse inculcating moral discipline proper to Colonists of that day and generation. The verse fitted the youngsters to know the names of the books of the Old and New Testaments, lists of which accordingly follow. Lists naturally suggest counting, so they are capped by the numbers, from 1 to 100, in arabic and roman and written out. To crown the whole count the verses of the Reverend F. John Robinson, who was burned at Smithfield in 1554. He wrote for his children a testament in which the devil and his works are appropriately the leading themes.

The hopes and fears of the Puritan, embodied in the ruling social type, determined, as you see, the materials and methods of education. As in all ages, the objective to be attained was the characteristic of the particular

phase of the process of civilization that happened to be ascendent in that place at that time. So, in the eighteenth century, the personality-image of society is molded after the "gentleman" of the period, the man of property, strong in common sense and quick in wit, easy in morals and courtly in manners, who would rather be mean politely than kind like a boor, and who would take no nonsense even from the king. The standard textbook for this type was written by John Locke, a tutor in a noble family. One can see easily enough how the status and duties and privileges of the members of this family and the class to which they belonged determined, without his knowing it, Locke's view of the materials, the methods, and the ends of education. Why should they not have? Did not Aristotle's ethical conceptions get whatever relevant import they had from the fact that he was the tutor of Alexander, an heir apparent to a throne?

### III

Indeed, from Aristotle's day to Locke's the notion never occurred that there could be such a thing as what we today call "a natural human being," a human being considered in himself, without regard to the special circumstances of time and place, the special conditions of life and labor and love, of passion and war and death whose succession is history. In every age, the child was held to be father to the man, because he was held to be already in miniature what he was to become in the large, what other men of a generation desired in their secret hearts that their children might become in the large. This was a figure of the ruling class; and the personality-image of this class gave whatever real definition was possible to the objective of



education. That which members of other classes wished their children might become, members of the ruling class wished their children to stay. As they alone were the beneficiaries of education, education aimed never at more than a repetition of themselves. Its ideal changed only as one type was, for reasons in no way connected with education itself, cast aside and another lifted up in its place.

This condition continues to prevail. But educational practice is now confused by educational theory in which the conception of "a natural human being," a child of nature abstracted from all specific environment, plays a large and influential rôle. This conception, no more than any other, derives directly from the educational interest. It is a fruit of the social struggle of the eighteenth century, a struggle wherein one side endeavored to offset an actually practiced "divine right" by a claimed "natural right," to nullify the mystic superiority of kings and aristocrats by the equality in nature of "the natural man." "Natural man" and "natural rights" began their careers as weapons in a struggle of the classes, not as impartial discoveries of impartial science. They now have a certain scientific respectability, but it can be debated whether they would have attained thereto if democracy had not reached, as a form of political economy, even the dubious supremacy that now characterizes it.

The personage with whose teachings these conceptions are most widely identified is Jean Jacques Rousseau. He has been for a long time in bad odor in respectable circles, but his mission was not to the respectable. On the contrary, Rousseau did not discover, he invented—and the invention in the course of time got converted into a discovery—"the child of nature," that which comes of age in

Samoa. As he challenged the current forms of social control in the adult community, so he repudiated social control in the education of children. "Hold the child in reverence," Rousseau admonished, "and do not be in any hurry to judge it for good or ill." Let the child alone. This is good advice, awfully good advice today, even here, even now, in this company.

Rousseau's "child of nature," being, as it is, a creature of the imagination, an instrument of social warfare, a methodological device, does not exist anywhere, not even in Samoa, although it comes of age there. It was created by a process of unification and abstraction, unification of real differences, abstraction from the environs of time and place and circumstance amid which actual children do grow up, and grow old, and when their term has been reached, die. But the abstraction was pat to its times. People took to it, they found it an effective tool of social reorientation, of intellectual analysis and moral combat. Its bearing upon education was especially significant. It seemed to cut away all man-made excrescence and to correct all of society's twistings of human nature. It seemed to lay bare at last the orthopedic anatomy upon which education could build. In so far as modern education is different from education that is not modern (modern is not the same as contemporary; there is more education which is contemporary but not modern than education which is both), it is different because of this abstraction of Rousseau's. It took hold of people's imaginations, especially people whose childhood and youth had been like Rousseau's miserable, unlucky, oppressed, and whose period of adolescent rebellion had been passed through without their getting assimilated and coerced by society. Rousseau did not get

assimilated and coerced by society and stayed a rebel all his life. This is why he continues to be important after he is dead.

The successors in his line, educationally, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, present, broadly speaking, the same general pattern of resistance to the coercions of the established educational order. Pestalozzi's *Leonard and Gertrude* develops the precedent initiated by Rousseau's *Émile*. It sets forth an ideal of education, a Utopian statement of the program Pestalozzi had tried to carry out for himself and had failed in. I say "develops the precedent," not "repeats the example." For *Leonard and Gertrude* already exhibits the distortion of the ideal "child of nature" which society operates upon the educational objective and the educational process wherever these occur. Leonard and Gertrude may be children of nature—abstractly. But, concretely, Gertrude is a girl born to poverty who by means of hard work and *thrift* wins herself a competence which leads her fellow-villagers to regard her so highly that they beg her to become their educator and to repeat her model self in their children.

I stress the word *thrift*. By her *thrift* Gertrude becomes the ancestress of all the variations of a type affiliated through that long line which we can trace in Samuel Smiles, Oliver Optic, and the like, to the last hero of business prudence celebrated by the *Saturday Evening Post* or glorified in a talkie. In Pestalozzi's day, thrift was not the stale, outmoded virtue it now is. It was a new ideal of character, an ideal that had come in with the Industrial Revolution. It was the ideal of a new class rising to power: theorists treated it as the very foundation of the economic process; moralists found in its practice the true

differentia between the virtuous and the vicious. The concept has illuminated the heavens of the industrial adventure to this day, when it is beginning to dim. Capital, which used to be regarded as the unique consequence of *saving*, is now coming to be seen as dependent on *spending*. Mr. Henry Ford, no mean advocate of thrift in his time, is calling upon the public to be spendthrift. He is a sign and a portent of a new revolution in the ways of life in machine civilization, and with this revolution, and the return to the pre-industrial view of thrift, will come a new type of ruling class and a new distortion of the educational ideal. When Pestalozzi wrote, industry was beginning; to be thrifty was more important than to be natural—whatever “to be natural” was conceived to mean—and, though he did not know it, Pestalozzi’s very signal contribution to educational theory was in no small way dominated by that fact. His example in practice was based on it.

Froebel, the inventor of the kindergarten, was moved more as Rousseau had been. Pestalozzi’s elaborate plant at Yverdon, where he had served, seemed to him to be lacking. He didn’t touch the beginnings. His own embittered childhood was too near, in his heart. He wanted for children relief from regimentation, from forcing, from the misery-breeding coercions he saw around him. His educational theory was of a piece with the democratic aspiration of the middle classes of his country and times; the aristocracy, through the agency of Bismarck, repressed him. His *Education of Man* inculcates *obedience* to God through “self-activity” and “social participation.” The means, which presuppose *freedom*, are obviously incompatible with the end, which is submission. The distortion operated by social pressure is patent. And everybody

knows that the conventional Froebelian kindergarten is as remote from the "natural child" as any other educational instrument. The distortion is even clearer in the case of Herbart, also a Pestalozzian. His instrumentalities in effect move the child educated according to his scheme only a little to the left of the conventional German of his day.

#### IV

Modern education, as a technique and an objective postulated upon the conception of "the child of nature," starts with Pestalozzi and Froebel, and starts already distorted by the dominant personality-image of the times. Its subsequent history does hardly more than reproduce this pattern. The ideals which define it are always implicated either to repeat and perpetuate the personality-image of a ruling class or to abolish it. But even in the latter case, unless the ruling class is itself changing, they repeat its features and, in ways as countless as unconscious, re-enforce its automatic endeavor to maintain its prestige and status. The alternative to its type which the abolishing ideals set up are infected from the social environment, from the manners, the morals, the arts, the games, and the rituals—with the qualities of that which they condemn. The ideals are distorted by the actualities into images of themselves.

And the effective agents of this distortion are more often than not the very parents, nurses, teachers who have charged themselves with the incarnation of the new ideal. For these, the directors and controllers of education are themselves, regardless of the equipment at their disposal, the ministers willy-nilly of the current standards of life and conduct, the reproducers of the dominant personality-



image. They transmit and impose conformities—conformities in precisely those little things whence the greater patterns grow, conformities in dress, in table manners, in speech, and the like. They impose such rituals as cutting lettuce with a fork instead of a knife, wearing beads on the neck and not the waist, bracelets and not anklets, saying correct things at coming and going, at eating and drinking, and the like. They repeat, hardly knowing it, the conventions of conduct to which prestige conventionally accrues; the attitudes and manners attributed to the “best” society, which is the society they want their children to move in.

And what is the upshot? That it makes little noticeable difference what you start with in your educational process. Your school may be organized on the most elemental modernist assumptions, it may be the most progressive of the progressives—Rousseau in its premises and Freud in its techniques; or your school may be the most unadvanced and traditional—a military academy or a Jesuit college in its regimentation: both will turn out in the end approximately deindividualized types—characters molded into conformation with the personality-image of the ruling class. In a world so internationalized as ours, this becomes the personality-image of the ruling class, not of a particular country or special community merely, but of a civilization. So in revolutionary Russia, the practical ideal is to industrialize the country on American lines: American machinery and American men of affairs are the themes to which prestige is attached, are being imported to effect this transformation, to “Americanize” the Russian scene. How that can be accomplished without Americanizing the scene in other ways, the Russians do not say. They propose it,

and they have their ideals and their faith. One can only wish them luck.

The fact is that current educational theory has been able to add little toward a conception of the "child of nature." This concept is still abstract and still ideal, not so abstract as it was in Rousseau's day, but quite as ideal. The weight and mass which have accrued to it in our times have been prepared by science, where terms are themselves abstractions. The sciences of man, from physiology to sociology and psychology, are being used to give "child of nature" and "natural man" substance and form independent of time and place and institution and circumstance. What they say applies indifferently to all human beings and differentially to none. Their measurements and definitions get social significance only when that to which they are applied is brought into contact with the prevailing standards, with the views and the mechanisms that compose the modern social establishment, whose institutions are the tracks on which a man's life runs its course from birth to death.

And because the overruling component of the social establishment is industry, because it is made of machines and factories and banks and accounting, the contemporary specification of the "child of nature" is industrial. I cannot believe it an accident that the modern reinterpretation of the history of Western culture in terms of industry which is made by such contrasting social philosophers as Marx, Veblen, and Dewey should coincide with the supremacy of the captain of industry and the domination of the machine. I cannot believe it an accident that Dewey's educational theories starting with "the child of nature," as they do, should nevertheless give it embodiment by means

of the industrial component of our social inheritance and not the theological, or the military, or the purely scientific. Libertarian, even anarchic, as traditionalists in education see the Dewey school, it is but the latest word in the series of specifications of "the child of nature" that Pestalozzi started.

Being a pragmatist and, I hope, a contemporary one, I share Mr. Dewey's opinion that a child may come to its appropriate happiness and the good life, that its growth can best be facilitated and its development enhanced by an educational technique that prolongs into the school the process of continual planning and reflection characteristic of industry, the automatic co-operation which arises out of common labors commonly conceived and executed. But I submit that this view involves nevertheless an educational distortion of the original ideal of "the child of nature" in the image of the dominant type of our day—the image of the captain of industry, the lord of big business, with his swift decisions, his so-called scientific management, his mastery of details, his use of rules and measures on all levels, his dependence on the quantitative method in the judgment of all values from master products of the industrial process to love, sensibility, and wisdom.

How potent is this personality-image emanating from the industrial establishment and symbolizing it, how pervasive, how infectious, you may gather by recalling once more that one of the most sacred symbols transmitted by the generations since the beginning of Christianity, the figure of Christ, is made over in the image of the big business man. That image irradiates education. Its legend underlies the overelaboration of the quantitative treatment of mind and heart, and the rest of the ritual of the pro-

fessorial psychologizers. Because it is ritual it is not a revelation of the real drives and defining energies in the lives of individuals. It is only a pattern which is superimposed upon the experimental event in order to symbolize and control it. The symbol cannot reveal the experimental event precisely because it is something that overlies, not an emanation or precipitate of the event itself, but an infiltration from another field, from the technique of organized industry modeled into the figure of industrialized man.

## V

I am unable to guess what a later time may bring to birth, whether as dominant social type or as correlative educational ideals. But of the testimony of the past I have read enough to feel certain of at least two statements which we educators could do worse than take into account.

The first is that education deals, and all life deals, with individuals. Apart from the works of man which outlive their makers, apart from the overlapping of the generations, which renders possible cultural continuity and social inheritance, there could be no such thing as organized historic society. The *life* of society is not in its continuities, not in its institutions or properties. The life of society is in the disparate, mutually exclusive centers of present feeling and action which are its individual members, and there are as many such centers as there exist individual members. All enter into the environment of each; each is an incommensurable nucleus of response to all. Even if society were constituted of identical twins, the fact that they were many and not one, the fact of nothing more than mere numerical difference would make of its members unique and irreducible individualities, each shaping the same contents

of experience in different experimental perspectives, each working the same environment into different patterns and values, because operating on it from never-to-be identified centers of attack and points of view.

The second is that the human young, upon whom education is a contagion and a discipline which society operates, starts its career as merely a physical organization. All we can *practically* mean when we speak of it as "a child of nature" is that at birth it is an animal whose structure and dynamics physiology embraces, an extremely helpless animal which stays so "naturally" over a longer period than the young of other animals. During its long infancy it is in fact a parasite on adulthood, taking from it food, clothing, shelter, and security without responsibility and without obligation. I sometimes think that in the United States social classes of a certain income level derive so much pleasure from this state of parasitic infancy that the whole educational system, especially the topmost part of it, the colleges and the universities, is designed to keep the human young in that state of irresponsible though not innocuous desuetude. The responsibilities of man's estate, social vision, and the courage of social experimentation, common student traits elsewhere in the world, are conspicuously absent in the student population here. Too much seems to be designed to keep them children of nature, mere physiological organisms repeating the ways of the fathers. Too much seems to work in the direction of preventing them from acquiring minds of their own.

For children are not born with minds. They acquire them. From birth on, the psyche is fundamentally and pre-vaillingly a congeries of emotions. The newborn child is



endowed to feel, but it is not endowed to think. It has a heart but no mind. For heart is a matter of the mid-brain and the spine and the organs of internal secretion, but mind is a matter of the surrounding world.

Primarily mind is what you mind. This is why you are able to distinguish minds as musical or mathematical or legal, or financial or alcoholic or political or erotic. The musician, the mathematician, the lawyer, the banker, the politician, the drunkard, the lover—they all live in a world of endlessly varied contents and patterns. The exigencies of existence compel all of them to pay attention to eating and drinking and transportation and health and play and love. But their minds are not designated by these momentous objects of their attention, nor by any other from the great variety of their interests, possible and actual. Their minds are designated by those fields of their attention, of their *minding*, in which they are especially skilled and at ease. The musical mind minds music more absorbedly, competently, and powerfully than any other field of its life; the mathematical mind so minds mathematics, and thus, through all the types of *minding* that could be enumerated.

A mind is defined by the class of objects selected from an organism's environment, that predominantly hold its interest and enhance and refine its activities. Interest is emotional. It is definable in terms of the organism's response, of its selective response, to one stuff or pattern rather than another in the surrounding world. In its selection, luck and chance play no mean rôles. There is nothing inevitable in the kind of mind one acquires. There are few inherited dispositions to mind one thing rather than another, and those are doubtful. What sort of mind a child

acquires is usually a matter of personal inertia, family tradition, social rigidity, and the favorable and unfavorable influences of teachers and parents and leaders. That which most of us mind we find ready made at hand. Materials and patterns exist already set up for us in the institutions of civilization. These facilitate our getting minds, but limit their varieties and prescribe their qualities. We contribute only feelings; society imposes mind. The helpless infant must necessarily acquiesce in the more deep lying prescriptions and contagions; the plastic child is soon molded to conformity with those closer to the ground. Before one knows it all a child's feeling flows along the channels founded by its institutional patterns. If not, then it is a genius or a criminal and is able to make effective his most personal mind. So might anybody be, if the educational establishment could be so arranged as to protect individuality without anarchy, and to enhance variation without disorder.

If mind is *what* you mind, heart is *as* you feel. As I see emotion, it is fundamentally the feeling tone intrinsic to direct response, the sense of the first changes that take place in us on the impact of any stimulus. Such feeling tones are innumerable and mostly indiscriminated. They go on all the time. They are at the core of personality, in constant flux, and emerge as temperament and character, as they get arranged under the molding of the environment into mutually antagonistic or harmonious systems. When the psychoanalysts speak of complexes, they mean such arrangements, while other schools give them other names. Considered with reference to the evoking environment they are often called sentiments. When the rôle of the environment and its bearing upon the fortunes of the organism are considered, the arrangements turn out to be the same

as ideals, or purposes, or objectives, or interests. They are then not matters of heart, but matters of mind.

The peculiar relationships of heart and mind, of emotion and intelligence, are now inferable. Emotion is an event in "the child of nature" which is identical with the occurrence of clashes between direct responses, established habits, sentiments, and the like. About such events there is nothing intrinsically inevitable or necessary. Fear, anxiety, rage, for example, are regarded by some schools as innate. But they are innate only in the sense that they are events in the organism, that begin and end there. This happens, however, only if they are not enchanneled and drained by movements of the organism directed toward an object which the movements "mind." Thus a prize-fighter in the ring is constantly receiving stimuli which evoke pain, rage, fear, perhaps anxiety; should these in fact occur in him we should say that he is a bad fighter, he *loses* his head. If he is a good fighter, what happens? The responses to the stimuli are enchanneled and directed in patterned ways outward upon his opponent. We do not say he loses his head. We call him a boxer. We say he *uses* his head. If he can use his head and not lose his punch, he has the makings of a champion.

All the hazardous occupations of man—and which are not hazardous?—such as structural steelwork, or tight-rope walking, or even riding a train or crossing a street in modern traffic, are immediate stimuli to emotion, but emotion develops only in so far as the aroused tension of response is not relaxed and drained by action-patterns focused on an object. Drainage by action-patterns converts emotion to mind or intelligence. Intelligence is at bottom diverted and elaborated drainage of emotion; it is control of emotion, not by repression, which makes two emotions grow where

one grew before, but by environmentally ordered expression. But any expression is more sanitary than repression.

The whole problem of education in terms of present knowledge, physiological and other, concerning the "natural" human being, the child of nature, is a problem in the enchannelment of feeling into intelligence. This enchannelment presents, if I may call it so, a natural *terminus ad quem* which the structure of the organism itself projects. It derives, shall we say, from the relation of the cord and the thalamus to the cortex. Now, traditionally, this enchannelment, this transformation of emotion into wisdom, into a plan and practice of life, is accomplished by the infection of the individual, through all the methods society owns, but most purposefully through the schools, with the dominant social ideal, with the personality-image of the ruling type.

Such personality-images, as we have seen, are many and varied and equal. Each was an absolute for its time and place. Each was displaced by another not less absolute, and there is no reason to believe that the one currently prevailing is less mortal than its predecessors. The same mortality pertains also to the educational establishments, their doctrines and their equipments and their methods. It is helpful to bear in mind that values in education are relative, that there are no absolute objectives, no eternal principles, no universal methods, no unchangeable *human* nature. The most that is here possible, and the most scientific, is the comparative study of educational ideals, whence they came and why, and why and how it is that the social forces which they project and symbolize distort that natural end of the educational process, the transformation of emotion into intelligence.

**ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS**





## SOCIAL IDEALISM IN ITS RELATION TO THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF THE CHILD

*Edward S. Ames, Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago*

I think I perhaps ought to fill out the implication of one or two of these remarks of the chairman by telling you that within a week he has had a daughter born to him and he can't get over the fact.

In the second place, I want to explain with reference to my possible equipment for talking on this subject that many years ago, before I had any children of my own, I was a professor of pedagogy and I was very loquacious on the subject of child-training at that time. Since then we have had four children born into our family, and I have been silent through all their period of training. Now that they have graduated from college I begin to feel free to talk again.

Our time is a little limited, and I am sure the most profitable part of this session will be in the general discussion we may have. Therefore, I shall speak rather briefly with reference to the points I have in mind.

Our subject, "Social Idealism in Its Relation to the Emotional Life of the Child," is a rather large one and some of the terms in it are rather vague. Some of them are what we call "weasel words," and, therefore, in order to give some structure to our thinking about them and to the discussion, I will start in good academic fashion by making a few definitions.

With reference to "idealism," I understand by it practical plans for action toward improvement—not mere

wishes or dreams or vague imaginings but definite plans such as a business man makes for the enlargement of his business (those are his business ideals), or plans which an architect makes for a building, drawn in the light of experience and drawn very carefully to scale with reference to a definite execution. More and more these days we think of ideals and idealism, I hope, in terms of such definite, practical procedure for improvement of conditions.

The word "social" here also is a bit complicating. If you talk of social idealism you may mean ideals for society or you may mean the ideals which society has. I propose to use the expression "social idealism" to mean the ideals which individuals have with reference to the improvement of society. Of course society is very complex in many phases of its activities and there are a great variety of social ideals, but not all members of society are particularly idealistic with reference to society. Certainly there is no social mind working independently of the individuals in society which can have this idealism, and, therefore, in order to be definite about it, I think we have to conceive that we are here considering the ideals that some individuals have with reference to social improvement.

The "child" also needs some definition, perhaps. We think more and more, I suppose quite generally, of childhood as ranging from birth to the tenth or twelfth year, and adolescence as supervening upon childhood from the tenth or twelfth year to perhaps twenty-five at the outside—and some people never get over it!

There are certain characteristics in this period of childhood which it seems to me are important to remember in connection with our general subject. We are talking about the emotional life of the child and I take it that the term

"emotional" is perhaps clearer and more available without specific definitions—the enthusiasm, the interest, the zest we have with reference to these ideals.

I think in this conference we are a bit more limited with reference to our problem than in any other, in this respect: Social idealism (at least as I view it) is characteristic of adult life and comes into anything like full expression only in adolescence. The idealism of childhood is not social in any such way as the idealism of adolescence and maturity may be, and idealism itself doesn't have the same depth and range and volume for childhood as it has for maturity.

The characteristic of childhood, as all of us know who are at all familiar with child study, especially with reference to these large interests represented by this expression "social idealism," are, you might say, external and second-hand. The child sees the surface features of our social procedure and catches the margins of our mature social enthusiasms. Those are very real to him and they are not to be treated lightly, but they are not at all the kind of social idealism which is possible to the person of more mature years.

I may illustrate what I mean by saying that a child is not primarily social, by calling your attention to the games of children. Children are individualistic and competitive in their games rather than co-operative. They run foot-races, they will compete in muscular strength and cleverness, but they are not so competent when it comes to co-operation or to teamwork.

A very striking illustration of this is that you do not find football or baseball teams among the younger pupils in the grades. It is only in the seventh and eighth grades

that you begin to have possibility of organization of athletic teams, because such games require the relative subordination of the individual to the team, and it is impossible to get the youngster to defer enough to this larger unit to appreciate the necessity of taking his place alongside the others in the group play. The action is more likely to break up into a foot-race or some such individualistic performance. If they could play this kind of game at all, they would all be stars—and you can't have an effective team with an all-star arrangement.

Another way of thinking of it is in terms of the fact that the little boys like to wear the football gear, but that doesn't signify that they are competent football players. They wear this regalia in delighted imitation of the great heroes of the gridiron, and it is interesting to see these small boys around in the open lots all dressed up in this fearful apparel and yet just wrestling with each other and tumbling about in individualistic efforts.

I suspect that some of you are teachers and some of you are parents of youngsters at the ages of which I am thinking, and it is part of your business, in the discussion, to correct me about these things from your experience and observation.

Take another illustration with which, doubtless, many of you are familiar—G. Stanley Hall's story of the sand pile. You remember that marvelous structure the children made in the sand. They put most of their efforts on the gates leading into the habitation, marvelous gates, very elaborate, quite out of proportion to the whole scheme. A child doesn't see things in their proper relationships.

I may tell you a story of a child of mine who is now past being affected by any publicity of this kind. We were



visiting out in the country at the home of the boy's uncle. This was some time ago, as you will know by the fact that they enjoyed buggy-riding very much. The boy was greatly interested in putting the horse and buggy away in the barn and especially in seeing it locked up afterward.

When he got back to the city he found a padlock one day and, in great glee, he said, "Now, father, here is a padlock. We can get a horse and buggy like Uncle John's."

You can see his inability to perceive the thing as a whole, to get it in proportion, in its relationships. That is a characteristic of a child through more years than we at first guess.

So far as we are dealing with social idealism as it appears to those of us who are older, it is for the child relatively external, and formal to the child's understanding and therefore also to his emotions.

How shall we conceive of the relation between social idealism which does emerge in society to the emotional life of the child? Take illustrations from civic pride, or patriotism, or the conception of international peace. These are expressed in celebrations of great days—the Fourth of July, Armistice Day, Lincoln's birthday, Washington's birthday, and they are often celebrated by great parades, by dramas, by pageants, by speeches, by appropriate music. The child's response to such things (unless it is the speeches) is very real and very interesting, but the features which he enjoys are those which do not lie at the heart of the procedure.

I asked a woman the other day what she remembered of her emotional conditioning as a child with reference to

social idealism. She replied, after a little conversation, that the thing most exciting to her in girlhood was to hear the fife and drum corps to which her brother belonged. She said the music wasn't really effective but it was exciting, it was martial music, and it had the rhythm and excitement which are characteristic of that kind of action.

The same thing can be seen with reference to parades. You see military parades on the street; you see them in the movies. I think few of us ever see them in real life or in the movies—masses of troops moving down in grand regalia and in effective rhythm—without being deeply moved. I have been interested in motion-picture theaters to see how frequently the crowd applauds that unfeeling screen during these parades, these great mass movements representing important causes.

The child, as we all know, is caught by the uniform, by the superficial element. It is real to him. It fits into the picture, but it isn't the sort of thing that the mother of one of those soldiers would feel, it isn't the sort of thing that patriotic mind would experience in thinking over what is symbolized by such a scene.

You have, then, this suggestion of what we mean by social idealism. I think it isn't necessary for me to recite the movements, the types of organization which would be included under such terms—all organizations for social amelioration, for education, overcoming of crime and of poverty. I suppose I ought to say for the benefit of you who come from out of the city that we do have such organizations here in Chicago! And I ought to say, also, that we feel a little thrill of social idealism in the way in which these gangs take care of one another.

But here is a specific problem, very real for practical

purposes—the specific problem of the way in which these social ideals felt by individuals, and which play so large a part in the better elements of society, are mediated in the emotional life of the child.

This occurs very obviously in certain situations where the idealism is expressed by a pronounced social solidarity. We have striking illustrations, perhaps more in the past than just now, of what I mean. If I asked you what the older régime in China stood for, I think most of you at all familiar with it would say classical scholarship. It was the ambition of every family to be represented in the line of classical scholars and of every youth who saw the honor paid to educated old men of China to join the ranks of the scholars, the classical scholars. There was no difficulty, in a situation like that, to have the child impressed by the importance of that kind of thing—no difficulty in having him respect age and culture.

In pre-war Germany you all recognize that the prevalent, pervasive ideal of the German people (the dominant elements in the empire, at least) was militarism—military power. It is no wonder that the youth of Germany were so intrigued and attracted by the glory of military life!

In this country we haven't anything quite answering to either of those. Certainly we don't respect scholars as they did in ancient China, and we don't have quite the same feeling for military heroes. But I can cite one or two illustrations which convey my meaning.

The exploit of Colonel Lindbergh marked an epoch in the life of the world; certainly in the achievements of aviation in this country. Every boy in the length and breadth of this land was stimulated, as every adult was, by that achievement, and every child easily thinks of Colonel

Lindbergh as an attractive hero, an enviable hero whom he would like to emulate. Our whole society takes the same attitude, and therefore there is no difficulty—in fact, you might say it is quite impossible that a child in any normal situation in this country should have anything else but enthusiasm for the exploit of Colonel Lindbergh and for what he represents.

It is an interesting and rather comforting fact that, in the case of the hero of an event like that, there must be some real substantial worth involved. In the recognition of him as a hero, we are paying tribute to certain qualities—to simplicity, to masterfulness, to great courage, initiative, and adventure—all of which traits we greatly extol.

In a more general field, which approximates universality in this country, you have another illustration, and that is in the field of sports, particularly in football which is still a respectable college sport. The general attitude of the parent and of the older youth is such as to give the little boy an idea that here is something worth while, something significant. We have put into sports all the idealistic meaning of health, physical vigor, and skill, and even the little girls admire the heroes of these sports and continue to do so after they grow up!

In the barber-shops, in the home, in the lobbies of the church, and around the fraternal orders, all these things go. Great space is given to such things in the newspapers, big headlines and attractive pictures, so that everyone has a chance to feel registered upon him the popular approval of this kind of thing.

On the other hand, there are many of these social ideals that are not so wrought into our common opinion and there-

fore do not have this social support. We have conflicting social ideals. Take the Democratic and the Republican parties which often have to hunt for differences but still insist that there are differences.

It is very easy to see how children in a Democratic home come to have very strange ideas about Republicans and how Republicans can come to have strange ideas about Democrats. The child looks with a kind of strange and prejudiced feeling upon members of the other party, especially if his family is at all politically minded and has political talk going on about the house.

This situation is mediated by the family attitude, by the school, or even by the playmates of the child. The attitude is reflected from the environment and takes hold deeply upon the individual.

This involves, from the standpoint of practical training, the desirability of participation on the part of children in activities that pertain to the larger social movements. It is significant in the school to get the child to see the desirability and practical value of co-operation—for instance, with reference to preservation of the school property. One of the common and almost universal difficulties is to get people who belong to public institutions to take the same interest in them as they take in their homes. Especially with children is it difficult to get them to have the sense of participating ownership and responsibility in property.

Yet that can be done and is done in every well-ordered and effective school and family to some extent. We have many illustrations from our gangs of boys in our city. When we find a company of predatory youth, one of the best ways to direct their activities in the direction of the

common good is to give them some police power, get them to help take care of other boys who are doing the mischief.

We have in this city very interesting companies of Boys' Brotherhood republics who organize themselves under the model of the city government and go through the performance of carrying out the duties and responsibilities of good citizens. Often they are drawn into participation with the police in discovering evildoers and maintaining order. This, in itself, becomes a tremendously educative force in eliciting the attitude of loyalty and enthusiastic support on behalf of social order.

There is also negative conditioning that often goes on unconsciously. Frequently it happens that in the family the denunciation of an institution or of a party may be such that the curiosity of the child is vastly intrigued. In the old days the child of a good family was taught that a saloon was a very hideous thing and heard so much about it that a saloon was liable to become a place of marvelous fascination. He could thus be made curious to get a glimpse of the inside, of the lights and the laughing men there. The constant denunciation of evil things sometimes generates an appealing interest in them.

Curiously, that sort of thing may happen in the religious conditioning of children. I could elaborate a story about a family which is anti-religious on account of the parents having had too much of the wrong kind of religion in their youth. A child growing up in this family might be expected to develop an antagonistic attitude toward religion, but it resulted in that child having a good deal the same kind of curiosity about the church that I have described about the saloon. The child was absolutely intrigued by the church and by religion, which had been so



much denounced by the family. I am sometimes inclined to think that it might help some of these ideal causes along—if we held back a little on them and made them appear a bit mysterious and more intriguing.

Finally, the period of childhood is a period of pattern-setting and is accompanied by characteristic emotional responses. They are childish but they are important, and are to be treated with respect.

These patterns and these emotional attitudes come alive, so to speak, in the period of adolescence and maturity, when there is larger co-operation in institutions and a better understanding of what they mean and a clearer conception of how they eventuate in the advantage of society.

It is a mistake to suppose that a child is only preparing for life. It is real life to him, but nevertheless it is a different kind of life from that upon which he enters when in the stirring time of adolescence his mind begins to take a wider scope, he begins to feel in a deeper way the significance of the home and the state and the vocations of life.

The patterns which are built up in early years have a chance in the later period to take on new meaning. They furnish the direction of development, and as a rule the individual is held by those patterns and directions of development until they flower out in later life. We now have a chance for a kind of experience meeting on the basis of our own childhood, and of our experience with our own or other people's children.

## THE CHILD'S EMOTIONAL LIFE AND RELIGION

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Emotion has been a very important thing in the development of the religions of the world as we now know them. As a matter of fact, the things which we today are so busily and anxiously trying to rationalize, striving to make appear reasonable in the existing religions, were very often the products of emotional responses of primitive men. A great many of the rituals, the ceremonials, the seasonal festivals, the great feast periods in the religions, go back to a primitive emotional response in time of stress which set up certain behavior patterns which later were intellectualized and stabilized. Even our ideas of God have their beginning in emotion; perhaps all the gods of the world began in emotional responses. The earliest gods there are, are the gods who in times of crisis and stress released the tension of anxious human groups in the early ages. It is not strange, is it, that dawn light and the warmth of the sun, and the storm rain which released the anxiety and tension in regard to the drying earth and the fading pasture, should call out an emotional response of gratitude.

These were the earliest gods, and man learned in times of stress to yield himself to these powers, hoping always in deep need for added benefits, until he loaded his wishes and hopes and anxieties upon these helpers in the outer world. So you might go through the religions of the world and you would find that ideas of the after-life, wish projections into the beyond life, are again grounded in emotional

response, frustration, anxious foreboding, eagerness for fulfilment, the refusal to accept defeat, seeking to find in the future the final fulfilment.

But that is not my subject, of course. These beginnings are emotionally grounded and in the culture religions they hold their place, only in higher religions the centuries have produced a rationalizing, an intellectualizing, a systematizing, a philosophizing of this simple reaction pattern. And, now, the religions of the earth are passing through a period of very striking transformation. In our age we have come to a new understanding of the universe and of man's place in it. At last we have come to the point where we are capable of exerting in times of stress and strain a new technique of control over our work. We have visualized an ideal of joy in living on an entirely different basis from that of the ancient ideals. Now we have begun to picture human values in a new way. And so religion turns from the earlier, otherworldly stress with its postponed and divinely guaranteed fulfilment, turns from the old ceremonial, ritual, institutional embodiments to find attunement to the central driving heart of religion through all the ages.

Religion comes to mean today man's age-long quest to find fulfilment, the effort to realize together the values which constitute a complete joy in living. If we take that as our understanding of what religion has been in its central meaning and what religion is today in its driving power, I can talk more easily about the emotional life of the child and religion. If it were possible to start with a clean slate, to say, "This is what I mean by religion—man's orientation in the universe as we now know it, man's effort to find joy in life, man's endeavor, therefore, to harness science and material things, the resources of the earth, and

machine technology to the realization of a social order in which human beings may be joyous and happy and creative," then it would be relatively simple to tell you all about how to orient the child to this vision of religion. But any such ideal presentation of a technique of religious education would have about it an element of unreality, for we do not start with a clean slate. Quite properly, you would at once complain: "Yes, but how will you do it? How can this be done when we are surrounded all the time with the traditional religious ideology, the inherited institutions and ceremonials, all the atmosphere and attitudes which belong to the past?" And I would not know how to answer that.

And so I am not going to build you an ideal picture; I am going to talk to you rather in terms of religion as it is to see if it is possible to get an emotional orientation of the child, so that in spite of the hold-over of things which must inevitably be outgrown, he will be stably adjusted emotionally. If I can do that, you will not be able to complain. If we accept the facts and stay within them, any program that emerges may have some appearance of practical reality.

So I say, first of all, that the child's problem emotionally is to grow out of the secure, enfolding, parental environment, where affection and the kindly care of the parent protects the growing infant, into that adult status in which he must wrestle with the actual maladjustments of the outer world. The key phrase is progressive, harmonious adjustment.

There is a striking simplicity in the Freudian interpretation of the transition from the prenatal omnipotence to the modified omnipotence of infancy, which ought normally to yield to the realization by the growing adult that the world

is not under his control, that the environment must be mastered, that life is often rough and surly, and even at the best refuses to yield to human wishes at many spots. Whether or not one accepts the theory, actually that is the situation. The child must learn to know and face, unafraid, the facts of the world as it is.

You who know your modern world, and have seen the actual crises of emotion which have come over growing adolescents, will be sure, therefore, as the child moves from the protection of the home to meet the real issues of life not to make unnecessary problems for him. Certainly you may assume that child nature is plastic human nature, and there is no real reason in the world that a child cannot adjust to any conceivable universe. It is not necessary that you teach some particular world-view. Human nature does not demand that some special form of interpretation be given to the child; it has no foreordained religious needs; human nature can be led to adjust harmoniously to the factual situation in any conceivable universe there may be. Only adults long indoctrinated in tradition are tender-minded. Children can face facts.

Therefore, let your first canon be a sincere chastity in regard to what the child is taught in regard to his universe. You must be absolutely sincere. You dare not teach these children things which even as you teach them you know must be outgrown by them; you must not orient them emotionally in a universe in such a way that they must meet storms of conflict as they come into the adolescent understanding of their world. Surely you have known yourself how difficult it is to come out from a traditional world-view into a modern world-view, and how difficult it was to win again emotional poise through that transition. For the chil-

dren of the new generation much of this emotional difficulty would be entirely avoided if we would take, for our children's sake, the vow of intellectual chastity in relation to them.

And now I have to do some negative talking for a minute or two, because the traditional religious world-view has emotional sets which are rather dangerous for children who must at last come to face the world of today.

I do not need to say anything to this audience in regard to the use of fear as it was used in the olden days. I do not suppose any one of us has ever sat under a sermon such as Jonathan Edwards used to preach when men and women clung to the pillars of the church to keep from slipping down into hell. You do not have these wild waves of emotion thrust upon you any more. There is no angry God threatening you, nor hell-fire waiting for you, and of course you would not teach these things, nor give these emotional experiences to children today, although apparently it is still done in some regions even now. None of this group would do that injury to childhood.

But there are other accepted elements of traditional religion which may be sources of emotional danger. Thus, the use of God as a sanction for good behavior may have undesirable effects. Of course, it is very old as a technique. Twenty-four hundred years ago a Greek thinker, Critias, suggested that the gods originated in that way. He said that a ruler in the ancient days was able to take care of the objective behavior of his people, but he could not keep track of them when they were out of sight. In the effort to discover some way of controlling their secret behavior, he invented the gods and told the people, "The gods will



watch you wherever you are. You cannot escape their eyes."

It is an old idea; as a matter of fact, there are some to-day who would even argue that if the idea of God were gone, its loss would immediately undermine moral behavior; but those of you who know the religious sciences know that man was moral before the gods were moral, and that morality is older than the gods. You also know that the control of moral behavior is, after all, in the social group, and only in so far as the ideal and its applied code is embodied in a group does it go over into the behavior of individuals.

To use God as a way of re-enforcing the moral pattern of the group is emotionally a danger, and in several ways. In the first place, used as a means of enforcing the group moral ideal, it takes away from the actual control where control can only be effected. In so far as the individual fails to conform to the group sanction, refuses to recognize the authority of the group, this idea of God as a watcher, as an enforcer, is an emotional cause of anxiety and distress. "But," you say, "all religions in the world have provided a way by means of which you can be forgiven by God." Certainly, and that is the great trouble, because if you can be forgiven by God you can escape responsibility to your group. There results then for the child, and later for the adult, the possibility of short-circuiting the emotional drive which ought to be the creative power behind moral living. And in so far as that short-circuiting takes place, the individual is lifted out of the actual, ongoing, creative process of living. That is merely one phase of it.

There is this, also: Sometimes this authority of the supernatural world is imposed upon certain patterns of behavior so that some ways of acting are eternally right and

others are stamped with an awesome taboo. In a world of changing—necessarily changing—codes of behavior an otherworldly sanction attached to an outgrown code may really stunt the growth of the child. Some people have a peculiar emotional feeling in regard to certain habits or actions which they were told in childhood were wrong, and which since then they have never been able to indulge in without that emotional apprehension. There may be many of us who were trained as children in the old attitude in regard to cardplaying, theatergoing, smoking, and dancing, who have not yet escaped the emotional hold-over, although we are completely emancipated intellectually in regard to these things. In so far as an uncriticized sanction stabilizes a form of behavior, it acts as a stunting power, and the individual is inhibited in all these lines as a creative, active, progressive social person.

Still further, this relationship of God to moral living in the light of the materials of history of religions may be seen at work repeatedly in terms of a short-circuiting of responsibility. "God and I" is a sufficient answer for both conservative and radical. You say that I am responsible to my group, that I must bow to the social conscience, that I must bear my share in achieving the group ideal; but what if I say, "No, my responsibility is directly to God"? There is no answer to that. There may even be a willingness historically to absolve one who dares to say, "Not father, nor mother, nor group, nor nation, no one can claim my loyalty; my loyalty belongs directly to the unseen world."

In the light of your understanding of modern religion and of the origin of our ethical ideals, ladies and gentlemen, that is a very dangerous thing to teach little children, because through it you do two things, you short-circuit

their emotions in relation to moral living, and you make it possible so to lift them out of their responsibility to the group as to make them ineffective as participating, co-operating units in the shared life of their real world.

Too much time must not be given to this negative side of our problem, but let me say a few more things. Sometimes we use symbols in the teaching of children, and these symbols are very likely to have emotional attachment which, in the light of larger understanding and larger experience, creates emotional disturbance. Take the Bible, for instance, as one. I wonder how many thousands of young people have had emotional trouble because of the way in which the Bible has been held up as a special book, as a book of peculiar authority, as a book that is different and apart from all other books, so that when they come to see it in the light of scientific study they face a difficult emotional adjustment. There is no reason in the world today that the Bible should be presented to children in such a way as to cause them emotional difficulty when they reach Freshman status in college or Senior status in high school. You know very well that they must face scientific teaching in regard to all the old symbols. Then, why not give them in their attitude toward these things the purely historical and, shall I be arrogant and say, accurate attitude and information, the thing which you have attained yourself? In that way they would escape emotional strain.

There is something more important still, and that is, perhaps, one of the things most striking in the old religion, the habit of transfer of the protecting security of parental affection to a supernatural guarantor. It has been, of course, the central thing in the thought forms and emotional technique of all religion. We have been living in a

world that we could not master. We have been forced constantly to face the fact of frustration. The world has not been good, and we have not been able to make it entirely good. Religions have compensated for that by projecting into the supernatural this needed guaranty, and it is so easy for the child to find the parental security which is given to him in distress and need, lifted by religion into the heavenly realm.

If you have been reading the literature of our intellectuals in the last generation, you will know what an emotional tragedy they have been facing. What is it that troubles Mr. Krutch? His old guaranties, his cosmic ultimates are suddenly gone. The intellectuals, one after another, through these last few decades have been coming face to face with this stark reality. Mr. Lippman has met it fearlessly. The attitude of the liberals toward naturalistic humanism is an emotional apprehension regarding loss of cosmic guaranties rather than an intellectual problem. All of us must necessarily face it if we are to live in this modern world. Inevitably, what the intellectuals are seeing today all men must see tomorrow. There is no reason why we should continue to give the emotional set to children which we know will lead them in their adolescent and early life into these very emotional crises through which we see our contemporaries passing now.

The old supernatural guaranty was a way in which you could overcome distress and defeat by compensation, a means of avoiding issues by flight, a way in which you could escape a tragic situation by anesthesia; but today you dare not do it. This is not to meet the world of reality. The way of flight and escape and compensation is not the adult mode of mastery of the world you know. And when Stoddard

Kennedy (I use him as an illustration because he was a minister and a chaplain, beloved of all the men on the Western Front in the trenches), after preaching "God is love," finally faced the realities of a world that is not good, a world in which evil cuts its devastating swaths through human lives, a world in which the old dragon of evil trails its slime through century after century, then the beloved lover of men, in an emotional crisis, cried out: "I hate God!" There should be no need for such emotional storms. Too long we have lived religiously in the childhood attitude toward the world as though it were our father's protecting home, but there is no reason, in any educational approach, why every little child should not face the world as it is. Then they may attain emotional adult status naturally.

All that I seek to say in this whole section is that all such traditional orientation has the danger of short-circuiting. It makes it possible for us to flee from the facts, it opens the door to escape from the actuality; in other words, it is the parental protection of the child carried into adult life, it is a continuation of the childlike, dependent attitude, it is a refusal of responsibility. In this age, if you are interested in religion at all, you must bring up the new generation to come to grips with the actual issues of life, you must teach them how to look cleanly and honestly and fearlessly into the face of facts. You must give them the fine vision which will see the inevitable things of their world, and at the same time the splendid, exhilarating courage which will make them have faith, nevertheless, in their capacity to alter their world. In other words, bring them up, not as children always, but as children who can escape the dependent and anesthetic and fleeing attitude by

attaining the adult status of wrestling with the actualities of the world as it is.

And now, the positive word, and this is what I have been coming to all the time. All that I have said so far is just obliquely positive on the background of the past. The thing we must do for these children of this new generation is make them so completely at home in their world that they will feel glad and joyous as sharers in the human enterprise. I would say it in these four ways: Give them a feeling of at-homeness in their world, a sense of being in a way cousins of birds and flowers and trees. Since we do belong to the earth, since we indeed are earth's children, since we are integrated in the very structure of Mother Earth, since no form of life is so safely and securely rooted in the planet as human life, let's feel our at-homeness. Why should we seek to get away? Why should we project ourselves beyond? We belong here and our guaranties and securities are here in this planet. But the world is not our world alone. The world is not good to us always. The world has been laid under tribute by this human thrust of life to some degree, and if the child sees it clearly, that knowledge will lead emotionally to a sympathy and a comradeship with all other members of the human line. We belong together. Our effort through these long ages as human beings has been to make a home for ourselves on the earth, and we cannot afford to be separated. Let the child feel this comradeship, this sense of belonging not only to the world of nature but to the human, and there is a chance that emotionally he will escape some of the prejudices that have worried so many of us so long—racial, national, color, class prejudices.



In this vision of religion you cut across all the old divisions, because a synoptic view of the long, long drift of the ages softens or obliterates the separations of centuries and reveals the march of humanity. The story of religions shows the splendid and tragic struggle of the peoples in their quest for the goods of life. Let the child enter into the natural history of religions and he may attain an emotional sense of oneness with fellows, a sympathy, a comradeship very important for the future of our world. Such an understanding will lead the child, as soon as he begins to feel at home with the vision, to the deeper, creative, aggressive, and courageous attitude of joy in being a bearer of responsibility for the human task. We are indeed bearers of the creative life of the planet. This sense of joy in living as a mediator of the heritage of the past, the heightening of emotional power in the realization that even a child can be a creative factor in the shaping of the future of planetary history in a fluid and changing world with possibilities of renewal and re-creation, ought to be a part of the emotional setting into which the child grows progressively until as an active creative adult he becomes a powerful shaper of his environment.

In considering the teaching of religion to children, it is impossible to stress too much the desirability of achieving an emotional loyalty to the task which has been the religious task of all the centuries. I should like to see children given the vision of these many moving religions of the ages, that they may understand how they worked out their programs, how they reached out for their gods, how their institutions and ceremonies functioned, but, more important, that the children may feel the significance of it all

and see under the changing forms always the hungry, longing, yearning, human heart, seeking ever for satisfaction, reaching out always for fulfilment, never satisfied with anything less than complete joy in living. They might watch the religions in their manifold ways coming down the ages until the tide flowed through their generation, until they felt themselves one with all this long quest, and were caught emotionally by a fiery loyalty to take up in their turn the ancient task of the religions of all the centuries, the unfinished task of building the world in which human life may be beautiful, creative, glorious, and happy, through progressive elimination of the evils which thwart the hopes of men.

So I say to you, positively, make the child at home in his world, make him feel his oneness in sympathy with his fellows, give him that sense of joy as a bearer of human experience and as a creator of values, give him the feeling of loyalty to the age-old human task which religion is, and then you need not worry about all that the schools and universities and sciences can do for him. He will have the emotional adjustment, he will have the basic emotional foundation which will only be built out into an intellectual system by all that science can give him. His at-homeness in the universe will be amplified and enlarged by all the sciences which deal with evolutionary processes; his at-oneness with his fellows will be amplified by his anthropology and all the archaeological sciences. His sense of joy in sharing the human task and loyalty to religion will be built out by the social sciences and the religious sciences until the emotional basis which you have given him as a child will integrate him as a co-operative, capable, participating, and poised unit in a world which will become at long last

one vast human family—some day—let's not be too optimistic—some day!

And, so, with a stable emotional orientation, with science and philosophy building the outlines of his universe, he may be emotionally attuned to all the past, calm and poised as he does his work in the present, and thrilled emotionally by the challenge beckoning to him over the hills of tomorrow.

## THE FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY IN RESISTIVE CHILDREN

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Research*

The particular phase of this subject that I want to talk about is related more particularly to clinical research, which we have been doing at the Institute in connection with a boarding-school for boys. I shall not attempt to extend this very far into the field of working with smaller children. I am not saying that to prevent any discussion you may want to raise about children who are not like those I shall describe, yet I do want this to be limited pretty well to the resistive children we are meeting in this boarding-school.

We see resistance in the form of temper tantrums in the very small child; we are inclined to expect them. It has been shown by psychiatrists that there is a time of life (about the third year) when resistance is at its highest point. At a later time we find fighting and cruelty. We find the older sister who, upon the advent of a younger baby sister, expresses her resistance first by a rather mild and, finally, a rather severe patting of the baby's head. This may go on until at a later time it amounts to violence. Violence in the adult appears as assault and, resistance in its extreme form in the adult, as an attempt to murder. All reactions which show absence of feeling for others might be classified in the group of resistance. There is an apparent lack of feeling in this type of behavior which is reacted to by persons in the community and by the mother in her rather severe reprimand of the child

from time to time; this grows more severe and more forceful as the child matures. Later on, as the child enters school, he is met by the same attitude on the part of the teacher who, perhaps, reprimands him for not doing as well in school as he should; she is convinced that he has intelligence and may even have him displayed before the class as a child who can, but refuses to do.

This may go even farther as the child gets into difficulties with his associates, and he may, as time goes on, land in a correctional school where he is met again by this attitude of resistance from the individuals supervising him, while he in turn reacts perhaps more vigorously as he becomes more experienced in his ability to resist, all the time showing less and less apparent feeling for others.

The particular reaction that tends to show as he grows older is what we later on classify as rebellion toward constituted authority. As the child gets into the correctional school, he is definitely classified as a delinquent and he thinks, from that time on, in terms of law and enforcement of law.

The recent report on the study of 510 criminal careers from the Massachusetts Reformatory tends to show, without any question of doubt, that meeting resistance with other resistance does *not* help the individual. The figures show that out of the 510 reformatory graduates, after five, ten, and sometimes fifteen years, 80 per cent showed further criminal activities; in fact, taken rather critically, less than 10 per cent of these adults become useful or reliable citizens in the community.

Our particular job has been to get children at a time when there is still some chance of working with them,

since we are quite agreed that work with adults, because of the late period of life, is less fruitful. To this end this boarding-school, which was established three and one-half years ago, is being developed in this particular area just outside of Chicago. It has accepted children classified as "borderline." These children are particularly interesting to us because they show marked resistance and lack of responsibility for others. In this group we have accepted a number of children with postencephalitic disease. This organic disease, which has become well known since 1918, has presented some problems from all walks of life, in all types of families.

In an individual suffering from this disease, it can be definitely established that organic brain changes have occurred, and behavior manifestations, again showing lack of responsibility, are attributed definitely to these changes. As an example of this, we find a child of twelve or thirteen years of age who has suffered from encephalitis doing good work in the seventh or eighth grade, when, suddenly in the midst of the instructor's directions to the class, he will get up and interrupt her and say, "Do you know our new Ford can make sixty miles an hour?" This outburst occurs in what is otherwise a serious, or at least definitely organized and well-regulated, class.

If it can be definitely shown that the child suffers from encephalitis, we can overlook and simply classify that child and say, "We will make exceptions for him." But in many *other* cases, we fail to find a definite cause. So we have another group in which there is no definite organic basis or explanation of this behavior. From that group many children do poor work in school, and on intelligence



tests are found to respond poorly and so are not classified in the group with adequate intelligence, but somewhat lower. Their physical condition may be good; in fact, we have accepted only those in good physical health for this particular study.

I think, perhaps, the general program could be very briefly outlined. Whereas these children have met repeatedly with resistance all along the line, have been repeatedly reprimanded and reminded of relatively poor school work, have accepted many disapproving remarks from those with whom they are living, it is our plan to set up an entirely new or reversed form of treatment.

Children who come in are met with no restraint, with no resistance, nor is there any attempt to point out to them their failures either in general conduct or school work. We attempt to surround them with what should be classified as perhaps an impersonal attitude on the part of the employees, but something which comes very near to love in their relationship with the child. A specific example will illustrate this point.

We accepted a ten-year-old boy two years ago, soon after the opening of the school, who had been tried in foster-homes, in institutions, and dismissed because he was such a serious problem; he was so cruel in his relations with other children that it was felt he could not be kept with safety. He was placed in a detention home, and while there it was necessary to put him with older boys. When he came to our attention we found him to be a boy short of stature, of nearly adequate intelligence as shown by tests, with numerous scars on the head, and hair clipped short in order to treat injuries received during quarrels with other

boys. His ears had been pulled so often that the skin was broken and had to be treated with zinc ointment. He had been subject to from twelve to fifteen temper tantrums a day; these were of a very violent nature.

Against the advice of persons who had worked with this child, he was admitted. This lad, Martin, on coming to the school, immediately got into a fight. He picked on a boy about his own size and won the battle. He was about to have another fight and, instead of trying to resist him, the instructor offered him his galoshes and other wraps and he was told to go outdoors. He had not wanted to come to the school, and here was his chance to run away if he desired to do so. Instead, he walked around the fence, the surrounding grounds, and out there in the snow he literally, as well as figuratively, cooled off.

This was repeated a half-dozen times, and at no time was there definite resistance on the part of the instructors; each time a tantrum was about to precipitate, he was invited to step outdoors. At the same time in the classroom, he was allowed to work with different kinds of handiwork, but not required to do so. He was told he did not have to do anything, he did not even have to do such chores as are usual in an institution of that sort.

This went on for a little time, and in the spring he began to show outdoor activity of a rather primitive nature. In the vicinity of the school there is a dump heap where a lot of worn-out articles are discarded, and in this pile he found several burlap sacks. He brought them in, washed them (the children had been making stencils), and cut a strip about the length of the top of an upright piano and, of his own volition, stenciled the ends of this burlap.

At the same time, he discovered there were a lot of rats about this dump heap. He succeeded in getting a rat trap and he claims the record for catching rats—he caught twenty-four in one day. Aside from the publicity he gained for himself in cleaning up the entire dump heap, he himself got something out of it: the realization that he could be pretty much himself. Our attitude of non-resistance was so complete that he found he could even irritate and impose on the instructors of the school. In fact, an outstanding example of this was when he took a rat he had caught, killed and threw it at one of the rather uppish and irritable instructors. He very cleverly selected that particular one and, of course, got a very typical reaction from her.

It is now almost three years since this boy came to us. He remained in this environment where he did very little school work for one year. He was then returned to the community of a North Shore suburb and there admitted to a grammar school; although it was rather late in the year when he started, he did quite well in that particular school. He was able to go on with a grade level in keeping with his mental age and experienced no loss of time so far as his school work went. That continued for a period of four or five months up to the time the family with whom he was living broke up. He then went to another community in a rural section, and he has continued to get along very satisfactorily.

What has happened to this child? At first very resistive, he met with resistance on the part of the people with whom he lived. He did not have his own family to supervise him, as he was only six or seven years of age

when his family broke up. We do not think that he has changed very materially. What has happened is this: he has received a certain feeling for the rights of others; he has taken certain responsibilities upon himself which have existed all the time and which had a chance to develop when surrounded by a diminution—perhaps almost cessation—of resistance from constituted authority. So far as resistance to children went, that certainly continued.

At about this same time we accepted a boy of eleven years of age with the report from his school teacher that he was doing nothing in school, that his only interest in books was to tear them up. When he came to our school, this lad was offered some books to read, at a great risk of having them torn up, but we had so few he could not tear very many. At first he just looked at them and said, "These are only baby books. I won't have anything to do with them." Later on, however, he did, with the result that he read them all and took such an interest in them that we made him our librarian. As new books were received, we gave him charge of them.

A third type of resistance which we feel stands out as representing another type is the child who appears to be retiring and is classified as a "sissy." He certainly does not take responsibility well. He has a way of making himself known, but the moment he is being attacked or approached, he disappears. When the attack ceases, he goes after it again. He is the child who will knock the hat off a bigger boy and then run.

We had at this time a boy of about the same age who also spent a year with us. His first reaction to the group was that of running away. He came to one of the in-

structors and had no hesitancy at all about being her pet. This was permitted. When he first came to us, he had nightmares almost every night; he would get up and scream and yell, but at no time did we see evidence of temper tantrums nor any violence other than that of constantly irritating the other children. With this child we felt we were meeting a different situation and that we must permit him all the protection he desired.

The first phase of our contact with him was to permit him to come in and run to shelter. He was at first very much abused by the other boys; they called him "sissy," "goofy," and such names as that. But there followed a second stage in which they simply ignored him; he was more or less ostracized; he just did not belong. But he was then even more active in irritating the others, starting brawls, and so on; however, it was during this time that he had his first fight, which was, we felt, a turning-point. Once he had established himself as a self-reliant person, holding his own, his other behavior disappeared and, when it disappeared, the nightmares left him. Just as in the temper-tantrum child who in two months ceased his temper tantrums, so this child ceased his nightmares after he began standing up for himself, not only with boys of his own age, but with larger boys as well.

With the encephalitic child we are dealing with a somewhat different situation. We have not excluded him because he showed evidence of organic brain changes. We felt certain things could be done with him as well, basing our assumption upon the theory that there are more paths in the brain than he needs, or is using, and that encephalitis has only destroyed a portion of them. So, in the

encephalitic child we have observed in several instances certain responsibilities are readily taken provided, again, the resistance to the child is reduced to the utmost.

To bring this down to our own families: the resistances that are found in the older children of ten, twelve, or fourteen years of age are of long standing, and go back to very early experiences; these are common not only to homes where there is a dependent situation, but also to homes where there is disorganization and incompatibility of parents. We believe that out of researches of this kind a clinical method can be applied to an early age. This is not new, of course, but our success in the treatment of resistance in children is not so great that we can boast about it.

I am willing to confess, also, as Dr. Cameron did yesterday that I am not so thoroughly convinced that we are doing the job satisfactorily.



## FAMILY DISORGANIZATION AND THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF THE CHILD

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No problem in the modern world, perhaps, is fraught with such pathos, such tragedy, and such universal interest as the disorganization of family life. Everywhere in the wake of domestic discord and the dissolution of family life lies a harvest of wrecked personalities, misshapen by attitudes of frustration, disillusionment, pessimism, and despair. And yet in no field of social relations is there a greater dearth of accurate information than exists concerning the steps which might be taken to prevent the heartaches of which each separation, each divorce, speaks so eloquently.

Throughout the Western world, and especially in the United States, the romantic attitude toward marriage has glorified this ceremony until it has become the crowning event of one's life. To break the union, which had its beginning before the marriage actually transpired, represents in many cases the destruction of a romantic picture for which no satisfactory substitute is ever found. To the child such a break in relations is a double misfortune, for it means, not only strained relations, but a loss of status among his friends who happen to be more fortunate.

Statistics of divorce, desertion, juvenile delinquency, and the behavior problems of children, however, offer little help in understanding the factors which have brought crises in the marital ventures of so many parents with the resulting disorganization of the personalities of their chil-

dren. What good does it do the social reformer, the distracted wife whose husband is unfaithful, or the distraught parent whose child is incorrigible, to know that in Chicago, for example, there were 6,094 divorces granted in 1919; 2,661 cases heard in the Court of Domestic Relations in 1921; one divorce to five marriages in 1924; 2,538 cases of juvenile delinquency in 1929; and so on? Such statistics give no clues to the causes of the family conflicts which they indicate.

It is necessary, accordingly, to turn to the more subtle aspects of situations for an understanding of the forces making for the disorganization of personality, both of children and of adults. What follows, therefore, is intended to indicate lines of fruitful research rather than a set of final conclusions.

#### PHASES OF THE PROBLEM

There are many phases of the problem of family disorganization, all of which are, in one respect or another, related to the emotional life of the child. First, we have what may be called the disintegration of the family in which the family unity has been broken by separation, desertion, or divorce. To the child this means the absence of one parent from the home, or that he is placed in an institution or with foster-parents. Second, there are the situations in which the family circle has been broken by the death of one or both parents. This type of family disorganization is of less importance from the standpoint of the child, since the culture of most people is better adjusted to the occurrences of such situations. Third, there is the phase of domestic discord, in which the family is yet a unit but in which the tensions and conflicts are so severe

as to threaten its dissolution at any moment. It is the latter phase of the disorganization of the family which is most pregnant with emotional conflict for the child, owing to the ever recurring crises in family relations.

Since family disintegration is always the climax or finale of family disorganization, and since the broken family in so far as it creates attitudes of conflict in the child is not so different from family disintegration, we may neglect these more restricted forms for that of domestic discord. All the tensions arising in the emotional life of the child may be found in an aggravated form in domestic discord situations. Feelings of inferiority, for example, are even stronger where conflict between parents is known in the community than if one parent were divorced, deserted, or dead. The constant reminder that the family relationship is fragile is even more disorganizing than a definite break, since no solution for the conflict situation can be achieved either on a rational or non-rational basis.

It is in situations of domestic discord, accordingly, that one finds all the family tensions epitomized which tend to produce warped personalities, maladjusted individuals, misdirected energies. Many children are handicapped because of low economic status, ignorance, unfortunate parental guidance, and so forth. But the child in a family where there is constant open conflict between parents is doubly handicapped.

#### DOMESTIC DISCORD AND CHILDREN

One of the questions which immediately confronts one when he begins to talk about the effect of family disorganization upon the emotional life of the child is: How prevalent is domestic discord? Unfortunately, that is not an

easy question to answer. And while we all have, perhaps, rather definite impressions, their accuracy is probably not very high.

We know, however, that divorce is widespread and the trend seems to be toward more divorces. In the United States, for example, the divorce rate has increased from 79 to 154 per hundred thousand persons in twenty-five years, viz., from 1901 to 1926. We know, also, that this upward trend is not restricted to the United States. In fact, there seems to be no country in the world, with the exception of Japan, in which the divorce rate has not increased of recent years.

But we know, also, that divorce is not an adequate index of the prevalence of domestic discord. In the United States, for example, the divorce rate varies from state to state to a much greater degree than can be explained upon the assumption that in each case it represents an adequate measure of the prevalence of domestic discord. No one would insist, I do not believe, that the family in Nevada is 2,523 times as unstable as it is in South Carolina, though there are that many times as many divorces per hundred thousand population. Divorce rates vary, in other words, not only in response to the prevalence of domestic discord, but also in response to the ease or difficulty with which divorce may be obtained in a particular country or state.

This leads one to the conclusion, accordingly, that so far as official records are concerned, there is no way of determining the prevalence of domestic discord. One is forced back, then, upon general impressions which may be highly faulty because they are so closely tied up with what one wishes to believe. We are safe in asserting, however,

that there are as many domestic discord cases as there are petitions for divorce, and that perhaps is serious enough to call for careful consideration of the problem. In 1926, for example, there were 12,180 divorce bills filed in Cook County, which is approximately one to every three marriages.

The next question to be answered is, of course: How frequently are children involved in cases of domestic discord? Again one has to fall back upon general impressions. We know, for example, that there are children in about 36 per cent of divorce cases. We know, also, that where there are courts of domestic relations the proportion of cases in which there are children is considerably higher, being approximately 70 per cent in Chicago.

This contrast between the frequency of children in divorce cases as compared with desertion cases has led to a paradoxical situation with regard to the interpretation of the influence of children upon domestic discord. It has been asserted again and again by students of divorce that the absence of children makes for divorce, whereas others have said that large families lead to desertion and non-support. Since divorce, desertion, and non-support are all outgrowths of domestic discord, it seems difficult, upon the basis of statistics, to say how children effect domestic discord.

We can assume, however, that the frequency with which children are involved in domestic discord cases is no less, and is perhaps greater than that indicated in divorce data. That, undoubtedly, is sufficient reason for considering the effects upon the life of the child. Before considering the effects of family disorganization upon the child, however,

it is necessary to understand clearly the essential nature of domestic discord.

#### FORMS OF DOMESTIC DISCORD

When one speaks of the disorganization of the family, the picture he tends to call out in the minds of his hearers is one of black eyes and flying dishes. Or, perhaps, what is as common, the sudden filing of a suit for divorce revealing the disillusionment of the wife and the duplicity of the husband. These are, however, only the surface indications of a conflict situation which we may call domestic discord.

The family is something more, in other words, than the legal union of male and female with their offspring. It is a process of living together in which each individual participates in a give-and-take, hampering-and-encouraging relationship. It is, to state it differently, a process of social interaction of the most intimate sort; a relationship of stimulation and counterstimulation organized upon such a fine scale as to tear upon the nerves of even the most unsensitive person if the wishes and attitudes of the persons are at cross-purposes, or to lead to the most blissful co-operation and identification if the members are in perfect agreement.

Interaction in family relations, accordingly, may take either of two forms: First, conflict, i.e., discord, and, second, accord. Conflict may be either open and overt, or it may be incipient and repressed. Accord also may be either of two types: First, accommodation in which the conflict elements are dissipated by a tacit agreement, but which with a change in situation may readily reappear; or, sec-



ond, it may represent complete identification of interests at least so far as a particular type of situation is concerned.

In every family relationship both forms of interaction tend to appear. There is, in other words, both discord and accord. Whenever the discord elements tend to overbalance the accord elements, the unity of the family is threatened. It is the latter situation with which we are concerned when we speak of family disorganization, for it indicates that the conflict elements have become so severe that the members go outside the family circle for assistance in control. Thus family disorganization may be defined as that situation in which there has been differentiation of interests and wishes to such an extent that one or both persons have given up hope of achieving, alone, mutual understanding and appreciation.

The forms of family disorganization are wide and varied, but may be conveniently grouped into five types. Each case of domestic discord, in turn, may contain some elements or features of each of these types, may be restricted to one type, or may present any other possible combination of more than one type.

The first type (first in order of treatment, not importance) arises out of differences in conceptions with regard to money matters. These are the sort of situations which are often dubbed as resulting from failure to support, stinginess, laziness, and the like. Such characterizations, however, are inadequate since they fail to take into account the differences in attitudes out of which they arise. In a world in which marriages occur between persons having diverse standards of living, in which women refuse to follow the old established custom of allowing the men to control the economic affairs of their families, and in which

wives demand and follow vocational interests, it is not surprising that conflicts develop out of differences in economic outlook.

The second type of domestic discord is that in which there is lack of adjustment in response relations. This form of conflict is often inadequately called "sexual incompatibility." This term is inappropriate, since the word "sex" to many persons indicates little more than a physiological reaction. To speak from the standpoint of origins, of course, it is probable that all "love" elements have their origin in sex, but in the experience of the individual the sex impulse is so overlaid with traditional attitudes and with colorings from one's own sexual experiences as to vary widely from the physiological base. It is sex, then, as a composite of sense and sentiment, which is at the basis of conflicts in response relations.

Conflict in response relations, accordingly, may arise out of a wide variety of differences: differences in the strength of the physiological impulse, differences in temperament, differences in cultural background, differences in personal experiences. And, since the situation is so in the realm of the unmentionable, there are difficulties in the way of rational approach or even of frank recognition of differences. The result is that conflict in this sphere comes out in many disguised forms, and even when recognized is difficult to overcome, owing to the ingrained reticence of most individuals where sex is concerned.

Differences in cultural backgrounds give rise to the third type of family disorganization. These differences are chiefly in the religious, racial, and educational folk ways and mores of the groups in which the two persons grew up. Conflict generally centers about questions of right and

wrong, proper and improper conduct, diversity of interests and contacts. Differences in tastes, manners, and enthusiasms lead to attitudes of frustration and lack of sympathetic response. Misunderstandings arise owing to the failure of each individual to realize the relativity of all standards in culture. Even though one person is willing to make concessions to the other, since he has not assimilated the attitude of appropriateness of the standard, tension develops only to find expression in quite disguised forms.

The fourth form of domestic discord finds its origin in differences in life-patterns of the individuals. Each individual works out for himself, more often unconsciously than consciously, an outlook upon the whole of life which takes the form of a personal philosophy. This schematization, which may be called his "pattern of life," determines the attitude or bias with which he will approach any problem. It is probable that the pattern of life is based, to some extent at least, upon temperamental characteristics. Yet personal experiences modify very greatly the development from the temperamental background. In many persons there tends to be considerable change with age, and severe crises often produce profound effects. Thus the life-patterns of two persons, who upon marriage were very similar, may become quite different in later life.

Domestic discord also frequently grows out of the personal disorganization of one or both parties to a marriage union. Individuals presenting disorganizing trends in their personality development find themselves unable to cope with the problems which arise in family life quite as much as with those which arise in their relations with other phases of their social environment. The child, for example,

who played the rôle of the favorite in his family, but who is unable to adjust his rôle to the demands of outside groups, enters a marriage union without any adequate technique for meeting the new situations which arise. Frustration in outside contacts only aggravates the conflict within the family and leads to further maladjustment outside, thus compounding the personal disorganization until a break is inevitable. The result tends to be a thorough demoralization of the personality. It is here that the linkage between domestic discord in one generation and the next is so intimately revealed since personal disorganization so often grows out of a domestic discord situation.

Having sketched briefly the essential nature of domestic discord, one may turn to the effects which these tensions between husband and wife have upon the emotional life of the child. It is to be expected here, of course, that a wide variety of effects will be discovered, depending upon other factors than domestic discord in each situation. Domestic discord is only one of the many elements shaping the development of personality in the child. For purposes of analysis, however, one may, for the time being, neglect the other factors.

#### VARIETIES OF EMOTIONAL MALADJUSTMENT

Conflict between parents and child, normally found in family relations, is aggravated by domestic discord between parents. No child can develop normally in a family situation surcharged with tensions between parents. Even though the parents do all in their power to conceal their conflicts from their children, minimal expressions, incipient coldness, and reserve belie all attempts to hide the strained relations and therefore react upon the child.

Often, too, there is the lack of discipline, or at least lack of concerted discipline, which tends to accompany domestic discord.

Attitudes of favoritism, also, tend to be more apparent in domestic discord cases. It is, perhaps, quite normal for fathers to prefer daughters and for mothers to prefer sons, but when in domestic discord cases this becomes exaggerated to the extent of turning to the child for the response which would normally come from the other partner in marriage the disorganizing effects upon the child become felt.

There are many varieties of ways in which domestic discord effects the emotional life of the child. In fact, it is probably not far from the truth to say that every phase of the emotional life of the child may be affected by domestic discord, depending, of course, upon the form which domestic discord takes.

It is not uncommon to find one parent reacting toward his child in terms of certain traits identified with the other parent. A mother, for example, sees in her son the same care-free attitude which she associates with her husband. The result is that she tries to correct this attitude by constant reprimands, references to it, and so forth, until the son eventually takes the same attitude toward her as does her husband. Or, instead of trying to change the attitudes of the child, she may simply show hostility or indifference to his interests and so create in the child an attitude that he is being abused and neglected. In either case the conflict in the child is often quite acute. It is out of situations of this sort that attitudes of illegitimacy and adoption develop.

One child, for example, in telling of his earlier experi-



ences where there was conflict between parents, said he always felt mistreated by his parents, particularly his father. Neighbors often heard his father whip him and remarked, "It couldn't be possible that a father would treat his child that way." He got the idea, accordingly, that he might not belong to his father and often asked his mother, "Is he really my father?"

Thus, whether identification of the child with the other parent leads to neglect, to antagonism, or to undue solicitude and discipline, the attitudes of the child tend to be colored with feelings of mistreatment.

Sex conflict between husband and wife is pregnant with possibilities of emotional tensions in the life of the child. Because of the tendency for aversions toward sex relations to become attached to sex in general, such conflict often produces a high degree of reticence on the part of the wife and mother. The child, accordingly, grows up without sex instruction and tends to develop undue preoccupation and unsatisfied curiosity with reference to sex. Or, again, if the child is a girl, the mother may instil into her the idea that all men are brutes, that marriage is something to be avoided—an attitude which comes into conflict with the natural tendency to seek the attentions of the other sex. Some mothers, for example, have been known to instil in their daughters hatred and fear toward their own fathers, as suggested by the warning of one mother, "Don't let your father come near you or touch you. He will try to stay with you."

Describing her home life which was unhappy, one young girl said, "I had a miserable life. I felt sorry for my mother. My mother and father never separated but they never got along. My mother was everything to me.



I blamed my father. I decided that all men were no good. Because of my father I never cared to get married. I know that no man could make me happy."

Attitudes of infidelity of one parent toward the other likewise give rise to emotional conflict in the child, resulting either in attitudes of fear and aversion for members of the opposite sex or to impulses of experimentation and adventure in this dangerous realm.

Domestic discord sometimes finds its most pronounced overt expression in quarrels between parents over the discipline of the children. This situation tends to lead either to lack of discipline or to unregulated and uncontrolled attempts at discipline. In either case, each quarrel gives rise to an intense emotional situation in which, if the child is punished or disciplined in any way, he feels that he is being treated unfairly. Or, if no disciplinary action develops out of these conflicts, the child often becomes an opportunist, manipulating the stage, so to speak, as a way of getting what he wants. A man, for example, who was having conflict with his wife said, "I like the children, but when they grow up they will forget me. So long as I give them money I am a good idea—they are just like their mother."

Competition between parents for the affections of their children may be said, perhaps, to be a normal situation. In domestic discord cases, however, this competition becomes exaggerated to the extent of producing severe tensions in the emotional life of the child. In some cases the response of the child takes the form of intense egotism, especially in cases in which each parent tries to outdo the other in winning his allegiance. This type of response is probably more characteristic of the only child and of the

youngest child. When there is more than one child, it tends to lead to taking sides and so producing intense conflict and hatred between the children themselves. Or, again, it may lead to feelings of discrimination or to the development of complete emotional dependence upon the parent, which will later block all attempts to have any independent existence. Such situations as the latter often develop into what are sometimes called the Oedipus and Electra complexes, preventing successful marriages, separate interests, or individual development.

In fact, the projection of unsuccessful marriage attitudes upon the child is perhaps one of the most common consequences of domestic discord. It is not unusual, for example, to find a mother persuading a daughter not to marry for fear that she in turn will have the same difficulty with her husband. If the daughter refuses to be dissuaded, she often enters marriage in a highly skeptical frame of mind and finds what she was promised. Or, following the advice of her mother, she later resents the interference and develops attitudes of disillusionment and frustration. Another result of this sort of transfer leads to intense dislike on the part of the child for the other parent, so that contacts with the other parent are avoided. This situation was described by one man as follows: "She poisoned the children's minds against me. Even the youngest one runs away from me."

In extreme cases this dislike for one parent develops to such an extent that the individual becomes sadistic in his attitudes toward all persons of the opposite sex. Outside marriage this often takes the form of encouraging attentions of members of the opposite sex only to place them in embarrassing positions, drop them, or otherwise

torture them. In marriage relations the possibilities of inflicting pain are seized upon at every opportunity. These sadistic tendencies find expression in a variety of ways, such as making the other person feel inferior in the presence of friends by calling attention to his deficiencies; withholding sex relations; mistreatment of the other's favorite child; and so forth.

Another phase of the projection of unsuccessful marriage attitudes upon the child may be seen in cases in which domestic discord appears in successive generations. I have in mind a case, for example, in which conflict between parents continued over a long period of years. Of the four daughters, three are married and having trouble similar to that of their parents. This tendency is further revealed in a large group of cases recently studied in which evidence of domestic discord involving other members of the immediate family was found in 25 per cent of the cases.

It is not unusual in cases of domestic discord to find children losing respect for one or both parents. The effect of this situation upon discipline of the children is obvious, but it also has other far-reaching effects. One mother, for example, in explaining the attitude of the children toward her husband with whom she was having difficulty, said, "The children like him, but they say, 'Mamma, don't worry about your sweetheart. When we grow up, we'll take care of you.' They always call their father, 'Mother's sweetheart.'" Children under these situations often feel that somehow they have been unfortunate in having such parents—they lose their own self-respect and feel inferior to their playmates.

Finally, there is that variety of domestic discord grow-

ing out of the personal disorganization of one or both parents. In many of these situations the child also becomes highly disorganized. He tends to develop the same disorganizing trends as are found in the disorganized parent. It is not unusual, for example, to find a child developing the same neurotic mechanism of escape as exhibited by a parent. This may take the form of complaints of illness, nervousness, fainting spells, and so forth. In other situations, especially those in which one parent feels unfortunate in being unable to achieve his ambitions, these are projected upon the child. And while this occurs in many cases in which domestic discord is not apparent, the drive toward coercing the child to realize unfulfilled ambitions is even greater and more determined when marriage is unsuccessful.

A study of the varieties of effects upon the emotional life of the child produced, at least in part, by domestic discord seems thus to indicate the need for more thorough attention to the family situation, and especially the relations between husband and wife, in the understanding of personality development. This calls for a broader point of view, on the one hand, and for more concentrated attention to the family situation, on the other. It also indicates the need for more attention to the social factors and a skeptical attitude toward the widespread theory of the fixity and specific nature of heredity.

Such an approach would emphasize the rôle of the individual in the group—the first definition of personality being in the family. Many of the maladjustments in personality development have their origin in domestic discord and in the crises involved in adjusting one's self to a rôle in the larger group which is different from that in the

family. All of which re-emphasize the need for establishment of family clinics in which not only cases of domestic discord can be diagnosed and treated, but in which the whole of the relations between parents and children, the relation of the family situation to the development of personality, may be studied and methods worked out for adjusting disorganizing elements in situations. The establishment of such clinics would be as epoch-making in the study of personality development as was Dr. Healy's Psychopathic Institute in the study of juvenile delinquency.

## CREATIVE POSSIBILITIES OF ART FOR CHILDREN

*Edith de Nancrede, University School for Girls and Hull-House*

Anyone who has taught or observed children will, I am sure, agree with me that the desire for artistic creation is in every child. How hard children try to make something! What a sense of achievement they have when they have done so, and, above all, how they love the effort to do so!

In all the years I have taught drawing, I am sure no week has passed when some child has not expressed the longing to have drawing every day and for a long period. This alone would prove the natural love children have for that art, and even more so does the sigh of regret that never fails to go up from the whole room when the bell for the end of the period rings.

But, at least among little children, this love is largely the joy of creation. They all want to "make a picture" of something they love or that interests them. The older child, of fourteen or thereabouts, may choose to draw from the actual object and may enjoy doing so because it wishes to acquire knowledge, but I am sure that most of the joy in drawing is destroyed for the little child if you force it to draw from an object, instead of letting it express its imagination in a creative form.

So I have learned to teach what drawing I can through the medium of the child's own creative impulse. When I say "drawing" I perhaps use the wrong term, for it is my experience that no little child likes working in anything but color. Children, I believe, are especially emotionally sensi-



tive to color. Colors affect their moods. They notice bright-colored clothes. It is most amusing to see how the little boys in my dancing classes run for the little girls with bright-colored dresses, especially if they are red or pink. If I were the mother of a daughter I wished to make socially successful, I think I should always dress her in pink evening gowns!

In the plays, although of course all the children love to have a beautiful costume, it is the boys who enjoy them the most intensely. Does not this point to the fact that boys have less opportunity for this emotional outlet in their daily lives, and that they need such an outlet? I shall never forget the gasp of emotion from two small boys who sat in front of me at an exhibition of the color organ when it suddenly burst into vivid reds and scarlets!

I believe that there is an absolute need for this form of expression in many—indeed, in most children. Almost any child will be happy and “good” if given bright chalks or paints and allowed to make a picture of anything it likes. One has only to observe such a group as gathers daily in the Hull-House art school to be convinced of the value to the child of this form of artistic creation. The room will be crowded with the most nervous, noisy, restless, untrained little children, all busily making pictures with the greatest concentration and enjoyment.

I do not teach drawing in the Hull-House art school myself, but I know that many of their best, most outstanding, and most diligent pupils are the so-called “bad” children. Some of our more intelligent school teachers realize what can be done for a difficult child by giving it such an outlet for its misdirected emotions and energy. Many such have been sent to us and through their interest and pleasure in

an art class, or a dramatic club, have become busy, happy children.

We all know how sensitive little children often are to music, even to the point of weeping if the music is sad, or being made happy because the music is gay. And almost all little children make up little songs and sing them to themselves, and the Hull-House music school has found many children who will make up original pieces with the slightest encouragement. One of my little girls, aged seven, came to me one day and said she had made up the words of a song, a dance, and a piano accompaniment and would like to perform it for her group. "First I'll play it on the piano, and then I'll sing and dance it," said she!

The need of the child for some creative artistic outlet seems to me, then, obvious, and I hope that the day may come when the importance of the arts is recognized by our educators.

I believe that the happiest and "best" children are those who have the fullest emotional outlets through the arts. I base this belief on a long and careful study of certain large groups of children, between three and four hundred in all. For more than twenty-five years I have had under close and continuous observation ten different large groups of mixed boys and girls. Since these groups have been my chief interest for so long, you will perhaps forgive me for using them as an illustration.

Of all the modes of artistic expression, the one with perhaps the most universal appeal is the drama. Most children like music and painting, but I believe *all* children like to act—most grown-ups as well. Certainly we at Hull-House have found no other means so successful in holding

a large group together from childhood, through adolescence, and into maturity.

Our dramatic groups have proved that the drama is of the utmost value in educating and developing the young. I am sure if you could see these groups and compare them with the more transient social groups and classes you would immediately notice the great difference between them. One of the reasons for this difference is their close contact during a number of years with the House and its residents, for the older of these groups has been meeting for eighteen and twenty years, and started when the children were four or five years old.

But the chief reason for this difference, I think, is that these children have more interesting and charming things to think about than the others. One of the most noticeable things about them is that they all look happy. Indeed, I have never known such happy children, and I am convinced that they are happy because they have so many outlets for their creative impulses, for acting is, or ought to be, essentially a creative art.

Every child should be allowed to interpret the character for himself. This is easy for him, as children spend much of their time in "pretending." Some unwise person asked one of my little girls if she was never frightened when she acted. She replied, "Oh, no! I pretend I really am the person."

When I see children stiff or self-conscious on the stage, I am sure that their teacher has either failed to stimulate their imagination so that they can pretend they "are the person," or, what too often happens, has made the children imitate the gestures and expressions. Imitation destroys the power to create.

The need of some means of making life more interesting and beautiful, the need to stimulate the mind and the imagination, is peculiarly felt in a neighborhood such as that of Hull-House. For this reason plays are carefully selected, as often they are the chief intellectual stimulus of the young people once they have left school. Such plays as *Midsummer Night's Dream*, *The Sunken Bell*, and *Prunella*, with their opportunity for beautiful and imaginative settings and lovely incidental music, develop a real appreciation of beauty as well as give opportunity for many different kinds of creative expression.

The dramatic groups are so much concerned for the beauty of their performances that they spend a large amount of time and effort and all the money they take in at their productions upon costumes, scenery, and lighting. Often before a play the work on the stage continues all night, as the older groups as well as their director work all day.

The results of such devotion are that the Hull-House productions are often quite beautiful to look at and the music (performed by pupils of the music school) lovely to listen to. One very delightful development has been made possible through the co-operation of the music school. Several Reinecke and Humperdinck cantatas have been produced, as well as some original operettas with music by Miss Eleanor Smith, the head of the Hull-House music school. By combining the music school, the dramatic clubs, and the rhythmic dancing classes, delightful pantomimes have been achieved; in fact, one of the valuable functions of dramatics is, I think, the uniting of all the arts to produce an artistic whole.

I think that a progressive list of the plays which have

been given by one of our oldest clubs will give a better idea of their development than anything I can say. Beginning with such simple fairy plays as "Puss in Boots" and "Red Riding Hood and the Wolf," the club progressed through *Alice in Wonderland*, *Hansel and Gretel*, *the Blue Bird* by Maeterlinck; *The Sad Shepherd* by Ben Jonson; *Midsummer Night's Dream*, *As You Like It*, *Twelfth Night*, and *The Taming of the Shrew* by Shakespeare; *The Land of Heart's Desire* by Yeats; *The Bourgeois Gentilhomme* by Molière; *The Rivals* by Sheridan; *The Romancers* by Rosset; *Arms and the Man* and *Blanco Posnet* by Shaw; *A Night at an Inn* by Dunsany; *The Green Cockatoo* by Schnitzler; *The Sabine Women* by Andreyeff; *The Sunken Bell* by Hauptmann; *The Mob* by Galsworthy; *What Every Woman Knows* by Barrie; *Anna Christie* by O'Neill; *Prunella* by Housman and Granville Barker, and numerous others.

After observing for some twenty years remarkable results in the form of charming and interesting young people, I am fully convinced that there is no force so powerful as that of the drama in awakening and stimulating interest in intellectual and beautiful things. And to me it has an even greater quality, that of freeing people from inhibitions and repressions.

The drama is like Josephine Preston Peabody's *Piper*—always letting things out of cages. Sometimes, as I watch a young, self-conscious creature expanding and growing under the influence of the inspiring or poetic thoughts he is expressing, the drama appears to me like one of those Eastern magicians who puts a seed into the earth and immediately before one's eyes it sends forth roots, branches, leaves, buds, and opens wide a flower.

I have seen an incredible growth on the Hull-House stage. And it is because of such miracles that to me dramatic work has a fascination far exceeding the fascination of all other work, and I am convinced that those children make the happiest and most successful grown people who have had the fullest opportunity for the expression and development of their emotions through the arts.



## CREATIVE POSSIBILITIES OF ART FOR CHILDREN

*Marie Claussenius, Art Teacher, Chicago Teachers' College  
and Francis W. Parker School*

Even a few years ago such a subject as this one would have brought little response to parent or teacher. In art, skill was the ultimate gain to be attained; therefore form must be mastered. Few children could attain such a standard; consequently it was not a popular subject. Now the standard has changed, and we consider every child a potential artist.

Colonel Parker, a pioneer in progressive education, made an important statement in his book, *Talks on Pedagogics* (p. 260), regarding skill. He says, "The difficulties of technique or skill are very much over-estimated. The reason for this over-rating is that attempts are commonly made to make forms of expression without adequate thought-correspondence." The old-time drawing book with subjects to copy has given way to the free expression of ideas. This freedom has released the creative idea, and the child's true nature has bounded in joyous form. Dr. Cizek's children's art and the more recent art produced by the Mexican children have been a revelation to teachers as well as to artists. A little girl from one of the younger grades came down recently to work after school. A young visiting teacher asked the child, "What are you going to make?"—a question very commonly asked by teachers. The little girl slowly answered, "I do not always know what I am going to make, but when my fingers feel the

clay, something always comes." In this instance the thing that came was a quaint little old lady.

Most children have great expectations with art materials. Teaching has too long permitted the intellectual to govern the feelings; it would be well to let the emotions find outlets that bring joy and satisfaction to the child. Art that is dictated by the teacher lacks the creative feeling entirely. Children can imitate and are often clever at the game, but this is not art. Art must reach an inner consciousness and through self-effort bring forth a worthy production. I can illustrate with an approach to Greek art. Our children in fourth grade study the Greeks. The heroic makes an appeal to children of this age. The beauty-loving Greeks are easily understood by the children. We want them to recognize some of the Greek forms of design. To introduce design to such young children might become merely a technical process; to avoid this we tell the children that the Greeks loved beauty so much that they could make beautiful patterns using straight or curved lines. Then we ask the children if they could make up a lovely pattern. It is like a game to them, and the results always exceed our expectations. The children's response shows great versatility. These designs are then placed on brown paper, shellacked, and cut to use as stencils. The handling of material gives the child much satisfaction. His heart and soul go into the work. After the children have created designs of their own, they are ready to reproduce and better understand some of the Greek patterns, such as the Greek key, the wave design, the grape vine, the egg and dart. It is interesting to note how quickly children will recognize Greek designs in their homes, in stone, tiling, rugs, and on dishes. This approach to the study of

design quickens a child's interest in the life of other people and gives him an understanding of other human beings; he is interested to know why the Greeks had an eye in the prow of their ships and the Norse a dragon head. This desire to learn is a good motive and is an opening to the study of technique. If other peoples could make up patterns and designs, then we can do it, too. This thought helps a child to work with all his mind, and the result is always a creative thing with a feeling for beauty.

In the working out of designs for stencils, we let the children select the best part of their pattern and carbon it so the repetition will be the same. This work can all be done by the child with some direction. A group of five fourth-graders wanted to put Greek designs on some bowls they had turned on the potter's wheel. The bowls were not perfect, but we let the children finish them as perfectly as they were able to do, and then the design was drawn with pencil. There was not time to finish the work during the regular class period, so these children were given permission to work when the older children worked. One tenth-grade girl was amazed with the spirit of these younger ones; not a minute wasted, eagerness to see the underglaze colors mixed with the clay powder, and then with steady hand putting on the design. One boy, who was making a Greek wine jar, said, "This is small for a wine jar but it shows how they looked." His jar was about two and a half inches high. Children love to use materials; the very handling stimulates the creative instinct.

Our fifth-grade children wrote a play on the adventures of Sinbad during their literature period. They wanted to give a puppet show. The making of the puppets, dressing, painting the face were all so delightful. Then came the

manipulation of the strings, seven to a puppet; at no time were the children weary of the work, and it was real labor. The materials were simple, just what we had on hand, paper towels and wet glue to make the hands, feet, and face. The interest has spread to other grades. A sixth-grade boy came day after day to see what we could do for him. It was recommended to him that he think out something from history that had a dramatic incident. He decided, however, that if he chose a subject from history, he would have to stick to the truth. The next day he came with a version of "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves." All this work is done either before or after school. We have a small room next the clayroom which we call our laboratory. The only difficulty is it is too small; however, it provides a place where a child can go and make something if he has time. There is scarcely a period in the day when the room is not occupied with one or more children. One seventh-grade girl comes in every day after her luncheon period. She shows the greatest appreciation for the privilege of coming in to work.

A few days ago a twelve-year-old boy said, "Do not consider this dog finished; I am going to make him as perfect as possible." This attitude we cherish; it is this self-effort and self-criticism that makes for better technique; and this is one of the joys of teaching.

We consider it a good activity for children in fifth grade to cut a linoleum block. Last year it began with boats and ships of all kinds, stimulated by their study of the early explorers. All went well, and we were satisfied with the results, but the real creative work came in later. Having mastered a new technique, these children wanted

more. Every day they came in after school asking for small pieces of linoleum. My helper cut up pieces which she sold to the children for a few cents. The art quality of these small blocks far exceeded those made during the class period. There was a creative feeling there; the children had learned to use a new tool and were glorying in the discovery. In our efforts to have children produce something that will look well, we often lose sight of the real value of creative work; such work should never be judged by an adult standard. We should never separate the child's work from the process of doing or we lose the value of the whole experience. It is well to remember that we are not competing with art that has skill for its basis. The true value of a handmade article always has the human interest as its biggest factor.

The principal of one of our public schools visited our school recently. After seeing some of our children's things she said, "We could do this free work too with a little modification," and then she spoke of the real difficulty. Her teachers liked to have their rooms look orderly, everything in place, and the children in their seats where they belonged; consequently free activities were not popular; seatwork took its place, and quiet reigned in the rooms. This principal hopes to convince her teachers that it is possible for janitors to clean up a mess.

We make beautiful things, not to glorify ourselves but that others may enjoy. We make a puppet show that the school may enjoy a morning exercise. Stencils are cut to beautify the room. There is a need to be satisfied by the child's awakening capacities. It makes a child a better member of the community when he has contributed some-

thing of his own efforts that others may enjoy. The child who has the greatest gift should be the largest contributor or he may think he is superior. Let us watch that our children keep the sweet grace of humility that others may benefit, for then they are on the right road toward true greatness.



## THE TEACHER AND THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF THE CHILD

*Carleton Washburne, Superintendent of Schools, Winnetka, Ill.*

The emotional life of the child is influenced, of course, most of all by the parents; but next to the parents, the most influential factors in a child's emotional life are, in a great majority of cases, the teachers who have him so many hours of the day for many years of his life.

The influence of the teacher is quite truly parental during the earlier stages of his education and to some extent even through his university work. Therefore, the reactions that a child has to his teachers are going to be somewhat similar to the reactions he has to parents. Just as some parents can overstress authority, can overstress domination, so can some teachers; and just as some parents can spoil the child, can love him too much, can form too close an attachment, so can some teachers.

In going over the various cases that the principals and Miss Dummer piled before me when I called for help in preparing this talk, I noticed that the teachers were inclined to fall into various categories. I noticed that it was not unusual to find a teacher who was very good for one child, while that same teacher was quite bad for another child. I think it is probably true that a teacher might be good for a child during one period of his development, and bad for that same child in another period of his development.

One cannot, therefore, make broad generalizations and say such-and-such a person is never a good teacher and an-

other one is always a good teacher. There is, perhaps, occasionally a teacher of that sort, but in general each teacher is good for some children some of the time, and probably very few teachers, indeed, are good for all the children all of the time.

One type of teacher whom we have found in our own work in Winnetka who is likely to be a very favorable sort of candidate, a person one enjoys having on one's faculty, but who, every now and then, is decidedly bad for a child, is the intellectual type. I am thinking of one whom we will call Miss Thompson—a university graduate, a young woman with a wide range of interests, intelligent, energetic, interesting, a delightful person to go out with, a delightful person to talk to, a delightful person in every way, the sort of a person you would expect to be a thoroughly successful teacher.

With much older children, with high-school children, Miss Thompson had proved a successful teacher. Owing to an emergency situation in our schools, we put her in charge of a third-grade group. We found a series of conflicts and difficulties arising. She did not have a genuine understanding of the children; she could not get down into their emotional lives. She would ignore certain types of difficulties; she would be unduly irritated by other types; she would be baffled by the failure of the children to respond to the intellectual approach that was natural to her.

We had a letter from her recently. She has married. She says she now has a ten-month-old baby, and that she hopes through it to be able to understand children. Probably that is just the thing she does need—a close contact with a little growing child.

In her room, while she was with us, there was a little

boy; his name we will call Ronald. Ronald was sitting in one corner, quiet, more or less bored, doing very poor work, doing arithmetic so poorly that the department of educational counsel was called in for help. His other subjects were lagging, and the child himself was irritating the teacher by his indifference and seeming lack of interest in everything.

When we analyzed the case, we found that the youngster had an intelligence quotient of 160. He came from a very stimulating home, a home where he met a good many people who were traveled and people who had a fine, cultural background. Somehow or other, in spite of the intellectual endowment of Miss Thompson, her attempt to get herself down to a third-grade level spoiled the stimulus that she might otherwise have given him. Had she really understood that youngster, she had the sort of brain that might have stimulated him.

We put Ronald into a different room. But just at the time we were going to transfer him, we found that his father was going to Atlantic City. We arranged to have the boy go with him and planned certain arithmetic games that Ronald could play with his father on the way. When I say "we," I mean Miss Dummer. Ronald played games with his father most of the way and came back with a pretty good grasp of the number combinations and other facts that he had not known before. He was stimulated to a new interest in arithmetic.

He went into the room of Miss Anton, a fifth-grade teacher. He was a third-grade boy. Miss Anton is a born teacher. Miss Dummer referred a while ago to the fact that sometimes the mere cultural background of a teacher is not the essential thing. Miss Anton was a Roman Catho-

lic from a Hungarian home. Her English was not perfect by a long shot. Her table manners were such that we were alarmed when she was first invited out to luncheon by one of our parents. We had to tell her how to use her rouge and lipstick more artistically, and in various ways she was not the sort of person one would pick out as being an ideal teacher. But she had the stuff. Down underneath she had a deep understanding of children; she was a person with forcefulness, with real love for her work, and one who handled her children in an objective way.

Her principal describes her as follows: "She thinks cases through; she takes suggestions and gives them. She is not sentimental. She can give complete freedom without losing control. The social work in her room is fine. She gives endlessly of herself."

This teacher received Ronald. He found himself swept into the activities that were going on in the room, into the enterprises in which the children were all making things together. He found the work sufficiently difficult so that it challenged his full ability. He became one of the shining lights of the room. This happened a year ago. That fifth grade is now the sixth, and he will go into the seventh grade with them. He saved himself two years. He had to make up all the work, and he had to use every bit of his intelligence quotient of 160.

Another child that was with Miss Thompson was quite a different case. This child, Edward, came from a home in which he was not getting the affection and the care that he needed. It manifested itself in school by his continually showing off, continually trying to get attention. He was just a nuisance. If the teacher scolded him, that was what he wanted, because it drew attention to him. If she

sent him out of the room, it gave him a chance to make faces and cut up. No matter what the teacher tried doing to him, it still focused attention upon him.

Miss Thompson tried reasoning with the boy, tried talking things over with him, tried showing him the error of his ways, but nothing worked. When Miss Dummer, who is counselor in that building, went into the boy's home, she found that he had a little brother. This little brother had a very serious illness, such that he was quite completely paralyzed, and when the mother went to the telephone to answer it while Miss Dummer was there, she had to take the chair along with her and hold the child in the chair. The family had spent what little means they had to take care of this invalid child. Consequently, the mother had to do all the housework and take care of the children. Little Edward said to his mother not long before the visit of the counselor, "Mother, do you suppose you will ever have time to love me a little?"

He was starved for affection. When we got at the inside of this case, we went to another teacher, one who in her ability was not unlike Miss Anton, a Miss Johnson, who had a very engaging personality, was very pretty, very well dressed, and also had a deep understanding of children. We said to her, "Here is this child. Here is the situation in regard to him. He is starved for affection. He is making a nuisance of himself. He has made so much of a nuisance of himself that there is a conflict between him and the other children. Would you like to take this case on?"

She said she would. She took Edward and mothered him. She did a little judicial spoiling. She went out for walks with him after school, played games with him, talked

to him, giving him chances to get legitimate attention. He blossomed out and the whole problem disappeared.

I must pause for just a moment to give one other example of the intellectual type of teacher. She is also university-bred. We shall call her Miss 'Rose. Miss Rose is a departmental teacher in our junior high school. On the whole, she handles her class work wisely. But in her room was James. James was a silent, thoughtful boy, with pretty sound judgment. He came from a home in which the parents were intelligent, but often disagreed with each other as to the best way to bring him up.

James tended to draw his own conclusions and keep still. In Miss Rose's room he was so undemonstrative, so inexpressive, that Miss Rose became irritated. She found that she could not bring him out, and her attempts to do so were always based on the assumption that there was something perverse about his silence. She thought he was sullen, and he became somewhat sullen under the suspicion of it and under her tendency to nag a little, to be a little irritated, to remonstrate about things that seemed to him perfectly natural. He was transferred in this case to another teacher, Miss Elba, whose personality was of a very different sort. Here is the principal's description of Miss Elba: "She has strong force, the sort of force that picks the boy up and carries him along. She treats the child like an adult friend, because she is really interested in him. She has a happy temperament. She is adaptable."

With that teacher, swept out of himself by her enthusiasm and by her activity, given self-respect because he was treated like an adult, James began to participate. He still doesn't talk a great deal, but he uses his good head and is recognized as an intelligent person with sound judg-



ment. He is becoming a valuable part of the school community.

Passing from the overintellectual type of teacher, we find a type whose ideals are too high, at least too high for some children—for example, Miss Elton. Miss Elton is a supervisor with a great deal of ability, tremendously high ideals as to what a teacher should be, the kind of supervisor that expects the best and usually gets it. She is very stimulating, an excellent teacher, can take hold of a class and demonstrate with it how things should work out; but she is inclined to be impatient, and even sometimes to lose her temper, if a child or a teacher fails to live up to the ideals that she holds of him.

She came in contact with Henry. Henry was a rather dull boy, very slow in his reaction time, from rather a dull parentage. He was scared, inhibited, very reticent, didn't take part in things socially, and generally seemed to be in need of drawing out. He had as his teacher a girl who was herself naturally rather timid, very modest, quite enthusiastic. Her enthusiasm often carried her beyond her timidity, and with the help of the counselor this teacher was gradually drawing Henry out. She finally got him to the point where he was willing to take part in a play. Just as he was impersonating someone in this play, Miss Elton, the supervisor, stepped into the room. She didn't like his impersonation of the part. She didn't know the child, didn't know the case, and she "jumped on him" vigorously. The child was crushed, and from that day on, although that is now a year ago, we have never been able to get him to take active part in any dramatization.

He was in a room this year where the room teacher was ill. The substitute who came in was again a teacher

of high intellect. She was inclined at first to attribute Henry's slowness of reaction to stubbornness. (As a matter of fact, if you offered that boy a piece of candy he would be slow in saying whether he wanted it.) The teacher was irritated. Then the counselor explained the whole situation to her, and she began to allow the youngster plenty of time to think things through, to avoid giving him work that was too difficult, to avoid anything that would frighten him. Instead, she tried quietly to draw him out and let him alone a great deal of the time.

She came to the counselor recently and said, "You know, if you haven't done another good thing this year, you have done wonders for Henry." But the counselor hadn't worked at all with Henry this year. It was the teacher herself. She got the clue from what the counselor had told her. Then she had adjusted her attitude to the needs of the child.

A third type of case is one of the formal teacher, the teacher who is used to the routine kind of school. Miss French is such a teacher. She is a fine person, has good brains, good training, was distinctly successful where she had been before, is as co-operative as she can be, excellent about taking criticism, and all the way round very good, indeed; but she has always been used to children who have sat in straight rows, has been used to teaching the three 'R's' and making that the main job of the day. Being more or less of a formal person, she had no idea of how to handle Johnnie.

Johnnie was a boy who came from an exceedingly unfortunate home, one where the father was a bootlegger and the mother had no use for the boy. She lavished all her affections on a younger sister and was persistently finding

the things that were wrong about Johnnie. Johnnie got beaten up every day before he came to school. He came to school in a vindictive frame of mind.

We were beginning to get hold of Johnnie until he got into Miss French's room. She tried to use formal methods on him, punishments, scolding, "making him behave." That was the sort of thing he was getting at home. That was the sort of thing he resented. Authority made him rebellious. He was therefore transferred to a different teacher, who is described in this way by the principal: "Consistent in teaching, and in the handling of children. Has genuine respect for the children. She is changelessly calm; has the power to throw the children on their own resources. Is secure within herself."

When Johnnie came in contact with her, he found a teacher whom he couldn't upset. He found a teacher who understood him and was willing to work with him, to overlook some things he did that were harmful and not be too disturbed about them. He became much less of a problem. He certainly is not a solved problem, however, for there is no hope of that while he stays in his home.

A fourth type of teacher is that of Miss Ohrmer. She is young, pretty, bright, but a little afraid of herself, a little insecure, is not sure of what to do under various circumstances, is somewhat inexperienced. She has in her room, Walter. Walter is an unstable child, a child who has been actually malicious. He had been disliked by every teacher because he was always doing mean things. He was disliked by other children because he made them cry. He came from an unco-operative home, a rather ignorant home, where we have never succeeded in getting co-operation for his numerous older brothers and sisters.

The teacher tried remonstrances and punishments, but in herself she was afraid of the child. He got under her skin. She realized that she didn't know how to handle him. He was transferred to Miss North. Miss North was calm and unemotional in her requests for the child to behave. She never let him feel that he was "getting" her, that anything he did bothered her.

But that wasn't enough, she had to get the child's interest. In feeling around she found that he was interested in dramatization. He got so much interested in working out the different details that he forgot to be mean to the other youngsters. He wanted to co-operate with them because he was interested in the thing they were interested in. The children were making up a dramatization of Spyri's *Heidi*. When it came time to elect the one to take the part of the Alm Uncle, it was Walter who was elected unanimously to take this main part. This was his first taste of success. The teacher found that she was actually able to like the boy. He certainly needed it.

Before taking up another type, I want to speak of two cases of people who are good for some children and not for others. One is a case of a relatively inexperienced teacher who has the tendency to spoil one youngster in the room. She has too much sympathy and understanding for him and thinks he is cute; consequently he gets away with murder. That same teacher is inclined to dislike a child in her room who has been a nuisance in that school for years. In this particular case her dislike results in ignoring the child, paying little attention to him, and it has done him more good than all the careful affection that was lavished on him last year by an understanding teacher. There we have the interesting example of a fault and

virtue on the part of a teacher which are working the wrong way round. Her virtue in understanding one youngster is spoiling him; her fault in disliking the other is doing him good.

Another instance of a teacher being good for one child and bad for another is that of Miss Suth. She is matter of fact, literal-minded, bright; she gives long, hard work periods; she talks to children as she would to grown people.

Into her room came Dick and Jonathan. Dick is a timid, quiet, sensitive little boy who needs to be drawn out. He found her forceful personality, her adult way of talking to the youngsters, crushing. He was moved into a different room, where the teacher was imaginative, sympathetic, and understanding. She loved him along and he bloomed. He became a valuable member of the class group.

Jonathan, on the other hand, was the baby of his family. Most of the older brothers and sisters looked at him as the cute little fellow in the family. He had a good deal of natural ability, but nobody ever made him use it. In the room of the same Miss Suth he found himself stimulated. He became, instead of a rather spoiled baby and a careless, lazy child, a real worker who has forged ahead. The same teacher thus had a totally different effect upon two different children.

But now, in order to leave you a little time for discussion, let me draw to rather a hasty close. The upshot of all these cases is this: Teachers with different personalities have different effects upon different children. If a teacher is really going to be successful in the handling of children, she must have the right sort of emotional effect upon them. It is one of the most important jobs of the super-



intendent, the principals, and the counselors, to see that the children are placed with teachers who will have the effect upon them that is desirable.

I don't want to imply that there is no better or worse among teachers. There are some teachers who are within themselves confused, not integrated. For example, Miss North has an unhappy home situation. She has been married, separated, and all of her own inner thinking is confused. If you go into the classroom you find the entire classroom disorderly. It is very hard to put your finger on a thing and say, "This is bad," but you have the feeling of nothing being solid in the whole room. You never get beneath the teacher's veneer. Her inner conflicts are such that she is a wrong teacher to be handling children at the present time. Other teachers, on the contrary, are so well poised within themselves that they produce the right sort of emotional reaction in almost every child.

It is our job in the training of teachers to develop them not merely as teachers but as persons; to see that their own personality is an integrated personality; that they have a joy of living, a broad philosophy of life; that each is the sort of person who unconsciously will influence in a desirable way the lives of the children who come in contact with her.

Each teacher needs to be trained, also, in an understanding of the mental hygiene approach to children's problems, in an understanding of what is back of external behavior. A child is misbehaving, is doing poor work in school, is showing off, is doing various kinds of things that are harmful—what is back of it? If the teacher is using the repressive kind of discipline, she will have a bad influence upon the emotional life of the child. If she her-



self is a poised, well-developed person, if she has a joy in her own work that makes it possible for her to find personal satisfaction in it, if she is able to look into the life of each child and to see what is the mainspring back of various kinds of behavior, so that she becomes a diagnostician rather than merely a teacher, then she will be able to do a great deal toward bringing about a sane, balanced, desirable emotional life on the part of the children.



## DINNER MEETING



## CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

*Robert M. Hutchins, President, The University of Chicago*

Before beginning my speech on the needs of the University of Chicago, I have the honor to present Mrs. B. F. Langworthy, of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers; Professor Ernest Mowrer, of the Department of Sociology, Northwestern University; Miss Flora Cooke, director of the Francis W. Parker School; Mrs. William G. Hibbard; Dr. Edmund Jacobson, University of Chicago; Miss Marie Claussenius, Francis W. Parker School; Dr. Paul L. Schroeder, Institute for Juvenile Research; Mr. Carleton Washburne, superintendent of schools, Winnetka; Miss Katherine Blunt, president of Connecticut College; Professor John J. B. Morgan, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University; Mr. Frederick Woodward, Big Chief of the University of Chicago; Professor Floyd H. Allport, Syracuse University; Mr. E. C. Lindeman, professor of social philosophy, New York School of Social Work; Dr. Milton C. Winternitz, dean of the Yale School of Medicine; Maude Phelps Hutchins, sculptor; Dr. William Marston, of New York; Mrs. Alfred Alschuler; Mr. Horace M. Kallen, New School for Social Research; Dr. Jessie Taft, Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania; Dr. Otto Rank; Mrs. Cornelia Stratton Parker; Dr. Benjamin C. Gruenberg; Mrs. Otto Rank; Dr. George J. Mohr; Miss Lydia Roberts, University of Chicago; Dr. Louis Leon Thurstone, University of Chicago; Dr. Mary Lee, University of Chicago.

My own task tonight, though far less difficult than that

of my predecessors at the earlier meetings of this association, is complicated enough. The thought of standing up here to address so discriminating an audience on so abstruse a topic as the emotional life of the child fills me naturally with awe, bewilderment, and alarm. But what would have been my predicament if, like Mr. Woodward, I had had to preside over a meeting devoted to the subject of "Building Character," and what should I have done if, like Mr. Mason, I had to preside over a meeting devoted to the topic, "Intelligent Parenthood"? I have never been very long on character; I could not be a university president if I were. I must admit that any claims I might have to be an intelligent parent have vanished before the almost daily assertions of the University Co-operative Nursery School that I am one of the most unintelligent parents they have ever had the pleasure of dealing with.

The steady descent of this association from the lofty plane of character down through intelligence to the lower levels of emotion is very fortunate for me, and yet I recognize very few topics on this program to which I could make any contribution. It is true that I was once a child, and the press has raised grave doubts as to whether even now I am anything else.

I suppose that as a child I had an emotional life, but nothing on the program of these meetings suggests anything that I can recall in infancy, except possibly Dr. Carlson's paper on "Hunger and Appetite." My emotions centered, as I remember them, almost entirely about the dinner table, and I am happy to learn that those of so distinguished a scientist as Dr. Carlson did too.

Nor can I feel that my position as a father entitles me to the privilege of addressing you on this occasion, for



the coldest, most calculating, most unemotional child that I have ever had the misfortune to meet is my own four-year-old daughter. Although I have devoted myself from her earliest hours to trying to arouse in her feelings of affection and sentiments of regard, I find that I have never been able to down that penetrating intelligence which she inherited directly from me.

On her mother's birthday last month, I asked my daughter what she was going to give her mother for a present, and without a moment's hesitation she replied, "I am going to give her a new daddy."

I must therefore pass from a personal to an official capacity and consider very briefly the position of a university in the movement of which you are a part. The representation of my own institution on your program raises the question as to how the University can run when all these people are downtown talking to you, and the representation of other universities indicate that scholars all over the country are participating in and respecting your program, and this is as it should be.

A university is an organization devoted to training people and to finding out things. It naturally has a considerable interest in the kind of people it will have to train, and this association is likely to make a very important contribution to the character of those individuals whom it will be our fortune or misfortune to deal with in the future, and it may be that under the aegis of this association we may learn a little something about how we might train the individuals with whom we have to deal. Furthermore, this association, even though it may not carry on research or at least be as well equipped to carry on research as a university, is a clearing-house and, if I may mix my meta-

phors, a channel: a clearing-house for the results of researches and a channel for their distribution, and this, of course, no university can be.

Universities are exhibiting at the present time one tendency above all others, and that is the tendency to pool their resources for the study of human life. At Yale, an institution in Connecticut, this tendency has taken the form of an institute with this express aim, and this institute is a direct result of the energy, imagination, and intelligence of our first speaker. Emerging from the Johns Hopkins University, a child full of emotional life at the age of eighteen, he entered its Medical School, and from twenty-two to thirty-two was a member of its medical faculty. At thirty-five he became the dean of the Yale Medical School, and the history of that institution since that time is one of the most spectacular chapters in American education. Every important advancement that Yale has made in education since 1920 is the result of the example or the initiative of the medical school, and the unique feature of the medical development at New Haven has been that it has been under the leadership of a man who is willing to think of the university as a whole and not alone of his own section of it. Dr. Winternitz even used to associate with the dean of the Law School, and from this condescension on his part I have admiration for him that has grown with the years. Not only as a great educator of vision and accomplishment, but also as the father of five remarkable children, he comes to shed upon us the illumination of his experience and his intelligence, and I am proud to present to you my old and dear friend, Dr. Winternitz.

## SCIENTIFIC PARENTHOOD

*Milton C. Winternitz, M.D., Member of the Institute of  
Human Relations, Yale University*

After having listened to this splendid eulogy I have only two regrets. The first is that neither the members of my family nor the administrative officers of the University are present to hear it. The second is that I did not have the opportunity of introducing the chairman. He was the flower of the flock. Both through achievement and promise of further conquest he was indeed an outstanding figure in the large group of extraordinarily capable men that composed the faculties of the university he formerly graced. Now you will agree, I feel sure, that he conforms all too well to that well-known definition of a college president—"a pillar of brass by day, and a pillar of gas by night."

And this is night, so I am in a quandary. There is nothing I can say that our presiding officer cannot say better. Indeed, when your chairman so kindly asked me to participate on this occasion with Mr. Hutchins presiding, the story of the two oysters in the soup immediately came to my mind. The smaller oyster whispered to the larger, "Where are we?" "In the soup," replied the larger. "Where is the soup?" inquired the smaller. "At a church festival," was the response. "Well," said the first, "if we are in the soup at a church festival, why are we both here?"

After studying your program this query still remains dominant in my thoughts, and I have come to the conclusion that your interest in the effort Mr. Hutchins and

I have made together to pierce the almost impenetrable barriers between university disciplines is the reason for my presence on this occasion. These disciplines, dealing with various aspects of science and art, have come to be regarded more and more as separate entities. This tendency has been a handicap in our attempt to attain greater understanding. Unorthodox in our views, and even more annoying in the methodology of putting them into practice, we attacked the more or less monastic seclusion of schools and departments and directed our efforts toward instituting a co-operative enterprise designed to co-ordinate related activities, to the end that each division might become more effective and consequently serve the world better.

The bearing of such a movement upon scientific parenthood is of course obvious. Much information is available concerning the selection of parents—how to be a parent, when to be a parent, and how to behave as a parent. Some of this information has been culled from the laboratory, some from the library, and some is factual knowledge acquired from accurate observation of life as it is conditioned by environmental influences in the world today. It is our desire to avail ourselves of all of these avenues of approach so that we may carry away to the melting pot of practicality anything, irrespective of its source or origin, that will aid us in leading individually and collectively, as children or as parent, more satisfied and more useful lives.

Of the uninitiated—and I belong to this group—the question may well be asked: Why is there so much interest in child study, parent education, mental hygiene, and the sundry other more or less scientific aspects of the problems of society? Is this an indication of the seriousness of contemporary questions involving children and parents, or is

it rather an outlet for the excess of energy we enjoy because modern machinery has relieved us of so much time-consuming labor? Let us take a broad view of the happenings of recent decades.

Some in this great assembly can recall the days when the horse was an important means of transportation. Others have witnessed the advent of the steam car; more, the traction and electric car; practically all, the automobile. When I was in Chicago as a student in 1904 I was surprised at the number of self-propelled carriages that sunned themselves in Jackson Park on high days and holidays. And now there is the aeroplane.

Think what such changes in our communication methods have meant from the standpoint of time. Things that required hours, days, weeks, even months for accomplishment are now done in ever diminishing fractions of time. Consider further our miraculously improved methods of personal communication. First the telegraph, then the telephone, and finally wireless communication have been perfected; and now devices have been made to carry not only sound but form and color too. The latter inventions are still in the throes of development, so that they represent luxuries even to our sophisticated and grasping age. We walk into our temperature-regulated offices and houses; with wall buttons we control light equally well by day or by night, for purposes not only of illumination but also of therapy. We have great refrigerating storehouses at our disposal where the perishable food products from every corner of the country, and further too, are at hand, converting the old diet of mid-winter to one of spring or summer—and so on ad infinitum. Important as these few examples are, they form only a tithe of the great changes



in life brought about by the unparalleled advances in science and their application to modern life. We accept all these mechanisms, and are all but unconscious of the change they have wrought and are constantly effecting in our every act. Yet we are almost entirely, if not completely, ignorant of the basic and even the applied knowledge that has made them possible. Perhaps machinery is more our master than our slave. If the car one is driving suddenly stops, all but an invisible minority stop with it. If the telephone on our desk is temporarily disabled and we must walk a block or two for an interview or a purchase, our day is virtually ruined.

But there is another side. All of these devices cost money and all of us, simian as we are, want them. All of them must be made, too, and this requires labor and creates occupations whereby others may attain the resources to indulge their tastes. Far from being a scarcity of hands and brains to supply these modern necessities, there is an overabundance. For the machine has robbed millions of the labor previously necessary for a much simpler life and has only supplied required occupation for a fraction of this army. So there is an ever increasing group of men and women driven into the luxury-producing group—a group that is unquestionably parasitic to no inconsiderable extent. For example, 10 per cent less farmers supply 20 per cent more produce than was available two decades ago. One steam shovel replaces fifty men, and so on. Furthermore, the freedom from erstwhile domestic responsibilities has liberated a horde of women so that they enter the world of science, business, and luxury production in competition with men, and share more or less alike in the earning and spending of the family income, in performing the



housekeeping tasks which grow lighter day by day, and in consuming the cigarettes on the side table next to the divan.

Much as I should like to indulge further in picturing the dramatic transitions which have taken place in society, a halt must be called and we must return to our primary thesis—the causes of our constantly growing interest in problems that have always confronted society, and our accentuation of their importance at present. I say “causes” advisedly, for the etiology is not simple and cannot be laid at any one door. In the old days—and there are still places in the United States where these conditions exist—there was little time or opportunity for reflection or correction of such phases of these problems as then existed. Everyone was busy fulfilling the obligations facing father, mother, and child, so that they might successfully withstand the elements, have food and raiment, a modicum of education, simple pleasure, and intercourse with a limited group of fellow men. Go back to your summer farm with your family, cut off your telephone, abandon your motor car, disconnect your electric pumps and heaters, and spend the year raising your own food products, making your own fabrics, keeping your place in repair, and see how much time there will be to worry about Willie’s thumb-sucking if he has time to indulge himself between chores, Mary’s depression over lack of social opportunity, father’s or mother’s club life, or your own introspection.

What a contrast: today villages remain small, cities are growing. Individual houses are available only for a few. “Bigger and better apartment houses” is the watchword of the realtor. There is nothing for the child to contribute to the family need, and much less than ever before for

the lady-mother to do, supplanted as she is by labor-saving machines, the apartment restaurant, the club and public dining-room, to say nothing of the food counters of the atrophied pharmacy and the indispensable five- and ten-cent store. And daddy is in the same fix. Saturday night's envelope, or the more impressive pay check, or in the last analysis a well-balanced bank account, represents his contribution. So mother and father must indulge in the many avocations, follies, and extravagances crowded in their path and rendered almost irresistible by the multicolored advertisements and brochures prepared by the propagandists. Among the wares which become an outlet for the parent, denuded of more useful activities and wholly unprepared to enter on the great and important field of social stabilization, are those of educators, uplifters, and numberless social organizations.

A curious antithesis arises. The desire for possession is taking a more prominent place in the consciousness of the parents as their separation from the children increases.

This possessive feeling seems to find expression in forcing upon the child ever more attention and routine. "My child shall have all of the 'opportunities' I can give him." Finally the child finds himself scheduled, guided, and protected by nursemaid, teacher, and tutor every waking hour, with only fleeting glimpses of his parents.

It may not be wholly undesirable to replace the parents and grandparents by employees in the care of the child. That depends entirely upon the individuals concerned and the only important consideration is that the initiative or personality of the child should be stimulated, whoever takes care of him. Much earlier, in the first months of life perhaps, youngsters develop distinct negativism to suggestion,

and the failure to recognize this often leads to character traits incompatible with the attainment which the natural endowment should have made possible. I learned my own lesson in this particular with my oldest child. Negativism, of course, is not confined to infants and children. It has its expression, psychologically and physiologically, in the inhibiting effect of weak stimuli—a phenomenon not entirely understood but extremely important in the comprehension of human nature.

Fortunately, the principle of latitude of expression for the child is being widely recognized. More and more are the child's inherent interests and abilities being fostered and its aptitudes considered and nurtured. There is a constantly accumulating mass of evidence for the further evaluation of the child's abilities so that it may meet the multifaceted opportunities present-day life offers. We owe much to the small group of professionals who have done so much to improve primary education. Unfortunately, the tendency which has grown so prominent in our lower schools grows less strong in the higher-grade school years and disappears completely or nearly so in later formal education. The cry, education for everybody, not only in the grade school but also in the college level, is not without grave dangers—dangers, indeed, as great as those inherent in child labor. Abuse of child labor crushes the child physically; abuse of education crushes him mentally—and one process may be fully as disastrous as the other. We are unprepared to educate the great droves of humanity that throng our institutions today. There has not been time to finance these institutions or to develop the teaching personnel and facilities. And so the education of the children is being conducted according to an inadequate

system. In the language of Mr. Larned, the slogan of the country is: "Save your coupons and get a diploma." Without this certification of erudition more and more difficulty is being experienced in acquiring the white-collar job necessary for sustaining our luxurious tastes.

But this is not my text, and it is necessary to say a more optimistic word concerning the grist from these great mills of education. Universities have multiplied prodigiously and have fractionated themselves along many lines as the content of knowledge in one or another field has increased. It is unfair to criticize adversely a development which has been essential for the increment of knowledge. But like hidden ice floes in the stream, these fractions may endanger our progress if they become individually too cumbersome and are not made more useful to the world they should serve.

The information at hand concerning the problem you have set for me—scientific parenthood—with its implications, is without doubt far greater than any of us would surmise; but it has never been collected and reduced to a terminology understandable by any but the specialists, and even then requires time for dissemination and more time for psychic adjustment of individuals and groups to its implications for practical utilization. For example, to be a parent requires the selection of a mate. Animal husbandry, genealogy, genetics, and a host of other disciplines have furnished basic principles for breeding with the qualifications of the product clearly as the objective. Yet man, in this great democracy, demands the inalienable right to choose his mate blindfolded to knowledge and experience; and divorce courts, reformatories, delinquent schools, and homes for the feeble-minded are the measure

of the success of this freedom. Lack of freedom of choice in the selection of a mate is not necessarily disastrous. Some of you can perhaps remember the good old days when parents sent messages to their children in the teens, "Come home, you are engaged." And other well-known restrictions concerning marriage may be cited. The principle of selection is dependent upon other than biological considerations, and it is not suggested that they are always wise, but marriage on the whole is not less felicitous because of them. If restrictions can be exercised on faulty premises, surely the youth of today will see merit in restriction based upon more fundamental information than they now possess.

How to be a parent! Every school child is alleged to know this, but does he? Is the crude fact and near fact, assimilated God knows how, sufficient with which to launch the individual into life? My thoughts revert to that somewhat overdrawn but most interesting exposition of the lilies and the bluebirds in a humorous book called *Is Sex Necessary?* Surely we are sufficiently emancipated from the prudery of the Victorian era to discuss freely and honestly the fundamental phenomena associated with the propagation of the species. Surely we must not leave our children in ignorance that may result in unhappiness, extending even into remote generations. They are entitled to information as brief and concise as compatible with a general understanding of the structure and function of the human body in health and in disease. The scientist and the physician should have no such vested interest in this sector of knowledge that a broad dissemination of facts is impossible. It is the unrecognized responsibility of educational institutions and their scientific personnel to take cogni-



zance of the need of such information and to prepare it in a form assimilable by the average individual in any walk of life.

How to be a parent is primarily a biological question. When to be a parent involves many other considerations, not least among which in the world today are sociological problems such as are involved in the economic status of the participants and their progress in the particular vocations they have chosen. There are a host of other factors both in this problem and in the query how to behave as a parent, involving in each of these two instances as well as in the two foregoing ones, man as a biological organism, man as a psychological organism, and man as a social organism. Progress of the kind you desire, knowledge such as your program indicates you are seeking, will come more and more from the co-ordination of the available facts derived from these three great branches of learning and the almost innumerable subdivisions included within each of them.

The danger of applying to the child too arduously any one aspect of scientific knowledge, without due regard for the nature of the child, as a whole, is only too evident. You all certainly have heard of Bartholomew Benjamin Bunting, who it is said "would swallow with never a gurgle what an ostrich would fail to digest," and of the extensive experiments carried on in comparative nutrition. These have led to the knowledge that animals—pigs, for example—will thrive better on the cafeteria plan than on any prescribed and carefully allocated diet. And why? Probably because even pigs are individuals, and "what is food for the goose may be poison for the gander." So if even pigs dietarily considered are individuals, then why not give the



man-child every opportunity for self-expression and development, as a rational as well as an alimentary being? I have tried, or rather am trying this, and so far every indication points to the conclusion that my children have more inherent intelligence than I have—which after this exposition, even without knowing them, you will say is self-evident.

To return now to our problem, which you will remark I avoid for obvious reasons as much as possible. The question of scientific parenthood is important, of course, but at the moment it is exaggerated on account of the period in the evolution of society which we are gracing—or disgracing. It must be approached as you are attempting to approach it, but your success is dependent upon quite fundamental changes in the viewpoint of the factories of knowledge, and the creation of assembling plants in these factories which will not only keep the different divisions informed of the practical problems their world is facing, but also attempt to bring from each of these divisions that grain of information essential for the understanding of the whole; and further to simplify the knowledge at hand so that it will become incorporable in the educational program of the coming generations, not only for the enlightenment of the student, but for the vitalization of education itself.

In many places this idea is manifesting itself—and this is fortunate. Were it an isolated program in one or another institution, it would probably fail, for great movements most often result from the recognition of needs of the time, and these become so pressing before they force themselves upon human consciousness that it is unlikely they would be perceived by only a single individual. In-

tegration, co-operation, the child in its totality, child study, parent education, human behavior, human relations, and many other terms are being met more and more frequently in the programs of educational institutions, in the discussions of learned and social groups, and in the public press. Certainly it is a goal of the University of Chicago, whose chief executive is our presiding officer; and it is to him that we at Yale are indebted for the broadening concept that expanded the projected institute of human behavior to that of the Institute of Human Relations. The Institute will be the activating agent of the human welfare group—a term coined to include all those activities in the university which may be utilized in furthering the common objective, namely, to bring every resource to bear upon vital problems so that men may lead richer, more satisfied, and more useful lives.

How can an organization such as the Institute of Human Relations further the objectives of such a study group as this represents? In the first instance, the group must come to realize the changed conditions of life which have created a much larger leisure class with time for the consideration of pressing social problems. It must realize that these problems have become more complicated because of this very leisure as well as through the greatly increased opportunities for social contact.

Second, the great increment of knowledge has definitely narrowed the perspective of the student and the scholar, so that the detailed information he has acquired in a restricted field is overemphasized. He has not stopped to take cognizance of similar achievements in related branches of knowledge. He has built up a technical nomenclature and has come to regard his field as an end in itself rather

than a means to an end. He is consequently in no position to transmit his highly specialized information to others, and when he does respond to the demands of society and attempt to accomplish this the result is inevitably an over-evaluation of a single aspect, due in part to the scientist's lack of orientation and in part to the lack of preparation of the recipients.

It is the purpose of the Institute of Human Relations to foster co-operative investigation; to orient each discipline in the problems of the others, for the very purpose this organization of yours has in mind; so to associate biological, psychological, and sociological knowledge in the attack on pressing problems of the day that each discipline will not only positively aid the other but will also serve as a check in the overemphasis of one or another facet. It will aim to train educators, sociologists, psychologists, and biologists; also doctors, lawyers, ministers, and business men and women in the larger social fields in which biology, sociology, and psychology all play a rôle. It will attempt to make knowledge in these fields available in the education of the child—the parent of the future—in order that the future parent will approach the great social questions more intelligently than is possible for us of the older generation in the brief span at our disposal.

## THE PARENTS' DILEMMA

*Eduard C. Lindeman, Professor of Social Philosophy,  
New York School of Social Work*

It is, I presume, my rôle on this program to place our discussions dealing with the emotional life of the child within a philosophical context. Many of you, who have been listening to learned specialists during these days, have, no doubt, reached the stage represented by the young lady who, after finishing the reading of a pamphlet on Professor Einstein's theory of relativity, exclaimed, "I understood all of the words and none of the sentences!" It is the business of philosophy, presumably, to deal with sentences rather than words, wholes rather than parts. But it is also the task of philosophy to ask pertinent questions, to stimulate fresh inquiries, and it is the latter function which I should wish to perform with respect to the present theme.

There is, I presume, a sense in which it may be said that adults can never enjoy complete understanding of the child. Children and grown-ups live on two planes of consciousness, upon two levels of experience. The child, for example, conceives and perceives his environment quite differently from the adult; even though both exist within the context of an environment which may be superficially the same, there is a vast difference in the manner of reaction toward these surrounding elements. Parents, for example, often wish their children to behave as though they possessed a "property sense," but this is precisely

what the child cannot do;<sup>1</sup> none of the child's need for security is consciously related to property, whereas the parents' very status may be property-based. Very often those features of the environment toward which adults behave most earnestly are the exact ones which evoke humor in the child. This may be embarrassing to the adults, and may even be interpreted by them as insubordination on the part of children, but is, as a matter of fact, a plain necessity derived from the two planes of experience. Understanding, then, consists of an attempt to distinguish between child and adult meanings.

## I

May I begin my inquiry by suggesting a generalized premise, namely: *There can be no such entity as the "emotional life of a child" except as considered in the light of the emotional qualities of adults, particularly parents, who constitute the main conditioning environment for the life of younger children.* If this premise contains truth, the real problem becomes the emotional life of child-parent. But it is at this very point that the parents' dilemma begins. The specialist, let us assume, recommends spinach as a part of the child's diet, believing, perhaps, that an adequately nourished body is a good in itself, but doubly good if one believes that the emotions will be correspondingly more wholesome if health is achieved. (A recent announcement by a leading New York specialist asserts that there is no authentic reason why any child should

<sup>1</sup>The child may, of course, be induced to form this attitude, or to simulate it, and, in a society in which property is a paramount value, considerable effort will be expended by parents and mentors to develop this adult attitude in children.

ever eat spinach. Here is a fair-sized dilemma in itself, namely, the lack of constancy among specialists.) Our examination should lead us to inquire at this point, What happens to the expert's advice when precipitated in a situation which is never child or parent, but always parent-child? The answer is patent in the current "spinach complex" which has gripped the nation. (One might write a history of the emotional life of American families with spinach as the pattern-forming element!) The general theory which evolves when expertness and experience are considered in relation to each other is this: Specialized knowledge derived from controlled laboratory research should, somehow, be resolved with ordinary experience in such manner as to expedite the former and illuminate the latter. Expertness, that is, should lead to efficiency and learning. Certainly, it should not lead to conflict, to emotional upset.

Parents, then, need to learn how to blend scientific with empirical knowledge; the laboratory and the family must be brought into harmonious working relationship. Family experience, however, is conditioned primarily by adults, that is, those adults who are parents and those who constitute the chief social controls in the community. The first approach toward an understanding of, and solution for, the parents' dilemma becomes, then, an analysis of adult experience.

Obviously, much of the so-called "emotional life of the child" is to be found in the emotional confusion of adults. A considerable portion of this concern, or overconcern, for the emotional life of children may also be traced to child specialists. A child specialist may, of course, be a perfectly normal person, but there are grounds for believing



that many of this new profession are individuals seeking an adjustment for unsatisfactory childhood or adulthood. Such a person, attempting to be a parent by proxy, may function more effectively than the natural parent, but there remains the misgiving that many child specialists have not thoroughly acquainted themselves with the character and quality of their own experience. And, certainly, much of the present preoccupation of the American adult with the problems of children may be explained in terms of the bankruptcy of adult life. When life is dull, drab, and unadventurous, we either place our hope and faith in the past or the future. Much of the confidence which contemporary parents place in the future of their children may be due to the fact that they have lost faith and assurance concerning the life they lead in the present.

Specialists must, of course, increase; there is no other method for the increase of scientific knowledge. But a large part of the parents' dilemma derives from the fact that specialists see this or that aspect of reality but never the whole. Expertness comes from specialization. But experience is a whole; we do not live one moment psychologically, the next economically, the next sociologically, etc. Experience comes in clusters. It should be the task of the educator to synthesize special aspects of knowledge in such manner as to bring learning into harmony with living. If parents are to be properly educated, we shall have need of many specialists, but we shall always require many educators, persons who will be skilled in the process of "stepping down" the scientific facts of the laboratory so that these will fit the generalized experience of family situations. But something more than "stepping down"

is wanted, namely, educators who will see family experience as the stimulating environment from which a lively educational incentive may proceed.

## II

With your indulgence,<sup>2</sup> I now proceed to another query which, in one sense at least, constitutes an abrupt departure. This conference has been attended by persons who, presumably, wish to be classified as devotees of so-called "progressive education." (The term "progressive education" may be defined for present purposes as the antithesis of orthodox, or conventional, education; its underlying assumption is that learning should proceed from the child's rather than the adult's nexus of interest.) The question which I wish to raise is this: Is there any likelihood that progressive education may be preparing children for a world which does not exist? The query may be reversed and stated affirmatively: All the progressive education potential in private and public schools will be fruitless unless we are at the same time engaged in creating a progressive world. I have purposely included the phrase, "at the same time," in the foregoing sentence because it seems to me to be a short-sighted view to expect children, even progressively schooled children, to alter the social system when all of their maturing adjustments must, perforce, be made in terms of adult controls. If the world, the so-

<sup>2</sup>The exigencies of public speaking, especially when the occasion is a largely attended dinner, often call for quick adjustments; in the present instance, my prepared notes provided for a logical development from the first to the second part, and included several points here omitted. It seemed, at the moment, more important to merge with the mood already created by previous remarks than to adhere to a preconceived outline.

ciety, in which children are to accommodate themselves as adults represents a denial of every principle of progressive education, the net result will be disillusionment, not progress.

In many schemes for progressive education, there persists a certain claim for naturalism. (This is, no doubt, a survival from the educational philosophy of that consummate romanticist, Rousseau.) To what extent is life in the modern world naturalistic? Is it not obvious that the world grows more and more artificial? Does not an industrialized, mechanized, urbanized society imply that adjustment is not to be found through a return to a naturalistic world? Consider for a moment the relation between naturalism and contemporary housing. The older, naturalistic conception of dwelling remains in our minds, or may be recalled by that universally learned poem which begins:

I remember, I remember  
The house where I was born  
And the little window where the sun  
Came peeping in at morn, etc.

Mr. Stephen Leacock, a humorist whose ideas are so frequently penetrating, suggests that this verse should now be re-written to suit the contemporary fact and mood. His version runs:

I wish I could remember  
The house where I was born  
And the little window where perhaps  
The sun peeped in at morn.  
But father can't remember  
And mother can't recall  
Where they lived in that December—  
If it was a house at all.

It may have been a boarding-house  
Or a family hotel,  
A flat or a tenement;  
It's very hard to tell.

There's only one thing certain from my questioning as yet,  
Wherever I was born, it was a matter of regret.

There is, of course, no reason why naturalistic phenomena may not be utilized as objects of learning, but the point to be made is that we need to adjust ourselves to a world which becomes increasingly technological. Even our contacts with other persons tend to become secondary, and our social life must be carried on within a context of artificial arrangements. Why, in such a world, should children, for example, spend hours learning to make fire by rubbing two sticks of wood together? Especially in a country which is presumed to be farthest advanced technologically?

The world in which we live tends to become collectivized.<sup>3</sup> Individuals who stand alone tend to become non-functional personalities. Even teachers, actors, and artists need to be organized. Recently I discovered a man in a medium-sized southern city who was a member of thirty-three separate organizations, and since then one of my students has discovered a man organized in thirty-five different ways, and an editor of one of our national weeklies has written to tell me of a New Yorker who actually sustains membership in forty-five groups. Industrialists frequently deny the truth of this situation and make claims

<sup>3</sup>Professor Dewey prefers the word "corporate," since collectivism has been so long associated with a conscious mode of co-operative conduct. But it seems to me that the term "corporate" also conveys a too restricted meaning.

on behalf of individual leadership. But, even in industry, leadership has become composite. Where great leaders stand forth, they have been made by expert publicity agents; industry itself calls for group control.

Progressive educators continue to lay emphasis upon the individual organism, the individual child, and the individual learner. This is, from one point of view, justified, since the mass methods of our public institutions certainly do harm to individual personalities. But it is a partial emphasis. In the modern world, wherever there is individual responsibility, there is also social responsibility. Speculators on the stock exchange may behave as if they were individuals, but the consequences of their conduct reflect upon the whole nation. The chairman of a committee, and how much of our lives is now spent in committee meetings, may preside but, if the constituent members do not learn the methods of group behavior, he will do more than preside; he will become the "boss," the dictator. Perhaps the most difficult of all adjustments in the future will be those emanating from our complex social interrelationships. Certainly, we are now witnesses of the lack of such adjustment in both national and international affairs. I, therefore, plead with vigor for a conception and a practice of progressive education which will equip students for the realities of social, as well as individual, living.





# ADJUSTMENTS IN EMOTIONAL LIFE



## THE LOVE LIFE OF THE CHILD

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In selecting a title for what I had to talk about this morning I felt a great deal of hesitation in using the word "love." I have no doubt that many of you will think it a silly word to use, especially in connection with the behavior of a child. Some others who are addicted to Freudianism may think that we are going to talk exclusively about the erotic excitement that accompanies some types of love. Altogether, the word "love" is one that requires a very careful definition, because so many different meanings have been advanced for it.

With regard to children, some people think, or tend to think, that children haven't any love, that a child is just one animated appetite. On the other hand, the psychoanalysts, some of them, would have us believe that even when a child is hungry and calls for his bottle or cookie, or whatever he may want at the moment, his desire for food really represents a suppressed love wish. I do not subscribe to either of those extremes in defining love.

To start with, because of this confusion in ordinary usage of the word, I think we might review very briefly the definitions of love as advanced by the behaviorists, the psychoanalysts, and by different types of psychologists.

All three of the schools of thinkers whom I have mentioned agree in calling love an emotion. But then we come back to the question: What is an emotion? The psychoanalysts, as you know, refer all human behavior ultimately to the libido. The exact nature of the libido is unknown.

Apparently, however, the libido consists of an innermost urge to self-expression. According to Freud, the libido is 100 per cent sex. The strivings of the libido therefore, are all love strivings in their ultimate analysis. All emotions are not love emotions, however, by any means, though love in one form or another is the most pleasant human emotion and the emotion most sought after by the entire human race. Love, therefore, according to the Freudians is really a state of consciousness which somehow accompanies successful self-expression of the libido.

Behaviorists say that emotion is simply a complex reaction of the viscera.] Why they select the viscera, I do not know. Both psychologists and biologists, for some reason, have seemed to delight in glorifying the visceral organs of the human being by identifying emotion with those reactions. We can trace the reasons for that in the history of psychology, which we haven't time to do at the present occasion. At the moment, suffice it to say that I, personally, believe there is no reason whatever for identifying the viscera with emotion any more than identifying the nose, the eyes, or any other part of the body. Nevertheless, that is what the behaviorists do. The behaviorists deny the existence of consciousness altogether. If you are talking to John Watson, for instance, the leader of the behavioristic school, and you ask him a question which includes the word "consciousness," he will say, "I don't know what you are talking about. I am so very sorry, I should like to answer that question, but I can't do it. Consciousness, I do not understand. If you will talk about visceral reactions, or word reactions, or verbal reactions or something else, I will be able to answer you. But really I can't talk about

consciousness." So, then, the denial of consciousness is really a sort of religious precept with the behaviorists.

The love emotion, according to Watson, is a behavior reaction, such as a baby makes to his mother or his nurse. The child holds out his arms, laughs, makes a movement of pseudowithdrawal. When he is tickled, instead of making a genuine effort to get away, he will withdraw his hand a little way and then hold it out again, a sort of play at withdrawal. These responses, together with the accompanying changes in the child's internal organs, constitute the emotion of love; the visceral part of it is the emotional love, and the bodily behavior that accompanies it is something else; what, Watson does not say, but behavior of one sort or another is love. It is quite hard for some people to think that. You have to get yourself in the frame of mind in which you eliminate the word "consciousness" from your vocabulary and then think that just what you do when you see a good-looking girl, for instance, or what a child does when it sees its mother, without saying anything or without being conscious of anything, is love.

Most psychologists will define love as a state of emotional consciousness which has a certain peculiar quality commonly recognized in everyday experience. Some psychologists who believe in instincts would say love emotion accompanies the sex instinct, the parental instinct, and possibly to a certain extent the gregarious instinct. Other psychologists would probably say that love is an emotional response to certain types of stimuli, such as persons of opposite sex, mother, family, or intimate friends. All of which really tells us very little about love, except what everybody knew before from his own personal experience.

Nevertheless, if we analyze all these different definitions

of love, we find certain ideas common to them all. First, we find that love is thought of as an unlearned, spontaneous reaction, something which human beings experience because they are made in such a way as to feel love whether they want to or not. Second, we discover that love is a much broader term than sex, and includes emotions of kindness and affection aroused in us by people who apparently feel the same way toward ourselves.

My own idea of an emotion is this: Whenever a person takes any definite attitude toward a given object or toward another person, a corresponding emotion is generated in the motor centers of the brain. Thus, if you assume a destructive, antagonistic attitude toward another person, you will simultaneously experience an emotion of dominance, or possibly hatred. If, on the other hand, you take an attitude of true friendliness and generosity toward any individual, you will experience automatically an emotion of love, or one of its minor variations. It is necessary at this point to distinguish sharply between the attitudes which it is natural to take toward inanimate things and the attitudes it is natural to take toward people. So long as we recognize that a given object is really inanimate, it becomes quite impossible to assume toward that object an attitude of partnership, altruism, or real alliance. If you think that out, you will see that even with your adult experience and associations, and the ability which you have acquired to manipulate your own thoughts, you cannot make yourself feel generous toward an object, you cannot make yourself feel a spontaneous emotion of love toward a thing. And if we cannot assume such an attitude of alliance toward inanimate things, then we cannot feel love toward them. Things are fundamentally different from ourselves. They cannot vol-



untarily take a friendly allied attitude toward ourselves. Things cannot love us; therefore we can never naturally love things. We must always assume an attitude of opposition or antagonism toward inanimate objects if we wish to use them or make them serve our own purposes. We cannot induce or persuade them to serve our ends.

If inanimate things appear weaker than ourselves, we try to dominate them and we experience simultaneously a feeling which I call the primary emotion of dominance. It is really the emotional experience of being stronger than our antagonist. Dominance is the strongest and most primitive of human emotions, it accompanies all aggressiveness and self-assertion, and I have taken some pains to look up all words which have been used in literature and in science as the equivalent of this dominance. You will find quite a list of them.

If the object appears stronger than ourselves, we comply with it and experience the primary emotion of compliance, as with a railroad train, for instance. We do not stop to argue with the engine; we get off the track.

Suppose, on the other hand, the stimulus is not a thing but a person. If the person is friendly, allied, and loving, we respond in kind by taking an attitude of alliance; simultaneously we feel, perhaps in a mild degree, an emotion of the love type, only it may be simpler, it may be so simple an emotion that we cannot legitimately call it love. We experience inducement feeling toward the person if he seems weaker than ourselves, or if it seems to us that he can be persuaded to follow our leadership or our suggestions. We feel an attitude of alliance with him but of superiority to him, a feeling which translates itself rather well, I think, in the word inducement, an urge to induce

that person to follow our leadership. I regard inducement as a primary reaction or a primary emotion.

If, on the other hand, the individual seems stronger than ourselves and still we feel friendly and in close alliance with him, we feel a wish or an urge to submit ourselves to that individual's direction, and that is the emotion or the primary response of submission. This response or emotion of submission is the one which is most suppressed and most mutilated in everyday life. The submission experience which we have in the world as it is becomes largely disguised and perverted with compliance. Submission is distinctly at a discount in our modern civilization. If you submit to anybody you have to disguise it in some way in order to retain your self-respect and the respect of those about you. That is a very curious development of a civilization which is not built on love but on appetite.

These are two primary emotions, inducement and submission, which together in various combinations make the compound emotion of love, so that you can see my definition of love is rather specific. Any emotions which are compounded of these two elements, inducement and submission, are included in my definition of love emotion. It includes the erotic emotion of sex, emphasized by the Freudians; it includes the friendly emotions that we feel toward our intimates, the affection which we feel toward our family, the feelings which children have naturally toward their parents, and the parental love which parents have toward their children.

Just as a little side line to find out what people really think love is, I asked somewhere between fifty and sixty people in Hollywood about a year ago what they understood by the word "love." I haven't time to give you all

the very interesting essays which they wrote and spoke in reply to my question; neither do I dare to give you some of the definitions. They were, I assure you, very amusing, and they revealed the fact that people think about love a great deal more than we imagine from their ordinary repressions.

Some of the would-be humorists said that love was a disease, some said that love was heaven, some said it was the opposite, and one motion-picture star gave a definition which, after all, contains an important point. She said that love was the one thing she could not do without and go on living. If you think that over, there is a great deal of truth in it.

Beginning with childhood, love seems just as necessary a type of experience, and a stimulus to love seems just as necessary to the childish organism as appetite, physical or otherwise. It is a curious fact that babies brought up in institutions, no matter how efficient, where they do not have the direct care and constant attention of a mother or someone who loves them very much in the same way that a mother does love a child, have a very high mortality rate. In other words, there are a great many deaths, comparatively, among children who do not have mother-love (or its equivalent). This rate, curiously, seems to be higher, so far as statistics are available, than the mortality rate among children even of the poorer classes who have a mother's love, care, and attention, or its equivalent. That indicates that love treatment or attention is an essential even to life itself with the child, a fact which perhaps the "hard-boiled" people of the world find it difficult to accept.

There are various explanations of this which I cannot very well go into, because they are complicated and techni-

cal. It appears, however, that hormones, chemicals probably from the endocrine glands and possibly from other parts of the organism, create a balance of nervous activity in the child's brain which requires a certain amount of petting or love stimulation to maintain. As you know, the erogenous zone in childhood is very much greater than the specialized love-sensitive zones or sex-sensitive zones in adult life. It includes the lips, which naturally receive stimulation at the mother's breast at the same time the child gets its nourishment, the palms of the hands, the soles of the feet, the thighs, and possibly part of the child's abdomen, and the neck and behind the ears; in fact, it is rather difficult to find a part of the child's body which will not respond to this type of stimulation, indicating again that the receptors, the natural apparatus which seeks love in the child, are very sensitive.

Children from birth should, in my opinion and as a result of my study of cases, be taught to differentiate very clearly between people and things. The two different ways of responding should not be mixed, especially in the early years of a child's life. Later, as one of your speakers last night at the banquet emphasized, those two different ways of responding can and must be put together into a unified life, but at first I think there is no greater confusion in the child's mind or brain than the confusion between things and people. He tends to respond in the same way to both. He loves his doll or his toys, he pets them, he expects them to be animate like himself and to respond, and, on the other hand, he tries to dominate people and compel them to serve his purposes as our chairman emphasized at the beginning of this session.

The selfish or appetitive treatment of things is the

proper treatment, the proper attitude toward things, and consists of various combinations of the elements of dominance and compliance. The child, to my mind, should be taught that if he wishes to use things for his own benefit (and he should use them for his own benefit), he must learn first to comply with them and then dominate them. There is no use trying, as I have said before, to induce or persuade a thing to do what you want it to do. You have to compel it to do what you want it to do, and that seems to be the law of nature. The thing is there to be compelled to serve the human purpose. On the other hand, this dominant attitude, this method of appetitive treatment, should be kept entirely out of the child's behavior toward people. He should be taught to treat people altruistically, to take a love attitude toward them, to try to win his toy or whatever he wants by saying please and by taking an attitude of asking for it in a friendly way. This is very difficult, of course, during the first eighteen months of a child's life; until he learns to talk and to understand words, it is pretty difficult to stimulate him in such a way that he can learn this attitude of friendly submission to people instead of the dominant attitude which he naturally adopts before he gets the other. Nevertheless, a good foundation can be built up during the first eighteen months of life upon which later the proper treatment of people can be based.

The mother most frequently errs, in my experience, in allowing the child to dominate her to get its food, its toys, and whatever else it asks for, by means of making itself disagreeable. The chairman of this meeting has already emphasized that point, that the mother should restrain herself from conceding what the child wants until



the child treats the mother as a human being and not as a thing. Everybody who has had a baby in the house knows that the howl of a hungry child is one of the hardest things to resist, not from reasons of altruism, no matter whether it is your own child or not, but simply because it is such an infernally unpleasant noise that you will do almost anything to stop it. Later in life the child begins to use the same technique in demanding his toys and other things that he wants. He learns that if he can make himself disagreeable enough people will give him what he wants in order to get rid of the unpleasantness which he is able to cause them. If you let a child learn that way of responding, that way of treating people, you are training him ultimately to be a criminal. He may not get the whole way toward the criminal state of mind or emotion, but he is bound to get a good way toward it; for, after all, a criminal is simply a person who does not treat other human beings ultimately as human beings but treats them as things. The gunman with his gun at your head or your heart—you people here in Chicago ought to know the proper technique, I am not up on it—or whatever the approved method of hold-up is, the threat of that gun or the knife or the club that the criminal holds over you is used to dominate you, to make not giving him your money or your watch so unpleasant that you give it to him to get rid of the threatened destruction. That is simply treating people with dominance.

I have personally studied cases of professional criminals in which that method of treating people could be traced very clearly back to childhood. In such cases the mother habitually gave the boy everything he wanted when he made himself disagreeable enough, and later, perhaps, an indulgent sister, nurse, or aunt continued that sort of treat-



ment. Before long the boy got in a condition in which he really thought, he really felt that the way to get things from people was to dominate them. He had been actually taught to make himself disagreeable in order to get anything he wanted.

The mother should show, of course, that she is superior in strength to the child, but she should always keep the fact clear in the child's mind that she is in alliance with him, that she is friendly, she is doing this thing, whatever it may be, for his own interest, his own good. If the mother is too harsh with the child, if she dominates him, she gets into another set of difficulties. Those are the difficulties with which you are all familiar. I am sure you have studied them repeatedly in your classes, the fears which are engendered by harsh treatment of children, the gradual attitude of withdrawal from people, pre-dementia praecox conditions, and so on. Those can all be started very readily by treating the child too harshly and breaking its spirit, breaking its dominance with a superior dominance on the part of the mother or the trainer. That has to be avoided. But personally I do not subscribe to the theory that a child should never be made to suffer pain or discomfort on the proper occasion and under the proper conditions.

I think that if a child has developed, when you get him for analysis or training, the method of getting things from people by dominating them, one of the simplest and most effective methods of teaching him what that means is to hurt him a little every time he deliberately hurts somebody else. Of course no punishment should be given when he hurts another person by accident, or mistakenly, or without understanding what he is doing; but whenever he does it deliberately if he is hurt a little that teaches him

very readily just what he is doing, particularly after the child is three or four years old and you can explain it to him.

That should always be done, however, in my own opinion, with the mother still maintaining the attitude of love toward the child; that is, she should not express by the way she hurts him irritation, anger, rage, or dominance on her own part. She should hurt him in a manner that is gentle and considerate. That seems like something of a paradox, but at the same time that is the complex effect on the child which you have to get. You have to get the double effect of remaining in alliance with the child, and doing something antagonistic to him. You must show the child that you do not hate him, that you are not angry with him, that you are not dominating him. At the same time you must also show him, by actual experience, that the thing he has been doing, the way he has been treating you or another child results in pain which is very unpleasant. How is a child to realize the pain he causes other people by treating them dominantly unless you teach him the actual results of his dominant actions? He cannot know this intuitively. Of course, I do not need to say that the child should not be hurt sufficiently to cause emotional shock or to injure him physically. That goes without saying.

With some children the threshold of compliance, that is, learning the lesson that I have just been talking about, is extremely difficult. In one case which I studied, the child paid no attention whatever to his mother. His mother would go out and call him, and the child would be in the middle of a group of children. The mother would say, "Edgar, Edgar," and the child would speak up from the

middle of the group, "Edgar is not here." He wasted no effort at all in running away from his mother; he had no feeling that she was superior to him in any way. To make a long story short, the father came down and took charge of the child for about two weeks, and he began the old-fashioned fatherly method of using the stick on the child. For a long time the child resisted that also; that is, his dominance was stronger than his father's. The father was not able, of course, to keep a friendly attitude toward the child. The father showed rage, and that slowed up the process of learning in the child; so the whole affair became a contest between the child's emotional strength and that of his father. After a while, the father actually injured the child's shoulder by beating him with a stick about as big as your wrist, and that broke the child's dominance. After that, however, he did not feel very friendly toward his father.

That, of course, is an extreme case. The child should never have been allowed to get into such an overdominant condition in the first place, and, having gotten him into that condition, a method should have been devised for teaching him the proper reaction toward people without injuring him or without making him feel that the trainer was unfriendly.

There is not quite so much danger in teaching, or allowing children to learn, to act with love toward things as there is in allowing them to learn to act toward people with dominance. Loving things is something that we New Englanders (I came from New England originally; I have tried to forget it, but here it comes out again) are very prone to do. A thing, a familiar heirloom, an old house, an old barn, even an old pump, or any old thing around the

place becomes an object of sentiment, and many people really love that thing, which is, from any rational point of view, ridiculous. Yet it is an error which adults, nearly all adults, fall into at one time or another. It doesn't do any good to love the thing, it doesn't do you any good, it doesn't do the thing any good, it is not a useful response in any way; it simply represents a transfer of a feeling which once was felt toward a person or a set of people, a transfer of that feeling to an inanimate object. That may be useful in religion and some other special activities, as a stimulus to make you feel the same way every time you look at the idol or the image or the book or whatever it may be, but in ordinary everyday life it is merely a waste of time.

In one case, that I had recently, it is worse than that. I had a man who was literally starving to death in New York City. This man, by the way, was a very well-known Broadwayite, a man who, at his height of success, earned several hundred thousand dollars a year. As with many people in the theatrical profession, hard luck had hit him and he was down. He had about \$3,000 or \$4,000 worth of jewels which were family heirlooms. This fellow allowed himself to be thrown out of his hotel and threatened with arrest. They actually sent a policeman to pick him up one day, but he managed to see him coming. He went without proper food for more than two months rather than sell those family jewels. Why? Simply because he felt toward the jewels as he should have felt only toward people. It is worth while, therefore, to say that the child should be trained to regard things as things and not to cultivate love sentiments about them.

The most important point of all, assuming that the child has been taught to treat people as people, with love responses, and to treat things as things, with dominant responses, assuming that that has been done, the most difficult and important thing remains still to be accomplished. That is to teach the child that love reactions to people should always control his dominant reaction toward things. This, with some children, if you do not get them at a very early age, I admit to be impossible. The whole world is based on a theory, that is, the civilized world, of using love for appetite. You cultivate the right sort of friends in order to get your project financed, you go to the right church or the right club or what not in order to make valuable connections, you marry possibly a person who has money (of course it never is admittedly because the person has money, but "it does make things easier"), and so on. The whole world is built pretty much on the primitive or really destructive theory that love may legitimately be used for appetite. That, biologically and psychologically, I believe to be absolutely wrong. I believe it is impossible, from the result of my studies, not from any moral reason, to attain happiness or a well-balanced life unless the love responses are completely in control of the appetitive responses. In other words, no one can attain complete psychological normality unless people are more important to him than things, and unless he treats things as they should be treated and people as they should be treated. Teaching the child that love should control appetite is really getting back to nature. Children and adults both care more, naturally, for the opinion of others about them than they do for anything else in the world (except, possibly, when they are in the midst of violent hunger pangs, a condition which the civilized adult

organism seldom gets into because food is always so readily obtainable). It is, as I say, a primitive, and psychologically destructive, condition in which hunger is so pressing, so vital, and overwhelms the organism to such an extent that love is relegated to the background and used only to serve hunger.

The development we are evolving toward, a real hope, a real peace, a real freedom from war and from destructive battling, is the condition in which the love responses of people toward other people always control their dominant responses toward things. In such a normal state of development, we should never use love for the sake of appetite. That condition, I do not need to say, has not been reached.

Appetite controlling love leads ultimately to prostitution, crookedness of all kinds, deception, treachery, and all the other well-known methods of using other people for our own self-enlargement, without letting them know we are using them until it is too late for them to prevent it. That is the easy path from the gold-digger's point of view, or the person who professionally uses love for appetite. It minimizes the resistance; you do not have to be disagreeable about it. A chorus girl can take a thousand dollars away from a "sugar daddy," or whatever the victim may be called, and have the "sugar daddy" very happy about it until he finds out that whatever apparent love there was, on the girl's part, was simply a tool to serve her greed. Love loses all its appeal when its appetitive use is discovered.

The temptation to misuse love in this way starts in early childhood. The child who has been taught the right way to treat human beings discovers that it is easier to get what he wants from his parents by being nice, and submissive, and persuasive than it is by demanding the thing or by stealing



it. The chairman also emphasized this, for which I am grateful to him. I shall not need to repeat.

I believe that the "original sin" which used to be taught by the Christian religion, and which is taught by many of the current religions of the world, is simply the misuse of love for appetite or self-enlargement. I am not going into this because, after all, we are not engaged in a discussion of religion. But in studying the child, I have found that the sudden awareness that love should control appetite forms a basis for religious experience in the child's nature. You will find that the consciousness of redemption from sin, which can be easily induced in adolescents, results from just once getting the emotional feeling that love for other people controls him completely and that he no longer loves people or, at that moment, he does not love people for what they can give him. That is the consciousness which is known as "coming through," or "being redeemed," or by various similar religious terms.

Because love is used so frequently and so habitually for appetite, the Western world has come to take the attitude that love is something bad, something to be suppressed, something to be talked about behind the hand or in corners, that it is dirty. Frequently you hear the term in everyday conversation, "a dirty story," and all that is meant by it is simply a story about some erotic experience. Of course, sometimes jokes thus referred to are literally dirty, but that is another matter. The association between dirt, between something evil and despicable, and love, I think, has come about because of the malicious use of love in criminal activities, in prostitution, and so on. Because love can be used for appetite, however, does not make love itself evil. Quite the opposite. And so this Western defense attitude of sup-

pressing love, of inhibiting it, of making it impolite and something only to be whispered about has grown up, as I see it, on a foundation of faulty logic. It is just as though society forbade the use of water to bathe in, because a certain number of people are drowned in the ocean every year.

Love, including erotic love, is the purest, the most wholesome, the most uplifting influence in society. Without it we would not have any family, we would not have any civilization, we would not have any living together in groups at all.

Various rationalizations are offered for the suppression of the teaching of love. The suppression of that is a great deal like the English attitude toward psychology up until about, say, 1900. The English church bitterly opposed the study of psychology. Why? Because they said the soul was something sacred and something that should not be investigated, that could not be investigated, in fact. That is the plea that some people make for the suppression of love study and teaching. They say that love is a sacred thing, that it is a wholly ultimate thing, that it is not of the world, but above it, that you have to go to heaven to find love, or that you have to love somebody in heaven and not on earth to understand it. To study it in all its physical relations, to take it up systematically the way you learn to eat, demeans love and renders it somehow impure, according to these opponents of love education. That is the justification which Western civilization offers for the suppressing of love training. I do not think I need to say that that is ridiculous.

The result of this Western suppression of love (I say Western because this particular form of love repression has its height in the Christian civilizations of the Occident) is

the fundamental conflict which Freud and the psychoanalysts point out so effectively between the libido, or the love strivings, and the environment which suppresses those strivings.

We had a very interesting paper yesterday by Dr. Bronner, in which she mentioned the apparent absence of these love conflicts in the girls of Samoa, and the almost invariable appearance of conflicts in adolescent girls and boys of our Western civilization. The woman who studied the Samoan girls reported that these girls had no conflicts of the sort emphasized by Freud, and while there are many ingenious and possibly contributory explanations of this fact, the fundamental one seems to me to be that in Samoa and the South Sea Islands they indulge in physical love with the utmost freedom. Adolescence is devoted very largely to training both girls and boys in physical love, and there is no suppression. Therefore, naturally, there is no conflict between environment and the love strivings. This is an end which we cannot jump to immediately, because no matter how free we are about talking of love at home and training the child at home in love, he will go out into the neighborhood, or the school, or into some new environment, and will find there that love is associated with the malicious, vicious use of love, for appetitive pleasure. Under the influence of such environment, he may gradually come to use the very thing you have taught him for a destructive purpose, unless you can continue to control him. Therefore, this matter of training children in love responses has to be done very carefully and with a great deal of common sense and judgment.

Nevertheless, it is my opinion that there is no reason in the world why a child should not be trained in the use of

love, the physical use of love and the emotional use of love, and the real nature of love. Above all, he should be trained into the attitude that love always must control appetite.

In a practical way, one of the chief situations which trains a child in the wrong use of love for appetite is this: the child has to look to its parents for support. Particularly if the people are wealthy, the child quickly learns that by being submissive and sweet to his mother or his father he can get everything he wants. He then finds that he can take that money and go out and buy other people and use them for his pleasure in one way or another. That is a great misfortune of wealth, and we have had cases, I think, here in Chicago, and I know I have studied several in New York, where most extraordinarily horrible results followed from exactly that sort of training.

A practical way of overcoming that, which is comparatively simple, is to train the child in this thought: that he does not get his appetitive rewards, his pleasure, or his money supply by virtue of loving his father or his mother. It is fine to love them, but he must be shown that that is not what wins him his money. He can be taught that the only way to get money is to do dominant work, to do appetitive work, and that the money is the reward of the work and not the reward of his submission and his love toward his parents. That is not a new thought by any means. A great many rich but sensible parents for generations have been putting their children to work simply to teach them, as they say, "the value of money." But without knowing it, they have taught them thus a far greater lesson, and that is that money is attained by dominant work, that the only way to get money is to dominate things, to do work for it. People who work for money soon realize that they do not

get their money or their rewards by virtue of their love for the people who give it to them.

To fit children for society, for ultimate mating, and the rearing of families, children and adolescents certainly must have a careful love training; that is, they must not only be taught the lessons that I have already indicated, which are really the foundations of normal life and morals, but many other things besides. They must be taught the different kinds of love, the use of erotic love, the limitation of that to the proper situations, and the relationship between the sexes that is most effective for erotic love. I am sure I may speak as frankly as though I were in a medical gathering; the child should be taught that erotic emotion, erotic stimulation, is actually good for his general emotional organization, but that the constant release of that emotion in the sexual orgasm is destructive, that it breaks down not only the benefit of the accumulated erotic emotion itself, but that it also injures other parts of his body. Training the erotic emotion to respond only to the proper stimulus, and training the adolescent to check the release of that emotion in improper ways, such as masturbation, culminating in sexual orgasm, are very important love lessons. They enable the individual to retain a sufficient body of erotic emotion to serve as a nucleus for his love life throughout his experience in the world outside the family.

In conclusion, I should like to make a plea, a very strong plea, if I had the eloquence, for the installation of courses in love training and the relation of love to life in high schools and the higher grades of secondary schools, and especially in colleges and universities. I should like to see research funds devoted to this, which seems to me the fundamental issue of civilization, the only thing that will ever make us want not to go to war.

## THE PARENT'S RELATION TO THE PROBLEM OF ADJUSTMENT

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Whatever the responsibility of the parent for the personality and behavior of his child, whether he be called to account by school, court, social worker, or child guidance clinic, there is this to be said in his behalf: everyone else concerned with the child may, so to speak, "go home at night," the parent has to live with the problem. For him there can be no vacation. The picture of the untrained, failing, unhappy, or delinquent child is ever before him and ever a source of reproach whether or not he admits it. Moreover he is, directly or indirectly, the target at which the child is aiming.

It is much easier for us who give advice to others about their children, to take the difficulties which the child presents calmly, because unless we have put ourselves too personally into solving the problem we are removed from the immediate pain and pressure which the parent must endure. Indeed, it is fortunate for him that we are, irritating as he may find our seemingly complacent aloofness. At bottom he knows that it will not help matters to have as adviser, another emotionally biased individual like himself. What he most needs is a mind at his service freed from personal entanglements and emotions as far as his situation is concerned, and yet it goes hard with anyone to accept the objectivity and coolness of the person who doesn't have to



care. Sometimes it is all the parent can do to refrain from saying, "Well, how would you feel if your child were doing these things to you?" Not to feel himself misunderstood or accused when his part in the situation is pointed out, though ever so gently. The parent is necessarily threatened, attacked by the child's undesirable behavior, if not by his personality, and comes to the psychologist, psychiatrist, or social worker to be saved. The crux of the matter lies in the way in which he comes, what his underlying attitude is, whether he is there seeking for a more effective weapon for applying pressure to the child, or whether he comes in real humility, ready to seek and take help in seeing himself and his child more clearly.

As long as we are faced with markedly disturbing behavior, with symptoms, the pressure exerted by the child on his environment is so great that it is almost impossible to divert the attention of parent, teacher, or neighbor from the immediate necessity of self-preservation. Such behavior can't be borne, must somehow be stopped. There was a period in psychiatry and child guidance which is certainly not yet past in numerous individual cases, when the consultant himself was all but lost in his sense of obligation to do something practical and immediate. Like the parent, his state of mind was one of determination to give good advice which should put an end to objectionable symptoms. In working with a delinquent child on an analytic basis some time ago, I found myself quite in the position of the parent when, as might be expected, the child's pattern of stealing was turned on me. I realized, as perhaps I needed to, just how difficult it is not to approach behavior directly, on the basis of one's own impulse to stop it.

The parent who is so much more identified with his own

child than the psychologist with this patient, and is so exposed both practically and emotionally to anything the child may do, may surely be forgiven if he presents first of all his determination to change behavior or to have the psychologist effect a change immediately where he has failed over a long period. At this point the consultant feels himself subjected to pressure also, pressure from the anxious or angry parent who wants something done. It takes a good deal of strength, conviction, and real understanding of the parent's situation to hold out against that pressure without self-defense or irritation until the parent realizes for himself that there is no remedy to be handed out, that behavior is only symptomatic, that if one form is forcibly or mechanically repressed another, perhaps even less desirable, takes its place. For the progressive parent today, as for the child guidance consultant, this shifting of focus from behavior to its meaning in the emotional life of the child is quite taken for granted. Both agree that there must be some inner release, some developmental process which shall result naturally in a giving up of the old pattern.

It is at this point that progress has slowed down in social work as perhaps in child guidance itself. We have achieved, and many parents with us, a fineness of perception with regard to children's behavior, an appreciation of how it functions in the child's economy, of its developmental history, and even of the part played by the parent in bringing it about which is far beyond anything dreamed of ten years ago, but treatment is still more or less blind. We are in the position of being embarrassed by our riches, so much knowledge, and so little therapeutic use of it. The parent, too, may be none the happier for having grown

more self-conscious, more responsible. He sees what the behavior means, he sees that he is as much at fault as the child; his guilt only increases his misery. It would have been better perhaps not to know, to be able to project discomfort in anger at the child or at the psychologist who is so futile in his attempts to help.

We find ourselves in the anomalous position of understanding at least in part why the child does as he does and of desiring him to be and do otherwise; how to connect the two dynamically is our, as yet, unsolved problem; how to make understanding a means of control.

Perhaps the *impasse* in which we find ourselves is real; perhaps it is a warning that we are on the wrong track and must look elsewhere or in a different way for our solution. Do we after all want to live in a world where we have the power to control human behavior from the outside by understanding or any other means? If for a moment we think that is what we want, we have only to reverse the statement of the process and see. Do we want to live in a world where anyone else, be he parent or psychiatrist, can determine even by virtue of superior insight what we shall become or how we shall behave? Could *we* bear to be the subjects of psychological manipulation however skilful? We may perhaps be glad to have someone struggle for our salvation, but we also want to be quite free to see that he does not accomplish his purpose; in other words, we must be free to resist any effort set up in our behalf, to will it otherwise.

The dilemma into which we have been thrown is serious, cutting deep into all of our habitual attitudes toward children. Either we are in the position of having transferred our determination to change behavior into an equally strong

determination to change the child himself for his own good by methods yet to be discovered, or we are forced to acknowledge that we are powerless to produce change of an organic developmental nature in any other human being, be it child or adult; that the change which we call growth is self-determined and that our only field of direct endeavor lies within the limits of our own ego structure.

Personally I am convinced that the first horn of the dilemma is one upon which the majority of us have unwittingly fallen and that so long as we remain impaled that long will progress toward treatment of behavior or personality problems be held up. The point I wish to stress is the impossibility of being determined in relation to the development of another human being, even one's own child. The technique which is subtle and skilful enough for that purpose will never be evolved. One may decide that certain forms of behavior, like certain tendencies to ill health, shall cease and within limits may even be able by force to prevent them, but once we admit that back of behavior lies the self, that living powerful organization of impulses, feelings, patterns which we see partially expressed in some particular bit of behavior, and which will continue to put itself out in similar fashion in spite of our efforts, it becomes evident that no determination save that of the individual himself can be genuinely effective. If there is anything in experience which ought to be plain to those of us who undertake to work with other human beings, it is the fact that one cannot will for another, cannot force one's own solution upon anybody else. Yet so deep is our need to control this problem of human behavior somewhere, if not in ourselves, that we find psychiatrist, parent, social worker, all trying to find some technique fine enough to

make the child will to be good, in other words, as we wish him to be. Hence the popularity of the conditioned reflex approach, and all the myriad tests, and training devices through which we vainly seek to short cut the painful process of changing the ego's organization and behavior patterns.

But, you say, does this mean that nothing can be done, that all of our attempts to interpret behavior, to educate parent and teacher to a better understanding of children are for nothing? I am obliged to answer "yes" if by "nothing" you mean the giving up of psychological insight, as a weapon for enforcing reform. The parent cannot hope to *control* his child's growth process even by understanding. He is fortunate indeed if he *contributes* to it as positively as possible; for as long as the parent, or the teacher, or the psychologist concentrates upon a determination to alter the behavior or personality, though his motive be the salvation of the child as he sees it, as long as his attempt to understand is only for the sake of pulling the wires as he conceives they should be pulled, so long may the determination of the child defeat him and in that battle of wills escape responsibility for himself.

Can anything be done about it? Yes, I think so, although I admit it is not easy and not always welcome because it places the problem where it is even more painful although more possible of solution, in the self of the adult most immediately concerned and in the child's inherent capacity for readjustment when the parent's change of attitude alters the relationship in which his behavior has been functioning. This advantage of this redistribution of the problem lies in the fact that responsibility is delimited and placed where it can actually be assumed.

We have hitherto been asking the parent to undertake an impossible task, that is, to feel himself responsible for his child's personality development, as well as for his overt behavior. This does two things: first, it implies that one person can be responsible for another, which is true only within the narrowest limits, thus directing the attention of the parent away from his own problem, which he alone can solve, and fixing it upon the child's, in which he is comparatively impotent; second, it makes of an organism, which, however young, is still living, powerful, and unique, a mere puppet whose strings are to be pulled by the adults around as if the child had no will of his own, no original patterns which express his way of meeting life and in terms of which he is going to work out his own adjustment, regardless of his parents' efforts to improve him, or perhaps thwarted and diverted by them.

I do not mean that nothing touches him. He is responding, reacting, changing all the time within the relationship which his particular parents make possible; but he is not just response, he is not determined solely by them. He is also an individual with his own way of meeting life. His brothers and sisters in the same situation will make quite different responses.

Treatment, then, from the viewpoint of the parents' contribution would consist largely of two changes in attitude, one of which may be found to depend on the other; first, a realization of the own personal problem as quite apart from the child's and a willingness to struggle with it there, instead of trying to project its solution in terms of effort expended on the child's behavior; second, a yielding to the child's difference, to his necessity to work things out his own way, and a consequent removal of the pressure to



make him other than he is, since in any case that is impossible. In other words, paradoxical as it may seem, the first vital step in any treatment process, for therapist as well as for parent, is the willingness to accept the other as he is, to bear him unimproved, and to set no norms which he can spend his energy in resisting. That this must be sincere, emotionally real, goes without saying. It cannot be a screen, for a predetermined goal, however remote. Hence the difficulty of working out treatment practically of which I am keenly aware.

Let us take, for example, a case of enuresis prolonged to the fourth year in a boy of unusual physique and intelligence. He is a powerful, able youngster who is adequate in every situation. His mother and father are the finest types of modern-educated, consciously functioning parents. There is surely no fault to be found with the way in which they have taken on the job of parenthood. Every training device known to the nursery school and guidance clinic, every mental hygiene precept has been taken to heart and intelligently utilized. The boy still wets his bed. This is a great cross to parents who are really superior in the raising of a family. Others who are far less conscientious have children far less remarkable whose beds are always dry. You can see that it will not be an easy, superficial step for these parents to admit defeat, to be willing to accept their child with the enuresis, if need be. Yet only when they can bring themselves to bear a child of theirs who wets the bed and may continue to do so will there be a new factor introduced into the dynamics of this situation which may result in a redistribution of energy on the part of the boy. I say "may" — for even so, cure cannot be guaranteed. All one can say is that with the sincere

willingness on the part of the parents to accept the boy and his enuresis as long as he has to have it, there is the possibility that, freed from the need to get the better of his parents, he may no longer have use for this particular weapon, and may work out new behavior for himself which will have positive value. It is not possible here to refer to the different values which enuresis may have for children. In this case, it is probably largely a protest against too effective parents. It is the one way to exert a control which cannot be denied, to express a will strong enough to stop enuresis or to continue it indefinitely. Our only hope here is to give no excuse for resistance, to admit the child's power, and leave him to fight through his own problem in a more positive fashion. That the parents cannot do this on a rational basis, I quite realize. There has to be an emotional realization which effects a profound change in their relationship to the child. If you ask how this happens, I can only say that sometimes it does out of the actual struggle with the child and a growing awareness of its futility. Sometimes it takes a third person, like the child guidance consultant, whose attitude has in it the same acceptance and understanding of the parent that the parent wishes to acquire for the child. It is through this experience of acceptance of himself as he is, that the parent may in turn be more able to accept his child. In other words, it is within the dynamics of a relationship that profound changes take place.

By acceptance I do not wish to imply approval any more than disapproval. The parent may accept, may understand, and finally come to bear that which gives him pain and which he cannot approve for his child. The child guidance consultant is in a far better position to accept the

parent because there is no cause for him to be personally hurt by anything the parent may do. He can afford to understand and accept regardless of whether he himself would sanction the behavior or personality before him. He is there to see the parent truly in his negative as well as his positive aspects, to put no pressure upon him as to how he shall work out his problem, but to help him to see what he is trying to do and where it is leading.

Perhaps another illustration will show you what is involved for the parent in separating his problem from the child's, and by putting it within himself instead of in the child, perhaps coming to an acceptance of the child's difficulty and a tolerance which will stand by while the child works it out for himself as far as possible.

A woman came to consult me about her middle child who, she said, was not doing well at school and had many irritating ways, such as extreme slowness in every task, hesitation in speech, lack of effort at school, and a habit of wetting her drawers a little every day. She spoke with great pride of her oldest girl, so quick, so brilliant, so everything that her mother admired, but added that the oldest was cruel in her treatment of the less clever, slower moving sister. As she talked, her enjoyment of the older child's conquest of the younger became more and more apparent, and when I asked her why she couldn't bear her second daughter, she answered frankly, "Because she is everything that I dislike and despise." It is surely of no use to say to this woman, "You ought to love your second child, or you ought not worship the oldest." She knows that herself. It is also evident that the important thing for her is not to discuss how she can induce the oldest girl to let the younger alone, or what methods she can use to encourage and release the

younger to greater confidence and spontaneity, but to allow her to focus the problem where it belongs, in herself if she is willing, and thereby, perhaps, to come to a realization of why she has to feel as she does. Is the older child her own ideal self, doing all the things she hoped to do, and the younger, something she cannot admit into her ego at all—something which has to be downed, overcome by the self, as the younger child is conquered by the older? I do not know, because she found the pain and fear of facing her own problem too great and frankly admitted it. If she derived any benefit from her interviews, it was perhaps that she no longer stressed the *child's* behavior so strongly.

You can see quite clearly in a case as extreme as this that the crux of the matter lies not primarily in whether one can accept one's child, but rather whether one can bear certain aspects of one's own self. Even the therapist may be blocked by the presence of certain behavior, traits, or feelings in the parent who comes to consult him, just as the parent is blocked in his relation to the child, if he has not been able to accept his own human nature and has to protect himself from certain unbearable impulses or feelings by leaving them in other people where he can react to them freely, perhaps to condemn, perhaps to try to root out, perhaps to condone. In which case the parent, like the offending child, will probably prove stubborn and unwilling to be saved or let the therapist do it all and take the full responsibility for his salvation. For all of us therapy, like charity, begins at home, in the own self; not that we must be perfect but that we must be able to accept with some degree of understanding our own imperfection. When we have done that, we are also able to bear the imperfection of other human beings, even our own children.

In any problem-child situation we have a constantly shifting dynamic interrelationship of all the wills concerned, the child's as well as the parents, and the emotions which are consciously experienced as well as the impulses and feelings which are denied the right to recognition.

The young child must inevitably undergo much thwarting of his natural impulses in the course of learning to be socially acceptable. Problems begin to arise, however, not so much from the necessity to give up his own impulse expression as from the failure to be allowed to have and express the emotions which accompany such training, particularly the negative emotions. If one is free to feel the rage or hate, is permitted to have them, the need to carry badness over into action is tremendously lessened.

The child who is positively identified with his mother can take on training without harm to his individuality and can even enjoy his new sources of ego, pride, and independence, provided negative feelings have not been so forbidden and consequently so strengthened that love identification with the mother is blocked and we see instead the stubborn resistance to another will felt as hostile or alien.

Bad behavior, as we call it, is quite likely to be the overassertion in some form of an impulse or impulses whose right to exist even in terms of emotion has not been recognized by parents. The child needs human, fallible parents, not perfectly controlled teachers or analysts; parents who admit their own emotions and permit the child to do the same.

Is this really practical, you ask. Yes, I think it can be so if we are willing to go slowly and wait for people to work things out for themselves. I have seen one woman through her own gradual change of emotional attitude and



acceptance of herself over a period of years affect profoundly the adjustment of all of her children, two of whom were nearly adolescent when she first presented her problem. It is true that her change of attitude also expressed itself in environment changes, but these she has been unable to bring about before because they were dependent on a change of attitude. She could finally admit that her boy was better off away from his father and could let him take his chance in a boys' school away from her protection. Her increased confidence in herself brought about automatically increased confidence in him since he represented her impulsive, loved, but unreliable self. Her daughter, she was able to send to a less formal school than she had once thought essential, where extreme virtue and conformity were not encouraged and where the girl became more human and less ladylike every day. The mother no longer needed to work out self-discipline on her daughter.

That such growth in the mother can completely solve the problems of the child is, of course, not possible, nor desirable. The children are persons who must in turn work out life for themselves, but this mother, by taking over her own conflict and separating it from the various personalities in her family, has brought about changes in herself in response to which the children have reacted with a marked increase of freedom to be themselves. This despite the fact that the father has taken no voluntary part in bringing about any change of situation.

The kind of therapy which relies, not on fear, force, or determination to alter the other, but on the ability of the individual to do for himself if he is permitted, if interference is removed, is not easy to accept nor to use, since it works only in the first person singular and offers no



immediate relief, but it has this to recommend it, it is reversible and applies equally to patient and therapist, to parent and child. We cannot use it to control others, but neither can others use it to control us. Perhaps it is only in this atmosphere of safety from the encroachment of another will that the individual in difficulty gains freedom to exercise his own will positively instead of negatively, for the solving instead of for the creating of a problem.



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


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
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